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I. INTRODUCTION
In Lehr v. Robertson' the United States Supreme Court brought to an end the
legal dispute over a New York judge's order that a little girl named Jessica be adopted
by her stepfather, Richard Robertson. The order was entered on March 7, 1979, in
response to an adoption petition filed by Mr. Robertson and his wife, Lorraine, who
was Jessica's natural mother.2 The Robertsons were married eight months after
Jessica's birth in the fall of 1976, and Jessica had been living with them for nearly
two years when the adoption order was entered.3 By the time the United States
Supreme Court finally validated the order, the Robertson family had been together for
nearly six years.
The dispute did not concern the qualifications of Mr. Robertson as Jessica's
adoptive father. Without more, the adoption would have been viewed by all con-
cerned as merely a legal recognition of what was already a de facto family situation.
Complications arose because the adoption that placed Mr. Robertson in the legal
position of being Jessica's father4 also had the effect of removing from her natural
father all parental responsibilities and rights regarding her.5 The adoption had this
effect even though Jonathan Lehr, Jessica's natural father, was never notified of the
adoption or shown to be unqualified to exercise parental responsibilities and rights.
Mr. Lehr disputed the adoption because he believed that its effect on his relationship
with Jessica required both more stringent procedures than New York provided and
more substantial reasons than merely that it would be in Jessica's best interests to be
adopted by Mr. Robertson.
6
Lehr is a classic illustration of the double effect of adoption on parental interests.
On the one hand, adoption legally establishes the relationship of parent and child for
the adopting parents.7 On the other hand, adoption legally terminates any relationship
that may have existed between the child and her natural parent or parents just before
the adoption.8 The underlying assumption of this double effect of adoption is that
1. 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983).
2. Id. at 2987.
3. Id.
4. See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 117(l) (McKinney 1977).
5. See id., quoted in Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 384 n.2 (1979).
6. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2990 (1983).
7. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-117(A) (1974), which declares:
Upon entry of the decree of adoption, the relationship of parent and child and all the legal rights, privileges,
duties, obligations and other legal consequences of the natural relationship of child and parent shall thereafter
exist between the adopted person and the adoptive petitioner the same as though the child were born to the
adoptive petitioner in lawful wedlock.
8. See, e.g., id. § 8-117(B), which declares:
Upon entry of the decree of adoption, the relationship of parent and child between the adopted person and
the persons who were his parents just prior to the decree of adoption shall be completely severed and all the legal
rights, privileges, duties, obligations and other legal consequences of the relationship shall cease to exist ....
See also CAL. CtV. CODE § 229 (West 1982); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.03(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
Lehr illustrates the only common exception to this effect. Adoption by the spouse of a child's natural parent has no
terminating effect on the relationship between that natural parent and the child. Thus, Jessica's mother was still her mother
in the eyes of the law after Mr. Robertson's petition was granted. See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 117 (McKinney 1977),
quotedin Caban, 441 U.S. 380,384 n.2 (1979); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-117(B) (1974) ("[Wlhere the adoption is by
the spouse of the child's parent, the relationship of the child to such parent shall remain unchanged by the decree of
adoption.").
The New York statute at issue in Lehr also illustrates that some vestiges of the legal relationship between parent and
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while a child may have no parents in the eyes of the law, she can never legally have
more than one mother and one father. 9 Any possible parental interests in persons
other than the adopting parents must be legally eliminated before the adopting parents
can assume the legal status of parents to the child. 10
The general subject of this Article, like Mr. Lehr's complaint and the Court's
opinion in Lehr, is state termination in adoption proceedings of parental interests in
children.l" Termination of parental interests is not always limited to situations in
which the termination is necessary to free the child for adoption. ' 2 Because the state
purposes in furtherance of which termination is decreed may have a significant effect
on the way the Court views state action terminating parental interests, this Article
generally will be directed at situations in which the termination is undertaken to free
the child for adoption by another.13
Ordinarily, before the'state may allow the adoption of any child, it must either
obtain the consent of the child's natural parents or establish that the natural parents
child may survive adoption. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 117(2) (McKinney 1977), quoted in Caban, 441 U.S. 380, 384 n.2
(1979) (adoption does not affect child's right to distribution of property under natural parent's will).
9. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNIED STATES § 18.1 (1968). Whether this
assumption is necessary is an issue beyond the scope of this Article.
10. In Lehr the subject of Mr. Lehr's complaint and of the Court's opinion was the terminating effect of the adoption
itself. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text. The state may legally terminate the parental interests of a parent in his
or her child prior to the commencement of an adoption proceeding. In Arizona, for example, if the state establishes the
grounds set out in ARIZ. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 8-533 (Supp. 1974-1983), the parent and child are divested of "all legal
rights, privileges, duties and obligations with respect to each other except the right of the child to inherit and support from
the parent." ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-539 (1974) (emphasis added). See also CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 232, 232.6 (West
1982 & Supp. 1984); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.02, .07 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). The child is then free for
adoption by another without regard to the natural parent. See, e.g.. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-106(A)(l)(b) (Supp.
1974-1983).
The state may also disregard the interests of some parents. In Texas, for example, unwed fathers who have not been
married to the child's mother or had their paternity voluntarily or involuntarily established are simply excluded from the
state's definition of a "parent" who must consent to adoption in the absence of termination of his parental rights. TEX.
FAm. CODE ANN. §§ 11.01(3), 12.02 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1982-1983). Such a father, then, need not be considered at
all in the adoption process. See, e.g., In re K, 520 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975), af'd, 535 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 907 (1976); In re T. E. T., 603 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1980), cert. denied sub nora. Oldag v. Christian
Charities, 450 U.S. 1025 (1981). See infra notes 487-517 and accompanying text for further discussion of the Texas
scheme.
The state also may disregard the interests of some parents other than unwed fathers. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 8-106(A)(l)(a) (Supp. 1974-1983) (provision for dispensing with the consent to adoption of a parent declared
incompetent).
The state will ordinarily require the consent to adoption of parents whose interests are not eliminated in one of the
ways discussed above. See, e.g., id. § 8-106(A)(1). Some states, however, have a statutory provision for dispensing with
the consent of a parent whose consent would otherwise be required, if the adoption will serve the interests of the child.
See. e.g., id. § 8-106(C). In Arizona, at least, that provision has been judicially construed to carry with it a jurisdictional
requirement of a determination of the parent's incapacity, specific misconduct, or inability or unwillingness to care for the
child, all conditions that demonstrate unfitness or conditions similar to the grounds that must be established under Asrz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-533 (Supp. 1974-1983). Clark v. Curran (In, re Appeal in Pima County, Adoption of B-6355 &
H-533), 118 Ariz. 111, 115, 575 P.2d 310, 314, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 848 (1978); Natural Mother v. Adopting Parents
(In re Adoption of Baby Boy), 106 Ariz. 195, 199,472 P.2d 64, 68-71 (1970); Caruso v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 167,
412 P.2d 463 (1966); Hyatt v. Hyatt (In re Adoption of Hyatt), 24 Ariz. App. 170, 176, 536 P.2d 1062, 1068 (1975).
11. The concern is with terminations whose ultimate goal is adoption of children, no matter how the terminations are
effected. See supra note 10.
12. For example, the statutory procedures for termination set out at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-531 to-544 (1974
& Supp. 1974-1983) are not limited to situations in which adoption is the ultimate goal. See ARIZ. R. ADMIN. P.
6-5-6807 (termination appropriate to free child for adoption or to end parent-child relationships when protection of the
child will result).
13. The state may have varying interests in adoption as well. If the adoption is by a stepparent spouse, as in the Lehr
situation, the state may merely want to validate a de facto relationship. If the adoption is by a stranger, on the other hand,
the state is interested in establishing new relationships for the child. See infra text accompanying notes 248-92 for a
discussion of the impact of these different state interests.
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are so unfit that legally terminating their relationship with the child or dispensing with
their consent to adoption is justified. 14 Because termination of parental rights per-
manently and irrevocably severs the parent-child relationship, it is the most serious of
all state interferences between parent and child. 15 Generally, American law subjects
such terminations, whether effected during the adoption proceeding or before, to
great restraint. 16 When the parent whose relationship is to be terminated is an unwed
father, however, the law has generally been much more lenient toward state efforts. 
17
14. See, e.g., the Arizona process set out supra note 10. The term "unfitness" can comprehend both fault on the
part of the natural parent and incapacity unrelated to fault. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-533(B)(2) (termination
if parent shown to have "neglected or wilfully abused the child"), 8-533(B)(3) (termination if parent shown to be
mentally ill, mentally deficient, or a chronic drug or alcohol abuser who is unable to care for the child because of the
condition and likely to remain unable to care for the child) (Supp. 1974-1983). See generally H. CLARK, supra note 9,
88 18.4, 18.5. Unfitness, however, presumes a condition of unwillingness or inability to care for the child without
consideration of whether or not, given parental ability and willingness to provide care, the child would be better off
without the relationship (the ordinary consideration under a "best interests" standard). See generally H. CLARK, supra
note 9; J. GOLDSrEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNrr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS oF THE CHILD (1973) [hereinafter cited as
GFS I]; J. GOLDSTEIN, A FREUD & A. SoLNrr, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CniLD (1979) [hereinafter cited as
GFS 11; Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226; Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removing
Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28
STAN. L. REV. 623 (1976); Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic
Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1975). The debate over the use of a "best interests" or a "fitness" standard may occur
in the context of any kind of state intervention into a family. It is important to remember that this Article is concerned with
the permanent and irrevocable termination of any relationship whatsoever between parent and child.
15. See supra notes 8, 10.
16. See H. CLARK, supra note 9, § 18.5; see also, e.g., Clark v. Curran (In re Appeal in Pima County, Adoption of
B-6355 & H-533), 118 Ariz. 111, 575 P.2d 310, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 848 (1978); Troska v. Kekovich (In re Adoption
of Hammer), 15 Ariz. App. 196, 487 P.2d 417 (1971); Natural Mother v. Adopting Parents (In re Adoption of Baby Boy),
10 Ariz. App. 47,455 P.2d 997 (1969), vacated on other grounds, 106 Ariz. 195, 472 P.2d 64 (1970); Detrich v. Dorothy
H. (In re Jack H.), 106 Cal. App. 3d 257, 165 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1980); Kern County Welfare Dep't v. Delores B. (In re
David B.), 91 Cal. App. 3d 184, 154 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1979); Department of Adoptions v. Daniel G. (In re George G.), 68
Cal. App. 3d 146, 137 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1977); Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1976); In re S.D.H., 591 S.W.2d
637 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); In re RE_W_, 545 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
17. Texas, for example, simply excludes fathers who have not been married to the child's mother or had their
paternity either voluntarily or involuntarily established from the definition of "parent" in its termination and adoption
statutes. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.01(3), 12.02 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1982-1983). Thus, in Texas, such a father
need not be considered at all in the adoption process because there is no parent-child relationship to be considered between
him and his child. See, e.g., In re T. E. T., 603 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1980), cert. denied sub nm. Oldag v. Christian
Charities, 450 U.S. 1025 (1981); In re K, 520 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975), affd, 535 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.). cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 907 (1976). The Texas procedure not only excludes fathers who have not established themselves as
"'parents" within the statutory procedure, but also apparently makes the father's voluntary establishment of a protectible
interest dependent on either the mother's consent or the judge's determination that a declaration of paternity would be in
the child's "best interest." TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.21 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). See In re Baby Girl S., 628
S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982), vacated sub nom. Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1760
(1983), discussed infra notes 487-517 and accompanying text. The Court vacated and remanded upon being informed that
the father might have recourse through Texas' involuntary paternity statute, TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 13.01-.09 (Vernon
Supp. 1982-1983). 103 S. Ct. 1760 (1983). The appellate court on rehearing, however, did not reach the question of the
involuntary paternity statute's applicability because it had not been pleaded at the trial court. In re Baby Girl S., 658
S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983). If an unwed father can use involuntary legitimation, he will be declared the father of
the child if the finder of fact determines that he is the natural father. TEx. FAMt. CODE ANN. § 13.08 (Vernon Supp.
1982-1983). The effect of that decree is "to create the parent-child relationship between the father and child as if the child
were born to the father and mother during marriage." Id. § 13.09. Thus, the unwed father, in the absence of termination,
could block the child's adoption.
Under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), on the other hand, a man may establish himself as the father of his child,
with the right of any other parent to withhold consent to adoption in the absence of unfitness, by (1) presumption, UNI'.
PARENTAGE AcT § 4 (1973); (2) adjudication, id. §§ 6-15; or (3) an appearance before the court in response to notification
of the mother's consent to the child's adoption, a claim of custody, a determination of fitness for custody, and a
declaration that he is the child's father, id. § 24 & commentary. In California, a state which has adopted a version of the
UPA, however, only a "presumed" father has the right to veto his child's adoption by withholding consent. CAL. CIV.
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Thus, many states have avoided the problem in the past by not including some or all
unwed fathers in their definitions of "parents" whose consent to adoption must be
obtained. 1s Other states have established certain categories of "unfitness" that per-
tain only to unwed fathers. 9 Still others provide for participation by unwed fathers in
the procedures that lead to the termination of their interests in their children, but do
not apply the same substantive standards to them that apply to other parents. 20 Last,
Code §§ 7017(a)(1), 7004(a) (West 1983), § 224 (West 1982). Thus, a man who has been adjudicated to be the child's
natural father may not block the child's adoption by withholding consent as other parents may, even though he may be, for
example, supporting the child.
Last, under old Arizona law, although Arizona declared all children to be the legitimate children of their natural
parents, ARiZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-601 (1974-1983), the consent of an unwed father who had neither acknowledged
paternity in writing to the court nor been judicially decreed the father at the time of or prior to the filing of a petition for
adoption was not required for the adoption of his child. Act of May 18, 1970, ch. 205, § 2, 1970 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1047,
1050 (amended 1976, deleting pertinent subsection). Under current Arizona law, the consent of any unwed father is
required in the same way as the consent of any other parent. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-106(A)(1) (Supp. 1974-1983).
18. See, e.g., the Texas scheme set out supra note 17.
19. See. e.g., TEx. FAI. CODE ANN. § 15.02()(H) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (father who voluntarily abandons
mother during her pregnancy, knowing of her pregnancy, and fails to provide support or medical care for her during the
pregnancy and remains apart from the child or fails to support the child after birth is subject to termination).
20. California provides the rights of notification and opportunity for hearing to any natural father "identified to the
satisfaction of the court" if a mother relinquishes her child for adoption or consents to adoption or the child otherwise
becomes the subject of an adoption proceeding. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(a), (b), (d), (f) (West 1983). Ifthe father is not a
"presumed" father under CAL. CIv. CODE § 7004(a) (West 1983), however, his consent is not required for the adoption
of the child regardless of his fitness. In the absence of unfitness, the consent of all mothers and "presumed" fathers is
required for adoptions of their children. Id. § 224.
A statute with a similar effect was at issue in Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). That statute required the
consent only of the mother for adoption of an illegitimate child. Act of Mar. 27, 1941, Pub. L. No. 274, § 3(3), 1941 Ga.
Laws 300. 301 (codified as amended at GA. CODE § 74-403(a)(3) (1975)) (amended 1977). In Quilloin the father was
notified and allowed to participate, but the standard used against him was best interests. Statutes with a similar effect also
were at issue in Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). Act of Apr. 9, 1938, ch. 606, § 1, 1938 N.Y. Laws 1610,
1612 (codified as amended at N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § I l I (McKinney 1977)) (amended 1980, 1983) (consent of mother
alone required for adoption of child born out of wedlock in the absence of her unfitness); Act of July 24, 1976, ch. 665,
§ 3. 1976 N.Y. Laws 1387, 1389-90 (codified as amended at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 1 l-a(2) (McKinney 1977))
(amended 1980) (unwed fathers in certain categories notified of adoption proceedings affecting their children and allowed
to participate); Act of July 24, 1976, cb. 665, § 3, 1976 N.Y. Laws 1387, 1389, 1390 (codified as amended at N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § I I I-a(3) (McKinney 1977)) (amended 1980) (participation of unwed fathers as notified limited to arguments
about the child's best interests).
The New York statute has been changed since the state court proceedings in Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985
(1983), and Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). New York law now requires the consent of unwed fathers to the
adoptions of their children in two situations. First, consent is required if the child is more than six months old and the
father has maintained a substantial relationship with the child manifested by support and regular communication or visiting
with the child or with the child's custodian. Provision is made for situations where visiting and communication are
prevented by the custodian. A presumption of a substantial relationship arises if the father has openly lived with the child
for a period of six months within the year preceding placement for adoption and has openly acknowledged his paternity.
Second, consent is required if the child is less than six months old when placed for adoption and the father openly lived
with the child or the child's mother for a continuous six-month period preceding placement, openly acknowledged his
paternity, and paid a reasonable share of the pregnancy and birth medical expenses. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § II I (1)(d)-(e)
(McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). These changes in the New York law, particularly the changes concerning children under
the age of six months, still embody significant differences in the substantive rights of unwed fathers and the rights of
married fathers and all mothers. Section 111 provides for notice to all those persons, including certain unwed fathers who
now have consent rights. N.Y. Domi. REL. LAW § 111(3) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). Fathers who are notified only
under § I 1 -a(2), on the other hand, are still notified only so they can present evidence about the child's best interests.
Further, notice is not required if the father has been notified of other proceedings affecting the child. N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § I I I-a(l) to (3) (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1983-1984).
Georgia law also has been changed since the opinion in Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). Georgia law now
generally requires the consent of any parent whose rights have not been terminated. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-3(a) (1982).
Consent or prior termination is not required when the parent has abandoned the child, cannot be found by diligent search,
is insane or otherwise incapacitated and unable to consent, or, in relative adoptions, has failed to communicate with or
support the child. Id. § 19-8-6(a). The Georgia statute now provides an elaborate scheme for the notification of putative
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some states do not even notify or provide for participation by some unwed fathers in
the procedures that effect the termination of their interests.2 1 For example, under the
New York scheme, Lehr, who had failed to register as a father who intended to claim
paternity, was not even notified of the adoption proceeding that terminated any
interest he might have had in Jessica.22
Because most states are quite protective of the parental interests of natural
parents other than unwed fathers, United States Supreme Court opinions in response
to challenges to terminations brought by parents other than unwed fathers generally
have concerned the precise form required of the procedural protections that all agree
must be afforded. 23 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has strongly
implied that the state may not terminate the relationship between parents and children
within a traditional family unit without substantial reasons.2 4 Because of the wide-
spread practice of treating unwed fathers differently from other parents, however,2
5
the challenges of unwed fathers against such practices have presented the Court with
fundamental questions concerning the nature of the parent-child relationship. If an
unwed father is ignored or given much less protection in the adoption process than
other parents, his challenge to this treatment forces the Court to identify what ele-
ments in parent-child relationships make them worthy of constitutional protection.
Only then can the Court decide whether the unwed father's interests are entitled to
protection.
fathers and a step-by-step consideration of whether they have the right to consent to the adoptions of their children. Id.
§ 19-8-7. If the identity and location of the putative father are known, he shall he notified of the mother's consent or the
termination of her rights. Id. § 19-8-7(a). If his identity or location is not known, a reasonable attempt must be made to
identify and locate him, and, depending on his involvement with the child, the court will either terminate his rights or
enter "an order designed to afford the putative father notice. ... Id. § 19-8-7(b). The mother is not required to
identify the father, and her name will not be used to notify him unless the court finds a significant involvement between
the father and the child. Id. § 19-8-7(b), (c)(5) (1982 & Supp. 1983). Even after notification, however, the father's
consent to adoption will not be required unless he successfully obtains an order of legitimation. Id. § 19-8-7(d), (e)
(1982). Legitimation is governed by the legitimation statute, id. § 19-7-22, which appears to use the best interests of the
child standard. See Mabry v. Tadlock, 157 Ga. App. 257, 277 S.E.2d 688 (1981). Thus, in Georgia, as in Texas, the
unwed father's rights still ultimately depend on a judge's determination of the best interests of the child. See infra text
accompanying notes 487-517 (discussing the Texas scheme).
21. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. RE.. LAw § 1 I l-a(2) (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1983-1984) (unwed fathers who are not
in the statutory categories are not notified of adoption proceedings affecting their children); UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 24(f)
(1973) (no need to attempt to notify a natural father not identified to the satisfaction of the court); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§§ 11.09(a)(7)-(8), 11.01(3), 12.02 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1982-1983) (only "parents" must be notified of adoption and
termination proceedings generally; many unwed fathers excluded from definition of "parent"; alleged father required to
be notified only of termination of mother's rights). But see Rogers v. Lowry, 546 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); see
also In re T. E. T., 603 S.W.2d 793, 797 (Tex. 1980) (implied that at least some unwed fathers are entitled to procedural
protections before any potential interest they may have is finally terminated), cert. denied sub nom. Oldag v. Christian
Charities, 450 U.S. 1025 (1981).
22. Mr. Lehr did not fit into any of the categories of persons entitled to notice of adoption proceedings affecting the
child. Lehr, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2988 (1983). See supra notes 20, 21 for discussion of the New York statutes.
23. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (standard of proof in a termination proceeding must be
greater than a preponderance of the evidence); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (198 1) (appointment
of counsel for indigent parents not always required in termination proceedings).
24. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("If a state were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their
children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best
interest, I should have little doubt that the state would have intruded impermissibly on 'the private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter."') [hereinafter cited as O.F.F.E.R.], quoted with approval in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 760 n.10 (1982); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
25. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
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For this reason, the United States Supreme Court opinions dealing with claims
by unwed fathers challenging terminations of their parental interests are the most
useful source for reaching an understanding of current constitutional attitudes toward
the parent-child relationship. This Article will analyze terminations aimed at freeing
children for adoption by others. In the process it will explore what the United States
Supreme Court has said about the constitutional interests of unwed fathers, with
particular emphasis on Lehr, in an attempt to reach some understanding of what
protection the opinions imply for unwed fathers who may make claims in the future.
II. THE DEVELOPED PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP
2 6
Only four opinions of the United States Supreme Court have dealt directly with
the constitutional claims of unwed fathers against state action terminating their rela-
tionships with their children. Thus, the opinions in Stanley v. Illinois,27 Caban v.
Mohammed,28 Quilloin v. Walcott,29 and Lehr v. Robertson30 must be the primary
sources for analysis. 31 Before turning to those cases, however, it is necessary to
explain the concept of "custody," a concept of great importance in considering the
parent-child relationship.
A. The Nature and Significance of Custody
Constitutional protection for a parent's right to maintain a relationship with his
or her child does not derive from some kind of parental possessory right existing in a
vacuum. Rather, the protection is inextricably entwined with the parent's constant
responsibility to care for the child.32 The relationship is truly one of rights and
responsibilities. Parents have the "right, coupled with the high duty, to prepare their
children for additional obligations which the state can neither supply nor hinder. "
33
In earlier times, the law focused much more on parents' legal rights than on their
legal duties.34 More recently, however, the legal right has been considered much
26. "Developed" is Justice Stevens' term. Lehr, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2993 (1983).
27. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
28. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
29. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
30. 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983).
31. The Court may soon be faced with another claim in the Texas case of In re Baby Girl S., 628 S.W.2d 261 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1982), vacated sub nom. Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1760 (1983). See supra
note 17 for a discussion of the history of this case. See infra notes 487-517 and accompanying text for further discussion.
32. The Court "has noted that the rights of the parents are a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed."
Lehr, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2991 (1983); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) ("traditional interest of
parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children so long as they, in the words of Pierce, 'prepare [them]
for additional obligations"') (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (Parents have the "right, coupled with the high duty, to prepare their
children for additional obligations." (emphasis added)); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) ("Corresponding
to the right of control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life.").
33. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
34. 1 W. BLA C 'rONE, COMMENTARIES *446-54, reprinted in R. MNooKIN, CtLD, FAMILY, AND STATE: PROB-
LEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILtDEN AND THE LAw 157-62, 169-71 (1978); Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic
Relations, 14 MtcH. L. REv. 177, 181-82 (1916).
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more dependent on performance of the legal duty. 35 Thus, the emphasis of the law
has moved from the position that children are dependent on their parents' good will
for their very sustenance and parents have a concomitant absolute power over their
children to the position that children ought to be cared for by their parents and parents
have a concomitant legal obligation to provide care.
36
This shift in emphasis has resulted in the intermingling of the parental right to
control the child with the parental duty to care for the child.3 7 The intermingling is
reflected in statutes defining the status of having "custody or legal custody" of a
child. For example, in Arizona that status "embodies the following rights and
responsibilities:
(a) The right to have physical possession of the child;
(b) The right and duty to protect, train and discipline the child; and
(c) The responsibility to provide the child with food, shelter, education and ordi-
nary medical care . . .. 38
35. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); H. CLARK, supra note 9, § 6.2, 17.5; Pound,
supra note 34 (development of a parent's moral duty of support into a legally enforceable obligation to support).
36. See generally Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, in THE YOUN EST MINORITY 318 (S. Katz ed.
1974).
37. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Developments in the Law-The Constitution
and the Family, 93 HAiv. L. REv. 1156, 1198-1242, 1351-57 (1980). This emphasis has also resulted in a notion of the
state's own parens patriae interest in child protection and development, an interest so strong that it often justifies state
displacement of parental control of the child-for the child's sake. For a more elaborate discussion of the ideas expressed
in this note, see Buchanan, The Constitution and the Anomaly of the Pregnant Teenager, 24 ARIZ. L. Rv. 553, 560 n.40
(1982).
In Arizona, a natural parent may be entitled to legal custody of his or her child in the sense of having the rights to
"physical possession" of the child and to "protect, train and discipline" the child. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-531(8)
(1974); see In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JD-561, 131 Ariz. 25, 28, 638 P.2d 692, 695 (1981). The very
same statute and case, however, define custody as a status embodying the responsibility and duty to "protect, train and
discipline" the child and to "provide the child with food, shelter, education and ordinary medical care." ARIZ. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 8-531(8)(c) (1974); In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JD-561, 131 Ariz. 25, 28, 638 P.2d 692,
695 (1981). If the parent does not perform the obligations of custody, the child may be adjudicated a "dependent" child
who has no parent willing to exercise or capable of exercising "proper and effective parental care and control," ARiz.
Rev. STAT. ANN. § 8-201(11) (Supp. 1974-1983), and who can be subjected to the control of the state through its
juvenile court, id. § 8-241(A)(1). These statutes are not really sequential, but "proper and effective parental care and
control" surely embody the responsibilities of custody.
The United States Supreme Court cases recognizing constitutional rights in parents to the custody and control of their
children really do no more than make a matter of federal constitutional law that which the laws of the states have generally
recognized as worth protecting. This Article considers the nature of the federal protection given the parental right and duty
and the identity of those who have the anterior right to take on parental rights and duties. Traditionally, that anterior right,
as a matter of state law, has belonged to married parents and to the natural mothers of out of wedlock children. That
natural fathers of out of wedlock children do not have an anterior right without taking special legal steps is implicit in the
statutory schemes that dispense with the need for their consent to the adoptions of their children. See statutes discussed
supra notes 17-21. That they do not have that right is explicit in (1) statutes giving "custody" rights to all mothers, but
only to "presumed" fathers of children-fathers who have married or attempted to marry the mother or have lived with
the child as a father, CAL. CIv. CooE §§ 197, 17004 (Vest 1982); (2) statutes setting out the rights and duties of
"parents" defined as the natural mother of a child and the man to whom the child is a legitimate child by virtue of
marriage, attempted marriage, or formal adjudication, TEx. FAM. COoE ANN. §§ 11.01(3), 12.01, 12.04 (Vernon 1975 &
Supp. 1982-1983); and (3) cases recognizing the right to custody only in unwed fathers who have married the mothers of
their children or who have properly complied with other formal requirements for establishing themselves as entitled to
parental rights, Caruso v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 167, 412 P.2d 463 (1966); cf. Steffen v. Bunker (In re Adoption of
Krueger), 7 Ariz. App. 132, 436 P.2d 910 (1968).
38. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-531(8) (1974) (chapter relating to termination); see also id. § 8-101(4) (similar
language; chapter relating to adoption). See generally H. CLARK, supra note 9, §§ 17.1, .5.
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Arizona, like other states, recognizes that the parent of a child initially has the rights
embodied in the status of custody, but that those rights are entirely dependent on
performance of the obligations that are also embodied in the status.
39
The United States Supreme Court cases give this basic precept of state law
constitutional significance as a paramount governing rule. 40 The federal con-
stitutional right, like the state right, appears to depend on the performance of the
obligations inherent in custody. 4 ' In the terms of the Arizona statute, parents have the
right to "physical possession" of their child and to "protect, train and discipline"
the child only if they do "protect, train and discipline" the child and "provide the
child with food, shelter, education and ordinary medical care.' '42
If a child in need of shelter and other material goods and of guidance and
discipline and other developmental necessities is being given these necessities by an
adult, it is logical to protect the adult's interest in continuing to give them. If some
constitutional protections derive from a fundamental perception of what private in-
terests serve basic public needs, it makes constitutional sense to protect adults who
fulfill the basic public values of providing children with their material, emotional,
and developmental needs. 43 That conclusion, however, does not answer the question
why biological parents get this special protection, nor does it answer the question
why biological parents who are no longer carrying out the responsibilities of custody
still receive extraordinary protection when the state seeks to terminate any remaining
legal relationship they may have with their children. 44
The Court has not given a precise answer to the first question. In Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform (O.F.F.E.R.),45 when
faced with a claim by foster parents that they were filling all the needs of children
and, therefore, should be given the rights given to parents who filled those needs, the
Court emphasized the difference between the traditional family, defined by biological
39. In re Appeal in Pima County, Juvenile Action No. S-I11, 25 Adz. App. 380, 543 P.2d 809 (1975), review
denied, 113 Ariz. 247, 550 P.2d 625 (1981); see CAL. CtV. CODE § 197 (West 1982); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.04
(Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); H. CLARK, supra note 9, §§ 17.2, .5.
40. See supra note 32; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs.,
452 U.S. 18 (1981).
41. See supra note 32. Professor Bruce Hafen has pointed out that the Constitution has been construed to protect
only the "private" rights of those parents who have performed "the public good" served by protection for marriage and
kinship relationships. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the In-
dividual and Social Interest, 81 MtCH. L. REV. 463,553-60 (1983). The quotations are from Professor Hafen's discussion
of Louis Henkin's proposal that requests for protection of privacy interests like parent-child relationships require a
balancing of public goods and private interests at some point in defining the private interest as one to be specially protected
by the Constitution. Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1974). The analysis of the nature of the
parental right in this Article is analogous to Professor Hafen's thesis because herein the degree of protection is defined by
considering the degree to which the private interests serve, have served, or will serve the public good of providing for
children.
42. Asiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-531(8), -108(A) (1974).
43. The dual emphasis in the Supreme Court cases on rights and duties, see supra note 32, makes clear that at least
this fundamental right derives from a basic social perception about the needs of children. The protection and development
aspects of the child's needs come from the analysis in an earlier article on the needs of immature pregnant minors in the
abortion context. See Buchanan, supra note 37, at 558-62, 583-98.
44. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
45. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
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ties and the lack of any required state involvement, and a foster family, 46 and said
that protection for a traditional family relationship has its source in "intrinsic human
rights." 47 While commentators differ on the reasons for denominating the relation-
ship between a natural parent and his or her child as an "intrinsic human right," they
agree that if the Constitution has a place for any intrinsic human rights that are not
explicitly mentioned in it, the natural parent's interest in maintaining a relationship
with his or her child is one of those rights.4 8
Regarding the second question, the Court in O.F.F.E.R. stressed that the "im-
portance of the familial relationship" 49 between parents and children results not only
from the blood relationship, but also from the "emotional attachments that derive
from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in 'promoting a way
of life' through the instruction of children . . . ."5 Parents and children obtain more
than custodial power on the one side and good custodial care on the other from their
relationship. They also form emotional attachments to each other in the course of
their association in a custodial parent-child relationship. Those emotional attach-
ments do not disappear automatically just because the parent loses custody of his or
her child or, according to the experts, just because a parent does not perform custo-
dial responsibilities as the state would like. 5 ' The children often retain emotional
attachments long after they have been physically separated from their parents.
52
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit have asserted that the parents' freedom from state
interference in childrearing is necessary to maintain the psychological bond that
arises between a child and a committed caretaker.5 3 For these writers, it is this
psychological bond that is the critical developmental need of every child, 54 and the
parents' custodial rights to provide for the child's physical and emotional needs are
46. Id. at 845. The Court also emphasized the difference between a state-arranged fostering situation and rela-
tionships like natural families that have their "origins entirely apart from the power of the state." Id.; see also Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (biological family given precedence over voluntary association of unrelated
individuals; difference also in childcare functions).
47. 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977) ("the liberty interest in family privacy has its source, and its contours are ordinarily to
be sought, not in state law, but in intrinsic human rights"); see also GFS I, supra note 14, at 16 ("blood-tie" gives
biological parent "first right to the possession of the child").
48. See, e.g., GFS I, supra note 14, at 7, passim (need of children for autonomous parents so great that parental
autonomy itself is an inherent value); GFS II, supra note 14, at 28-35; Hafen, supra note 41 (inherent value of the kinship
relationship); Karst, The Freedom ofIntimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980) (inherent value of intimate associa-
tions to individuals, including, but not limited to, the association between parent and child).
49. 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977).
50. Id. at 844 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972)). The O.F.F.E.R. language was recently
quoted with approval in Lehr, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2993 (1983).
51. GFS II, supra note 14, at 11-14, 50, 60-62. It is important to note that Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit would give
no further deference to biological parents whose child has formed new emotional attachments (or "psychological ties" in
the GFS terminology) with a present committed caretaker. Id. at 39-57. The Court has not made this distinction.
O.F.F.E.R., 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (interests of longtime foster parents, at least those whose fostering is the result of state
arrangements, are not of the same level as those of a biological parent, even one who does not presently have custody of
his or her child). But the Court has plainly coupled the emotional attachment developed between a caretaking parent and
his or her child with biology as an essential aspect of protected parent-child relationships. See Lehr, 103 S. Ct. 2985,
2990-94 (1983); O.F.F.E.R., 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
52. See, e.g., GFS II, supra note 14, at 59-62. The problem for the authors is determining when the child's bonds
with his or her parent have been replaced by bonds with someone else. For them, when someone else has become the
child's "psychological parent," that person's relationship with the child is the one to be protected. Id. at 39-57.
53. Id. at 3-14.
54. Id.; GFS I, supra note 14, at 16-28.
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merely a necessary preliminary to establishment of the more critical psychological
bond. 55 The Court has not adopted the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit thesis as the
constitutional policy reason for continuing to give special protection to parent-child
relationships even when a parent no longer has custody of the child. The Court's
reference to the "emotional attachments" between parents and children in cases like
O.F.F.E.R.,56 however, certainly is a recognition that the elements of a con-
stitutionally protected parent-child relationship include the emotional ties between a
parent and child, ties that are not eradicated just because someone else may be
providing for the child's physical and emotional needs or because the parent may not
be the best possible person to provide for those needs. In other words, the opinions
reflect the idea that the emotional attachment of a child to his or her parent that is
created while they live together is itself a "public good" making the private interest
that has given rise to it worth protecting.
In summary, the parent's constitutional right to be with, provide for, and control
his or her child is inextricably linked to the parent's duty to provide for the child's
physical and emotional needs. The term "custody" has been used to describe this
intermingling of rights and duties. That the Constitution particularly protects the
custodial rights of biological parents who perform custodial responsibilities has been
stated as a fact and explained in terms of tradition and natural right. That the Con-
stitution continues to protect parent-child relationships even when parents no longer
perform custodial responsibilities also has been stated as a fact and has been ex-
plained as a recognition that the emotional attachments that arise during a custodial
relationship are worthy of protection even when the custodial aspect of the relation-
ship no longer exists. Thus, parents who live with, provide for, and form emotional
attachments with their children perform the social function of caring for children, and
their interests are worth protecting. Under this analysis, unwed fathers who have
custodial relationships with their children are parents whose interests are worth pro-
tecting. 5
7
This method of analysis basically provides a vehicle for defining certain rela-
tionships between parents and their children as worthy of constitutional protection.
Consideration of the extent to which certain private activities serve basic social values
has always been a respectable approach to the problem of determining whether those
activities are worthy of constitutional protection. 58 When the activity is not one
explicitly protected by the text of the Constitution, this approach has been advocated
55. GFS II, supra note 14, at 11.
56. 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977).
57. The following are other commentators who have discussed the interrelationship of performance of the parental
duties with the constitutional rights of parents in the termination context: Freeman, Remodeling Adoption Statutes After
Stanley v. Illinois, 15 J. FAM. L. 385, 414-16 (1976); Ketcham & Babcock, Statutory Standards for the Involuntary
Termination of Parental Rights, 29 RtrrERS L. REv. 530, 531-40, 549-53 (1976); Note, Unwed Fathers and the
Adoption Process, 22 Wma. & MARY L. REV. 85, 97-100, 109-12, 124-27, 131-40 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Unwed Fathers]; Comment, Caban v. Mohammed: Extending the Rights of Unwed Fathers, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 95,
114-17 (1979); Note, The "Strange Boundaries" of Stanley: Providing Notice of Adoption to the Unknown Putative
Father, 59 VA. L. REV. 517, 521-22 (1973) (this student note, however, states that the "better analysis identifies the
liberty interest as founded upon the biological relationship between parent and child," id. at 522) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Strange Boundaries).
58. See generally Hafen, supra note 41, at 553-60.
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and followed by commentators 59 and by some Justices. 60 As noted above, the Court
has consistently and explicitly coupled the mention of the parental "right" with the
parental "duty" from which it derives. 6  The term "duty" stands for the social
values served by protecting parental rights, and the term "custody" and the activities
it incorporates may be considered to define parental duty. Professor Bruce Hafen
used the same method of analysis in a recent article to define various privacy in-
terests, including parental interests, as interests deserving of constitutional pro-
tection. 62 His consideration of the social value aspects of the analysis, however, is
both quite different from that of this Article and wider-ranging.
63
This Article focuses on using the analysis for deciding whether particular private
interests, those of unwed fathers in their children, are worthy of constitutional protec-
tion. The method of analysis includes two distinct stages at which the private in-
terest's relation to social values must be considered.' The first stage consists of
determining whether the interest is of any constitutional significance. This stage
requires consideration of whether what the biological parent does, has done, or wants
to do conforms to the social values reflected in the constitutional protection given to
parents. If the interest is determined to be of constitutional significance because it
serves those social values, the second stage requires consideration of the con-
stitutionally protected private interest relative to various independent social values
with which it may conflict. These independent social values are usually referred to as
state interests.
B. Unwed Fathers Who Have or Have Had Custody
The Court has responded favorably to unwed fathers' challenges of state laws
that treat unwed fathers differently from other parents only when it has perceived the
claimant to be a man whose relationship with his child has amounted basically to
what is described above as a custodial relationship. 65 In Stanley v. Illinois66 the Court
59. See, e.g., Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in PRIVACY 1 (. Pennock & J. Chapman eds.
1971); Hafen, supra note 41; Henkin, supra note 41; Karst, supra note 48; Pound, supra note 34.
60. The best example is Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). Justice Harlan
said:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any
code. The best that can be said is that through the course of this Court's decisions it has represented the balance
which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that
liberty and the demands of organized society.
Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The most recent example is Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court in Lehr, 103 S. Ct.
2985 (1983).
61. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) ("traditional interest of parents with respect to the
religious upbringing of their children so long as they, in the words of Pierce, 'prepare [them] for additional obligations,'"
quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It
is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (Parents have the "right, coupled with the high duty, to prepare their children for additional
obligations." (emphasis added)); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) ("Corresponding to the right of control,
it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life.").
62. Hafen, supra note 41, at 545-69.
63. Id. at 560-68, 472-91.
64. Id. at 559-60.
65. See supra subpart II(A).
66. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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described Peter Stanley as a man who had "sired and raised" his children 67 and who
had lived with and supported them all their lives. 68 Furthermore, no one questioned
that Stanley was the natural father of the children. 69 Justice White, in his opinion for
the Court, merely combined the two basic elements of a protected parent-child
relationship to arrive at the conclusion that Peter Stanley's relationship with his
children had constitutional stature. For the Court, the interest of a man like Stanley
"in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a
powerful countervailing interest, protection.' 70 His interest, like that of other par-
ents, was specifically "in the companionship, care, custody, and management of
his . . . children."
71
By equating the interest of a custodial unwed father with that of any other
custodial parent, the Court effectively eliminated distinctions that had been made
routinely by most of the states. 72 That equation forced Illinois, and implicitly all other
states, to try to justify the distinctions with a "powerful, countervailing interest." 73
In the Stanley situation, the applicable statutes, as construed by the Court, provided
that all mothers and the fathers of legitimate children could not lose custody of their
children to the state without proof in a judicial proceeding that the parents "were not
providing adequate care." 7 4 The fathers of illegitimate children, on the other hand,
were not included in the definition of parents whose children could not be taken from
their custody except upon a showing of some kind of inadequacy, or "unfitness." 75
Thus, the state could assume custody merely upon proof that the father had never
married the mother of the children.76
In Stanley's case, the mother of his children had died, and, therefore, there was
no longer any parent within his household with a right to custody that the state
recognized.7 7 Under the Illinois scheme, the state could place legal custody with
someone else without giving Stanley an opportunity to protest and, specifically,
without showing that Stanley was unfit to have custody of his children. 78 Although
Stanley retained custody in fact after the children's mother died, his custody was not
legal custody within Illinois law. 79 Since the Supreme Court declared Stanley's actual
67. Id. at 651.
68. Id. at 650 n.4. But seethe dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger, in which he points out that Stanley himself
had placed his children in the custody of others after their mother's death. Id. at 663 n.2 (Burger, J., dissenting). The
majority obviously did not take this view of the matter. Also see GFS II, supra note 14, at 60-62 (parents may temporarily
place care of children with others without being held to have waived their protected interests in the child's custody; the
important point is determination of the person with whom the child has a psychological bond).
69. 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., statutes cited supra notes 17-21.
73. 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
74. Id. at 649-50.
75. Id. at 652-54. From the Court's discussion in Stanley it is clear that "'unfitness" connotes some incapacity,
unwillingness, or specific misconduct on the part of the parent concerning the care of the children. See supra note 14 for a
discussion of the concept of "'unfitness."
76. 405 U.S. 645, 650 (1972).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 649-50.
79. Id. at 647-50. The Court contrasts the custody and control of a guardian with the rights of parenthood. A
guardian's custody is not complete because it is subject to change by the state in the interests of the children rather than
upon a showing of unfitness. Id. That kind of custodial power is not the same as that outlined supra subpart II(A).
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custody of his children to be protected by the Constitution, 80 however, Illinois had to
explain satisfactorily its failure to accord to his actual custody the same legal signifi-
cance it accorded to the custody of other parents.
In the Court's view, Illinois' general interests were "to protect the moral,
emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor. . . and to 'strengthen the
minor's family ties whenever possible, removing him from the custody of his parents
only when his welfare or safety . . .' cannot be adequately safeguarded without
removal .. ". ."' Since Illinois did not recognize unwed fathers as "parents," its
legislative goal of leaving children in the "custody of their parents" had not included
children in the custody of fathers like Stanley. 82 Because Justice White characterized
Stanley as a parent with the same constitutional protections as other custodial parents,
however, he treated the general state goal as applicable to children in the custody of
unwed fathers. 83 Justice White assumed the power of the state to remove children
from parents who threatened the children's safety or welfare, 84 but no showing had
been made that Stanley's custody of his children actually threatened their safety or
welfare. If Stanley were a fit parent, 85 removal of his children would do nothing to
further the state's interest in the welfare or safety of his children and would actually
detract from the state's interest in strengthening the children's "family ties." 8 6 The
state had to defend its failure to provide any kind of procedure to prove or disprove
Stanley's actual fitness.
As the Court viewed it, Illinois' defense depended on the conclusive presump-
tion that all unwed fathers are unqualified to have custody of their children.87 Illinois'
support for that presumption rested on assertions that illegitimate children usually are
raised only by their mothers, usually lack a family relationship with their fathers, and
may have no relationship with their fathers. 88 The state also argued that men are not
"naturally inclined to childrearing" and that fathers of illegitimate children in par-
ticular are not interested in their children in the same way that married fathers are and
do not have the same legal responsibility for their children that married fathers
have.8 9 While any unwed father to whom these assertions applied might well have
been unqualified to raise his children, nothing justified a conclusion that these asser-
tions applied to all unwed fathers. Thus, the state had no basis for concluding that the
state's interest in protecting the safety and welfare of children would always be
80. 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
81. Id. at 652. Stanley was not a case in which the state removed the children for purposes of adoptive placement, so
the legitimating effect of adoption and the greater stability conferred by state recognition of adoptive parents as equal in
right to mothers and married fathers could not be asserted by the state. See infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
Further, Stanley did not involve a conflict between Stanley and the mother of his children. See infra notes 225-37 and
accompanying text. Finally, there was no conflict between Stanley and another committed caretaker. See infra notes
280-92 and accompanying text.
82. 405 U.S. 645, 650-52 (1972). Chief Justice Burger also makes this point in dissent. Id. at 664 n.3 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
83. Id. at 652-53.
84. Id. at 652.
85. Id. at 653.
86. Id. at 652.
87. Id. at 653.
88. Id. at 653 n.5.
89. Id.
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served by not requiring proof of the individual unfitness of a father like Stanley.
Given the constitutional stature of Stanley's interest in retaining custody of his chil-
dren, the possibility of error in the state's procedure was too high to justify the
procedure by reference to its accuracy. 90 Further, although a small risk of inaccuracy
ordinarily might be excused because of the inefficiency of always providing hearings
on fitness, the constitutional stature of a custodial father's interest precluded that
excuse in Stanley's case.
91
Illinois' assertions about the characteristics of unwed fathers mostly concerned
elements of the concept of custody discussed earlier. 92 Illinois asserted that unwed
fathers are strangers to their children, do not live with them, and are not interested in
them.93 Stanley, an unwed father, was clearly not a stranger to his children, had lived
with them, and was at least interested enough in them to protest their removal from
his custody.9 4 But Illinois also rested its presumption on conclusions that all men are
somehow different from women in childrearing abilities and that unwed fathers are
different from married fathers because married fathers have different interests in their
children and have a legal responsibility to support them. 95 If these assertions had been
accepted by the Court, it would not have mattered that Stanley had raised his chil-
dren, was interested in them, and had supported them because he, like all unwed
fathers, would have been less able to raise them, less interested in them, and not
legally obligated to support them. By disregarding those assertions that might have
applied to Stanley, the Court implied something about both the nature of the custody
that gives rise to constitutional protection and the conditions that a state may use as
evidence of unfitness.
First, inherent differences, if any exist, between the childrearing capacities of
men and women are not of constitutional significance in determining whether the
interest of a custodial father (i.e., one who is rearing his children) is worthy of the
same constitutional protection that the interests of other custodial parents receive
against state interferences. Further, those differences alone do not amount to con-
stitutional justification for finding a custodial father unfit to retain custody of his
children. This conclusion does not mean that differences between men and women
might not justify state interferences in other circumstances. 96 Second, inherent dif-
ferences, if any exist, between the interests of married fathers and fathers legally
obligated to support their children and the interests of unmarried custodial fathers
who are actually supporting their children also do not justify denying constitutional
protection to unmarried custodial fathers. Those differences among fathers, without
more, do not justify finding an unwed custodial father without a legal support obliga-
tion unfit to retain custody of his children. Once again, however, those differences
90. Id. at 654-55.
91. Id. at 656-57.
92. See supra subpart HI(A).
93. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 404-09 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (inherent differences
between mothers and fathers of newborns justify differential treatment in the adoption process).
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might be significant when claims are made by other kinds of unwed fathers or when
other state justifications are raised. 97
The Court addressed the significance of the alleged differences discussed above
in Caban v. Mohammed.9" Abdiel Caban, like Peter Stanley, was a man whose
paternity of his children was unquestioned. 99 Moreover, he had lived with them,
contributed to their support, and generally exercised custodial responsibility for
them.' 0 0 He also was still quite interested in his children and wanted custody of
them.' 0 ' Last, he had never married their mother or in any other way legitimated his
children.102 In all other particulars, however, Caban's situation differed drastically
from Stanley's.
Although Caban had once had actual custody of his children along with their
mother and had even had sole actual custody for a time, their mother had gained full
legal custody prior to the dispute considered by the Supreme Court. 103 Thus, Caban,
unlike Stanley, could claim protection only for the emotional ties created by a past
custodial relationship and not for a current custodial relationship."°4 The Court never
addressed Caban's claim as one for current custody, and, indeed, New York could
defend its award of custody to the mother very differently from the way in which
Illinois had defended its removal of custody from Stanley and placement of custody
with strangers. 105 Caban challenged the New York statutory scheme that allowed the
adoption of his children by their mother's husband without Caban's consent. 106 The
effect of that adoption would not be merely a validation of the custody already
presumably exercised by the stepfather but a vesting in the stepfather of all the rights
of a parent in the children and an irrevocable termination of any relationship Caban
might have with them.1
0 7
Although Caban struck down the state scheme on sex discrimination grounds,1
0 8
the Court's comparison of the interests of a once-custodial father to the interests of a
presently custodial mother has broader significance for the constitutional status of
unwed fathers. Justice Powell, for the Court, stated clearly that a father like Caban,
who had lived with his children and their mother for several years and had "partici-
pated in the care and support" 10 9 of the children, "may have a relationship with his
97. See the discussion of Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246(1978), infra notes 174-87 and accompanying text;see
also infra notes 265-92 and accompanying text.
98. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
99. Id. at 382, 393.
100. Id. at 382, 389.
101. He strenuously objected to their adoption by their stepfather and petitioned for his wife's adoption of them. Id.
at 383-84. He also contested the mother's claim for sole custody, which preceded the petition for adoption. Id. at 383.
102. Id. at 382, 388 n.6.
103. Id. at 383.
104. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
105. Even if Caban were considered by the state as a parent with the same rights as those of the children's mother,
the most the state could do when forced to choose between two parents with equal rights would be to use a neutral
standard. See R. MNOoKIN, supra note 34, at 475-76; see also infra notes 215-39 and accompanying text.
106. 441 U.S. 380, 384-87 (1979).
107. Id. at 384 n.2; see also supra notes 4-13 and accompanying text.
108. 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979).
109. Id. at 389.
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children fully comparable to that of the mother." 110 Justice Powell made that state-
ment even though Caban no longer had custody of his children and the children's
mother currently had custody and was likely to retain it. Justice Powell further stated
that there was "no reason to believe that the Caban children ... had a relationship
with their mother unrivaled by the affection and concern of their father.""' Thus,
although Caban, unlike Stanley, could not claim that the New York statute tore apart
a family living together, the Court recognized that the relationship established by
Caban's former care and support of his children was potentially of equal weight with
the relationship they currently had with their custodial mother.112 Justice Powell's
point was not that a noncustodial father's relationship with his children is similar to
that of a noncustodial mother, but that a once-custodial father's relationship is similar
to that of a presently custodial mother.
If once-custodial fathers, at least for purposes of consent to adoption, have a
claim to equal treatment by the state with currently custodial mothers, they should
also have an absolute claim against unequal treatment even when that treatment is
based on the absence of custody rather than on sex. 113 Thus, after Caban, noncusto-
dial unwed fathers (or mothers) who have had custody in the past might be able to
claim independent constitutional protection against state statutes that terminate their
relationships with their children even though the statutes do not make sex-based
distinctions. This conclusion, however, does not mean that any unwed father in
Caban's position could, after Caban, claim the substantive protection against a non-
discriminatory statute that Caban received because of the sex discrimination in the
New York statute. The claim would merely be for equality of treatment for all
currently custodial and once-custodial parents. Justice Powell explicitly refused to
reach the issue of what standards might be satisfactory in the absence of dis-
crimination. 114 Caban does mean, however, that whatever substantive standards are
required for the protection of current custodial relationships ought to be required for
relationships like Caban's.
Caban's claim could be distinguished from Stanley's not just because his present
relationship with his children was different, but also because he was not asking only
for the procedural protections of notice of and participation in the state process that
terminated his relationship with his children. Caban was given every opportunity to
present his arguments against the adoption of his children by their stepfather.' '
Caban could only argue the children's best interests, however, while their mother
could block adoption merely by withholding her consent. 116 The mother's objection
could be disregarded only if she were proved to be unfit. "7 Caban's objections,
110. Id.
11. Id.
112. At least their weight was equal as against a state statute that gave mothers the power to withhold consent to the
adoptions of their children, while denying the same power to such fathers.
113. Such a claim would have to be based on the denial to one group of parents of the right to retain the emotional
relationship with one's children that is developed during a custodial relationship.
114. 441 U.S. 380, 394 n.16 (1979).
115. Id. at 385 n.3, 384-85.
116. Id. at 385-87.
117. Id. at 386 n.4.
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however, even if he were a perfectly adequate parent, could be disregarded if the
court found adoption to be better for his children."18
The New York statute, by providing for participation by a father like Caban but
not for equal substantive standards, reflected a common assumption about Stanley, 119
the assumption that although Stanley elevated an unwed father's relationship with his
children to constitutional status, the unwed father's relationship was not of the same
constitutional significance as that of other parents.' 2 Under this assumption, Stanley
required a state to allow an unwed father to present his case when the state tried to
interfere with his relationship with his children, but did not require the state to justify
its interference on the same substantive grounds as used to justify interference with
other parent-child relationships.' 2' This reading of Stanley was both too broad and
too narrow. It was too broad because it assumed that all of the procedural protections
given to Stanley must be available to any unwed father.' 22 It was too narrow because
it did not account for all of the procedural and substantive protections that must be
given to unwed fathers like Stanley.' 23 As a custodial unwed father, Stanley had a
constitutional interest in his relationship with his children that was equal to the
interests of other custodial parents.' 24 His interest entitled him not only to a hearing
on any standard the state might choose, but to a hearing on his fitness because fitness
was the standard applied to state removals of children from other custodial parents.125
It was his custody of the children, not his biological connection alone, that gave him a
constitutional interest, but that interest was of the same stature as that of any other
custodial parent. Similarly, once Caban's interest in his children was equated with
118. Id. at 387.
119. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
120. See, e.g., In re T. E. T., 603 S.W.2d 793 (rex. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Oldag v. Christian Charities, 450
U.S. 1025 (1981), in which the Texas Supreme Court implied that Stanley required notice and participation rights for
unwed fathers, but did not require consent rights for unwed fathers. See also the New York scheme described in Lehr, 103
S. Ct. 2985, 2987-88 & nn.4-5 (1983) (probably the same scheme in effect at the time of Caban). In New York, at the
time Lehr went to trial, many unwed fathers were entitled to notice of adoption proceedings affecting their children. Id. at
2988 n.5 (quoting Act of July 24, 1976, ch. 665, § 3, 1976 N.Y. Laws 1387, 1389-90 (codified as amended at N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § I1 l-a(2) (McKinney 1977)) (amended 1980)). However, their participation in the proceedings was
limited to the presentation of "evidence relevant to the best interests of the child." Act of July 24, 1976, ch. 665, § 3,
1976 N.Y. Laws 1387, 1389, 1390 (codified as amended at N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § I l-a(3) (McKinney 1977))
(amended 1980). The Court quoted from the report of the commission drafting those statutes that the purpose of the statute
was to "codify the minimum protections for the putative father that Stanley would require." 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2994 n.20
(1983). At the time Caban was decided, no unwed father in New York had the right to veto his child's adoption by
withholding consent. Act of Apr. 9, 1983, ch. 606, § 1, 1938 N.Y. Laws 1610, 1612 (codified as amended at N.Y. DoM.
REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1977)) (amended 1980, 1983). Under current New York law some unwed fathers have
consent rights. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § I 1 (d)-(e) (MeKinney Supp. 1983). It appears that a father like Caban would be
covered by current New York law. See discussion of New York law supra note 20.
121. See Bodenheimer, New Trends and Requirements in Adoption Law and Proposals for Legislative Change, 49
S. CAL. L. REv. 10, 53-75 (1975); Boskey & McCue, Alternative Standards for the Termination of Parental Rights, 9
SEroN HALL 1, 9-12 (1978); Freeman, supra note 57, at 386-94, 410-11,414-16; Note, Strange Boundaries, supra note
57, at 521-22; Note, Unwed Fathers: An Analytical Survey of Their Parental Rights and Obligations, 1979 VAsH.
U.L.Q. 1029, 1029-42, 1045-49 [hereinafter cited as Note, Unwed Fathers: An Analytical Survey]; Comment, supra
note 57, at 99-102. See state procedures discussed supra notes 10, 17, 20.
122. See infra notes 321, 329-30 (discussion of difficulties in providing procedural protections to all unwed fathers).
123. The New York scheme described supra note 120 was too narrow on both counts because it did not provide for
notice to all unwed fathers like Stanley who might have relationships with their children, and it did not provide for consent
rights to any unwed fathers. See further discussion infra notes 124-49, 331-76, and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 77-97 and accompanying text.
125. 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
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that of their mother for purposes of consent to adoption, his claim was no longer for
the minimum protection the Constitution might require the state to give all parents.
Rather, he also had a particular claim for the same treatment that the state chose to
give to the children's mother, because of federal constitutional protection against
unequal treatment by the state. Thus, allowing Caban to participate in the adoption
proceeding was not enough because a parent with a relationship similar to his (i.e.,
his children's mother) received better substantive treatment from the state. New
York, then, could not defend its statute by saying that in adoption situations the
interests of noncustodial fathers who have had custody in the past are of less con-
stitutional significance than the interests of currently custodial parents like Stanley
and the mother of Caban's children or the interests of mothers in general. Nor could
New York defend its statute by saying that all unwed fathers, no matter how close
their relationships with their children, are only entitled to the procedural protections
of notice and hearing because their interests are not equivalent to those of other
parents.126 Nevertheless, Caban's situation was different from Stanley's in yet an-
other way, and the Court had to deal with, or avoid, that difference. In Caban the
state had an interest in the adoption of illegitimate children by their custodial moth-
er's husband, but in Stanley this interest was not present. 12 7 In Caban, therefore, the
Court had to deal with New York's treatment of Caban as a means to promote the
state's interest in the adoption of illegitimate children.
New York was unable to rely on a claim that men like Caban have invariably
different interests in their children from those of women like the mother of Caban's
children. 2 8 Nevertheless, New York also argued that the differential treatment was
substantially related to its interest in "promoting the adoption of illegitimate
children.' 29 According to Justice Powell, New York was asserting that a require-
ment of the consent of unwed fathers to the adoptions of their children would have the
effects of "denying homes to the homeless," denying the "other blessings of adop-
tion" to children, continuing the stigma of illegitimacy, and impeding "the worthy
process of adoption."' 30 People might be discouraged from adoption if the unwed
father's consent were required, men like the Caban children's stepfather might be
discouraged from marriage because they could not adopt their stepchildren without
the natural father's consent, and, because unwed fathers are so often unavailable,
requiring their consent could impede or even prevent adoptions of their children. '31
Justice Powell did not question the importance of New York's interest in pro-
moting the adoption of illegitimate children; he did not question the state's interest in
providing homes for the homeless, providing "normal, two-parent home[s]" for
children, or even removing the stigma of illegitimacy. 132 Neither did he address the
issue whether New York, or any other state, could serve these important interests by
126. See supra notes 108-25 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 87-97, 108-25, and accompanying text.
129. Caban, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979).
130. Id. at 390.
131. Id. at 390-91.
132. Id. at 391.
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dispensing with the consent of all parents of illegitimate children to the adoptions of
their children. 133 Rather, having concluded that the Constitution required a close look
at any distinction made between the interests of Caban and the interests of the
children's mother,' 34 Justice Powell considered whether the state interest purportedly
served by the statutory distinction between unwed fathers like Caban and unwed
mothers justified treating unwed fathers and unwed mothers differently. 135 The broad
statutory distinction, in Justice Powell's view, was not justified as a reflection of any
real likelihood that fathers like Caban are more likely than mothers to object to the
adoptions of their children.' 36 Nor was it justified by the argument that impediments
to adoption would be posed by the general unavailability of unwed fathers, because
fathers like Caban with substantial relationships with their children are clearly not
"unavailable." 137
In addition to Justice Powell's failure to discuss whether New York could serve
its interests in adoption by not requiring any unwed parent's consent,138 several other
aspects of Justice Powell's approach in Caban are important. First, Justice Powell
apparently did not think it necessary to analyze the state's asserted interest in promot-
ing adoption by stepfathers and marriage between mothers of illegitimate children
and potential adoptive fathers. That interest, which would indeed be served by a
sex-based distinction, itself reflects an unconstitutional sex-based distinction. 139
More important, Justice Powell was careful to limit his discussion of the New York
statute to its effect on fathers like Caban who have had substantial relationships with
their children. 140 In particular, Justice Powell excluded fathers of newborn children
and fathers of older children who have "never come forward to participate in the
rearing of [their] child[ren]."' 14 1 He distinguished the former group of fathers by
mentioning the potentially greater difficulties in locating them and distinguished the
latter group of fathers by commenting that "nothing in the Equal Protection Clause
precludes the State from withholding from [such a father] the privilege of vetoing the
adoption of [his] child." 142 Thus, in the event of a real difference in the availability
of the fathers of newborns, differential treatment of them directed to their unavailabil-
ity might be justified because of its substantial relationship to the state's interests in
promoting adoption, regardless of the similarity of the fathers' interests to the moth-
ers'. On the other hand, differential treatment of a father of an older child who has not
established the kind of relationship that is promoted by participating in the child's
rearing is justified because his relationship with the child is not similar to the moth-
133. In such a situation the state would not be treating the mothers and fathers of illegitimate children differently,
nor would it be treating custodial and once-custodial parents differently. But see Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255
(1978); see also infra notes 174-87, 225-37, and accompanying text. Stanley does not answer the question because the
state's interests in Stanley were not in adoption of illegitimate children.
134. 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979); see supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
135. 441 U.S. 380, 391 (1979).
136. Id. at 392.
137. Id. at 393.
138. See supra note 133.
139. The interest would be sex-neutral only if it also applied to adoptions by stepmothers.
140. 441 U.S. 380, 392-93 (1979).
141. Id. at 392.
142. Id.
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er's. The state would not have to justify its distinction as substantially related to an
important state goal because a father who has not participated in childrearing would
not have a constitutional interest on the same plane as the constitutional interest of
mothers. Even when a father who, like Caban, has exercised custodial responsibili-
ties no longer has custody, his relationship is worthy of the same constitutional
protection that a mother's relationship receives. But if a father has not established
such a relationship with his children, he cannot complain about differential treatment.
In summary, unwed fathers who are presently exercising or have in the past
exercised custodial responsibilities for their children have a constitutional interest in
retaining the relationship established by their exercise of custody, and this interest is
equivalent to the interests of other parents in their children. 143 The interests of these
unwed fathers are strong enough to require a hearing when the state seeks to remove
their children, at least when other parents receive a hearing. In addition, the standard
for removal in that hearing must be a fitness standard, at least if that is the standard
applied to other parents. 144 Last, even when the state asserts an interest in facilitating
adoption of illegitimate children, fathers who have or have had custody of their
children' 45 are constitutionally entitled to the same procedural and substantive pro-
tections that the mothers of their children receive, 14 6 unless the state can show that
the differential treatment is substantially related to an important state interest other
than the desire to make sex-based distinctions.' 47 Remaining issues are the status of
fathers who have not had custody of their children 48 and the possibility that some
fathers who have not had custody of their children may have a claim to some
constitutional protections.
149
C. Unwed Fathers Who Have Not Had Custody
A year before the Caban opinion was issued, the Court had dealt with the claim
of another unwed father in Quilloin v. Walcott. 150 Mr. Quilloin was the unwed father
of an eleven-year-old boy whose adoption was sought by the boy's stepfather. 5 ' By
decreeing the adoption, the Georgia courts legally terminated any relationship Quil-
loin may have had with his son and precluded Quilloin from any future attempt at
legitimation. 15 2 The Georgia statutes applicable to the adoption had been construed
by the Georgia courts as allowing Quilloin the right to participate in the adoption
proceeding both by objecting to the adoption and by presenting his arguments for
legitimation of his son.153 Quilloin's participation was limited, however, to showing
that the adoption would not be in the child's best interests or that legitimation would
143. See supra notes 66-97, 103-14, 124-40, and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 77-97 and accompanying text.
145. See supra subpart 11(A).
146. See supra notes 98-137 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 132-42 and accompanying text.
148. See infra notes 150-97 and accompanying text.
149. See infra subpart II(D).
150. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
151. Id. at 247.
152. Id. at 251 n.11; GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-14 (1982).
153. 434 U.S. 246, 250 n.8, 253 (1978).
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be in the child's best interests."'5 Georgia law provided that a mother of illegitimate
children and a father who had legitimated his children by marrying their mother or
obtaining a court order of legitimation might block an adoption of the children merely
by withholding consent, unless he or she had been proved unfit. 155 The essence of
Quilloin's claim was that his relationship with his son entitled him to the absolute
power to veto his child's adoption in the absence of a showing of unfitness 156 or at
least entitled him to be treated the same as fathers who had formally legitimated their
children by marriage or court decree. 157 Quilloin thus relied on the aspect of Stanley
that required Illinois to establish Stanley's unfitness before it removed his children
from his care.' 5 8
Quilloin, like Stanley and Caban, had always declared himself to be the father of
his child. In fact, his name appeared on the child's birth certificate.' 5 9 Quilloin also
was not a stranger to his child: he had visited the boy on "many occasions," had
occasionally contributed to the child's support, and had given the boy presents.1
60
Although it is not clear that the child knew that Quilloin was his father, the child
"expressed a desire to continue to visit with [Quilloin] on occasion. '"161 Also, like
Stanley and Caban, Quilloin had not taken the steps prescribed by the state to
legitimate his son.' 62 In all other respects, however, Quilloin's relationship with his
child was quite different from Stanley's or Caban's. Specifically, he had never
consistently supported the child 163 and had never "had, or sought, actual or legal
custody of his child.' 16 Unlike Stanley, the adoption did not terminate a current
custodial relationship between a father and his son, and unlike Caban, the adoption
did not terminate a current emotional relationship that had been created during a
former custodial relationship. Nevertheless, Quilloin claimed that his interest in
retaining his relationship with his son was of the same constitutional significance as
Stanley's and could not be terminated by the state without the same substantive
justification-proof of his unfitness as a father.
Justice Marshall, for a unanimous Court, noted that any father's interest in the
"'companionship, care, custody, and management'" of his children is "'cognizable
and substantial.' "165 Justice Marshall focused, however, on the fact that Quilloin did
not have, had never had, and had never even sought actual or legal custody of his
child. 166 Although Justice Marshall validated the Georgia statute as applied to Quil-
154. Id. at 254.
155. Id. at 248-49.
156. Id. at 253, 254-55.
157. Id. at 253, 255-56. The Court declined to address the sex discrimination issues that might have been raised by
the Georgia scheme because Quilloin failed to raise the issues in his jurisdictional statement. Id. at 253 n.13.
158. Id. at 247-48.
159. Id. at 249 n.6.
160. Id. at 251.
161. Id. at 251 n.ll.
162. He could have married the mother or obtained a court order of legitimation. Id. at 249. He did neither, although
he finally petitioned for legitimation after the child's stepfather petitioned for adoption. Id. at 249-50.
163. Id. at 251.
164. Id. at 255.
165. Id. at 248 (quoting Stanley, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972)).
166. Id. at 255.
[Vol. 45:313
1984] THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF UNWED FATHERS 335
loin by relying on the state's interests in adoption, 167 his distinction between a
custodial father and a noncustodial father indicates that the interests of noncustodial
parents have less constitutional significance than the interests of custodial parents.
Caban's implication that the interests of a father who has never participated in the
rearing of his children are not equal to the interests of a custodial mother 68 lends
support to this notion. Most recently, the Court has distinguished Stanley and Caban
from Quilloin by calling the relationships in Stanley and Caban "developed" and the
relationship in Quilloin merely "potential." 169 Since Quilloin certainly had a type of
developed relationship with his child, the Court's distinction must relate to the special
kind of relationship that is developed by the exercise of custodial responsibilities.' 70
The Court's response to Quilloin's claim that his relationship with his child
could not be terminated without proof of his unfitness also focused on the state
interests served by the termination.17 1 Initially, Justice Marshall identified the issue
as the degree of protection an unwed father must be given when the interests posed
against him are more substantial than were the interests in Stanley. 172 In Quilloin the
state sought to promote the best interests of the child not by removing him from a
custodial parent for care by strangers, as in Stanley, or even by terminating the
father's relationship with the child so that the child could be adopted by strangers.
Rather, the termination of Quilloin's relationship with his child was a necessary
aspect of the state's giving legal validation to the already existing family relationship
among the boy, his mother, and his stepfather. 173 The termination thus served the
child's best interests because it made possible the child's adoption by his stepfather
with whom he had lived for years and with whom he already had a de facto parent-
child relationship.
The Court's response to another claim made by Quilloin focused more directly
on the difference in interests between custodial and noncustodial fathers. Quilloin
claimed that his relationship with his child was the same as the parent-child relation-
ship of once-married fathers who no longer live with their children. 174 He argued that
the state could not require the consent of noncustodial divorced or separated fathers
and dispense with the consent of noncustodial unwed fathers like Quilloin.' 75 Justice
Marshall did not discuss the state's justifications for such a distinction, but stated that
the interests of a father like Quilloin "are readily distinguishable from those of a
separated or divorced father,"' 76 and, therefore, the state was not required to give
Quilloin equal treatment. The difference, according to Justice Marshall, was that
Quilloin had never had custody of his child and thus had "never shouldered any
significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection,
167. Id. at 247, 255.
168. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
169. Lehr, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2993 (1983).
170. See supra notes 65-137 and accompanying text.
171. 434 U.S. 246, 251, 255 (1978).
172. Id. at 248.
173. Id. at 255.
174. Id. at 255-56.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 256.
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or care of his child." 17 7 Moreover, Quilloin had never complained about his "ex-
emption from these responsibilities."' 7 8 Unlike Quilloin, married fathers have had
"full responsibility for the rearing of [their] children," at least in the past, because
marriage imposes that responsibility on both parents. 179 The past exercise of that
responsibility sufficiently distinguishes separated or divorced fathers from fathers
like Quilloin for purposes of an equal treatment claim. 180 In Quilloin the presence of
a custodial relationship, even one that has ceased to exist, had great constitutional
significance because the lack of a custodial relationship alone justified the state's
distinction between Quilloin and divorced or separated fathers.
Although not certain, it is arguable that marriage itself, regardless of whether the
married father has ever exercised actual custody of his child, gives a once-married
father the same constitutional interests as married or unmarried fathers who have had
actual custody at some time. In Quilloin the Court focused on "legal custody" as a
central aspect of the marital relationship. 18 1 "Legal custody" implies a right to
custody whether or not actual custody is exercised.' 82 Further, the Court focused on
the legal commitment to the child implicit in marriage to the child's mother.' 83 The
act of marriage constitutes a voluntary undertaking not only to be responsible for
financial support of children born of the marriage, but also to be responsible for
rearing those children. 184 A married father who has never had actual custody of a
child of the marriage has had a legal right to custody of the child and has had a legal
responsibility for the child's custody.' 85 It is not the responsibility for financial
support, but the responsibility for and right to all the elements of custody-physical
possession, guidance, discipline, and material support-that distinguishes noncusto-
dial divorced or separated fathers from noncustodial unwed fathers.
In summary, two basic lessons may be learned from Quilloin. First, unwed
fathers who do not presently have and have never had custody of their children can
make no absolute claim that unless the state proves their unfitness, they must be
empowered to veto the adoptions of their children.' 86 Second, these unwed fathers
also have no claim to equal treatment with separated or divorced noncustodial fathers
because the past custody exercised during marriage gives separated or divorced
fathers an interest of greater constitutional significance.' 87 Considering Quilloin and
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., ARiz. Ruv. STAT. ANN. § 8-531(8) (1974) (quoted supra text accompanying note 38).
183. 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978).
184. See, e.g., Tux. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.01(3) ("parent" means one as to whom child is legitimate), 12.02(a)-
(b) (child is legitimate child of his or her father when child is born or conceived before or during the father's marriage to
the child's mother), 12.04 ("parent" has rights and duties that encompass the notion of "custody" and that go far beyond
the notion of financial support alone) (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1982-1983). Justice Marshall explicitly distinguished
between the child support obligation of any father, including Quilloin, and the incidents of "actual or legal custody," i.e.,
"significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the child." 434 U.S.
246, 256 (1978).
185. 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978); see also CAL. CIv. CODE § 197 (West 1982) (mothers and "presumed" fathers,
including married fathers, entitled to custody of the child).
186. See supra notes 159-73.
187. See supra notes 174-85.
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Caban together, it appears that unwed fathers who have had custody in the past can
claim equal treatment with currently custodial mothers, and these fathers, like sepa-
rated or divorced fathers, have interests of greater constitutional significance than
those of fathers like Quilloin.
The fate of a nondiscriminatory statute that provides for the adoption of children
of custodial parents like Stanley or once-custodial parents like Caban remains un-
certain after both Quilloin and Caban. Neither Quilloin nor Caban purports to distin-
guish parents who have had custody from those who have not had custody on the
basis of a difference in the minimum treatment the Constitution requires the state to
give these parents. Rather, those cases distinguish between parents with custody and
fathers who have never had custody in the context of deciding whether equal treat-
ment by the state is required. 188 In Quilloin Justice Marshall discussed the difference
between the individual interests of fathers who have never had custody and the
interests of custodial fathers, but he also noted the very important state interests in
promoting the adoptions of children, at least adoptions by spouses of the children's
currently custodial parents.' 89 In Caban those state interests did not justify unequal
treatment of men and women with similar interests, 190 but Justice Powell did not
answer the question whether equal treatment to the same effect might be justified by
state interests. Stanley implies strong substantive protection against removals from
custodial parents on less than a fitness standard when the state argues that the removal
might be in a child's best interests.191 Nothing in Quilloin requires expansion of that
rule to a situation in which the relationship of a once-custodial parent is terminated to
promote the child's adoption by a stepparent with whom the child has been living or
by adoptive petitioners with whom the child has been living.' 92
After Quilloin the constitutional rights of fathers who have never had custody of
their children are also unclear. Justice Marshall, in Quilloin, did not say these fathers
do not have any claim to constitutional protection; he merely said that they do not
have a claim to veto power over their children's adoptions when they have neither had
nor sought custody of their children.1 93 Quilloin was given notice of and allowed to
participate in the proceeding that legally terminated any actual or potential relation-
ship he may have had with his son. 194 He at least had an opportunity both to object to
the adoption and to request legitimation and visitation.' 95 It is not clear whether he
was given an opportunity to seek custody because he made no claim for custody or for
an opportunity to seek custody.' 9
6
After Stanley, Quilloin, and Caban, the rights of custodial and formerly custo-
188. See supra notes 108-14, 174-80, and accompanying text.
189. 434 U.S. 246, 248, 255 (1978).
190. See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 66-97 and accompanying text.
192. Quilloin does imply that removal on general best interests grounds would be offensive. 434 U.S. 246, 255
(1978) (quoting Justice Stewart's concurrence in O.F.F.E.R. to the effect that due process would be offended by removal
of children from their parents on a general best interests basis, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
But that statement still does not answer the question about the weight of specific state interests.
193. 434 U.S. 246, 254-55 (1978).
194. Id. at 249-50, 253-54.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 255.
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dial unwed fathers are firmly established as equivalent to the rights of other custodial
and formerly custodial parents, and the rights of noncustodial fathers who have not
sought custody are firmly established as being of less significance than the rights of
custodial and formerly custodial parents. But if custody is the sine qua non for
substantial protection, must a biological father at least be given an opportunity to seek
custody of his child? 197 And if he must be given an opportunity, of what must it
consist: what are his participation rights, and what substantive standards must gov-
ern? And, finally, if his request for full custody would be futile and he otherwise has
committed himself to his child by taking as much responsibility as he can, must he be
allowed to block his child's adoption by withholding consent or at least to present his
arguments that the adoption is not in the child's best interests? Discussion of most of
these questions must be delayed to part III of this Article, but the last one may be
discussed now.
D. Developed Relationships Short of Full Custody
1. Possibility of a Protected Relationship Short of Full Custody
As previously noted, Quilloin has left open some questions about the con-
stitutional significance of the relationship between a child and a father who has never
had custody but has otherwise established a substantial relationship with his child.
First, Quilloin received notice of and participation rights in the proceedings leading to
the adoption of his child, and he did not challenge the sufficiency of the procedures
accorded him. 198 Therefore, although fathers like Quilloin need not be given the
power to veto adoptions of their children by the children's stepfathers, the question
remains whether parent-child relationships like Quilloin's are significant enough to
require the fathers' participation in adoption proceedings as a matter of constitutional
law. Second, the status of an unwed father who has not had custody of his child solely
because the state has left or placed custody with the mother is unclear. Such a father
may have made every possible commitment to the upbringing of his child short of
living with the child. The question is whether the relationship established by that kind
of commitment comes close enough to the relationship established by full custody to
entitle the father to the same level of constitutional protection that custodial fathers
like Caban or Stanley receive. But, more important, the question goes to the sub-
stantive protection such a relationship receives even when it is not equal in stature to
the relationships of other parents.
If the level of constitutional protection to be given to the interests of noncusto-
dial fathers who nevertheless have substantial relationships with their children de-
pends, as does the protection of custodial parents' interests, on the relationship
between the interests and some public good performed by those claiming the in-
terests, 199 it is necessary to consider whether the relationships such fathers have with
their children contain the elements of a parent-child relationship that have been
197. The biological connection itself does have constitutional significance. See supra notes 43-48 and accompany-
ing text.
198. 434 U.S. 246, 253-54 (1978).
199. See supra subpart H(A).
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identified as having inherent value. Parental interests in children are not protected
because of some inherent value in the biological relationship. These interests are
protected, rather, because parents provide for the material and emotional needs of
children and because the emotional attachments that are created by the parents' care
are inherently valuable and worthy of protection. The biological connection does give
rise to an assumption that natural parents will provide for their children's needs, but
this connection alone is not sufficient to warrant protection.
20 0
2. Quilloin's Relationship
In his opinion for the Court in Lehr v. Robertson,20 1 Justice Stevens grouped
Quilloin's parent-child relationship with the biological connection of Jonathan Lehr
as merely "potential." 20 2 For Justice Stevens, Lehr's merely potential relationship
was so different in nature from the developed relationships of married fathers and
fathers like Stanley and Caban that Lehr was not even entitled to the basic con-
stitutional protections of notice of and participation in the proceedings leading to the
adoption of his child two years after her birth.20 3 It is unlikely, therefore, that the
potential relationship of a father like Quilloin is of enough constitutional significance
to require the state to give him notice of and participation rights in his child's
adoption eleven years after the child's birth.
The lack of a "full commitment" to the responsibilities of parenthood in a
merely potential relationship was crucial for Justice Stevens.2 0 If protection for
parent-child relationships depends on the degree to which the parent has performed
the concomitant responsibilities of parenthood, commitment to those responsiblities
is surely an essential element of a protectible interest.20 5 Furthermore, it is committed
performance that gives rise to the emotional attachments that are worthy of pro-
tection.20 6 Disregarding for now the question whether Jonathan Lehr had enough
opportunity to commit himself to and perform responsibilities for his child, 20 7 his
lack of any relationship with his two-year-old child would offer little evidence of
commitment.
Similarly, for eleven years of his son's life, Quilloin not only had never ex-
ercised the full custodial responsibilities of living with the child or marrying the
child's mother,20 8 but also had never done anything that evidenced commitment to
assist as much as possible in the rearing of the child. He made no commitment to
support the child and visited only occasionally and at his own whim. 20 9 He did not
seek to take on full custodial responsibilities for the child. 2 10 No evidence was
200. See id.
201. 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983).
202. Id. at 2993.
203. Id. at 2993-95.
204. Id. at 2993.
205. See supra subpart 11(A).
206. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
207. See infra subpart 111(C).
208. Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246, 247 (1978).
209. Id. at 251.
210. Id. at 255, 256.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
presented that his relationship with the boy was any more than that of a family friend
or perhaps an uncle. Moreover, there was no evidence of any sense on his part of
responsibility for the child's present physical and emotional welfare or future de-
velopment. 211 Quilloin, like Lehr, had made no discernible commitment to provide
for his child's material and emotional needs, to guide and direct the child's develop-
ment, or to live with the child.2 12 The emotional ties that arise from performance of
those acts could not exist between Quilloin and his son. In Justice Stevens' term, the
"nature" of Quilloin's relationship was completely different in kind from that of
Stanley or Caban. 2
13
The lack of commitment in a relationship like Quilloin's leaves the relationship
without any special constitutional significance. Therefore, the state need not refer to
any special state interests to justify its failure to notify or provide for participation by
fathers like Quilloin in their children's adoptions. A state may choose, as Georgia
did, to allow a father like Quilloin to participate in the proceedings leading to his
child's adoption,214 but it is not required to do so.
3. Other Relationships
Declaring Quilloin to be outside the pale does not, however, dispose of the
interests of all noncustodial fathers. Once-married fathers who have never had actual
custody of their children are probably entitled to the same protections that custodial
parents receive because of the implications for custody in the act of marriage. Mar-
riage implies a full legal commitment to live with, provide for, give guidance to, and
establish emotional ties with children of the marriage. The commitment is legally
incumbent upon the married father.215 For Justice Marshall in Quilloin2 16 and Justice
Stevens in Lehr,2 17 the legal commitment to the custodial responsibilities implied by
marriage gives rise to the kind of developed parent-child relationship that is entitled
to the highest degree of constitutional protection, regardless of whether the father has
exercised actual custodial reponsibilitity. The married father also has officially legiti-
mated his child, an act that appears to be of importance in the Court's lexicon of the
good things parents can do for their children. 21 8
An unwed father can make a similar commitment by taking advantage of what-
ever legal process short of marriage is available to him to establish a legally recog-
nized parent-child relationship. 219 Even in the absence of a legal process whereby a
211. Id. at 256.
212. These are all elements of custody. See supra subpart II(A).
213. Lehr, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2990 (1983).
214. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 174-85 and accompanying text.
216. 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978).
217. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2994 (1983).
218. See, e.g., Caban, 441 U.S. 380, 391 (1979) (removal of the stigma of illegitimacy as a valid state goal in
adoption); UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 4 (1973) (marriage establishes legal parentage); CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a) (West
1983) (marriage establishes legal parentage).
219. Thus, in Georgia, Quilloin could have, at any time during the eleven years before the stepfather's petition for
adoption, petitioned for legitimation of his son. Upon a decree of legitimation, his consent would be required for adoption,
and he would have the same duties and rights as a married father. Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246, 249 (1978); GA. CoDE ANN.
§§ 19-7-22, 19-7-25 (1982). In California, an unwed father who is not presumed to be the legal father of the child, CAL.
CIV. CODE § 7004(a) (West 1983), may independently bring an action to have himself declared the father of the child if the
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father can voluntarily make a commitment,220 he can perform acts that demonstrate
his commitment. He can share regularly in the material support of the child, visit the
child, and participate in the guidance and direction of the child as much as possible
under the circumstances. 22 1 A father who has committed himself to full custodial
responsibility and has actually performed as many of the custodial responsibilities as
possible appears to fall on the side of Caban, Stanley, and married fathers in Justice
Stevens' description of fathers with developed relationships. 222 A father who has
made such a commitment would probably be entitled to the substantial constitutional
protection that fathers in that category receive. 223 The question left unanswered by
Justice Stevens is whether such fathers' parent-child relationships are so like those of
Stanley, Caban, or married fathers that these noncustodial fathers are entitled not
only to more protection than fathers like Quilloin and Lehr, but also to the same
protection that fathers like Stanley, Caban, and married fathers receive.
224
Equating the interests of an unwed father who has done everything possible to
commit himself fully and exercise complete custodial reponsibility with the interests
of fathers like Caban and Stanley raises a basic problem. A father who has acted as a
father to his child as far as possible, but has never lived with the child, does not form
the "emotional attachments" that arise from the "intimacy of daily association"
225
and are an essential element of the most carefully protected parent-child
child has no presumed father and even if the child has a presumed father under some circumstances. Id. § 7006(b)-(d). In
Texas, an unwed father may petition for voluntary legitimation of his child. TEx. FAr. CODE ANN. 88 13.21-.24(Vernon
Supp. 1982-1983). If the petition is granted, the father will have all the rights of a parent, as though the child were born
during his marriage to the mother. Id. § 13.09. See id. § 12.02 for declaration of parental rights and obligations.
220. In some states, there is no specific method by which an unwed father can voluntarily establish his relationship
with his child. In Arizona, for example, the Arizona Supreme Court has recently found that a county attorney has no
standing under the state's involuntary paternity statute to bring a paternity action on behalf of an unwed father, rather than
opposed to an unwed father. Sheldrick v. Maricopa County Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 329, 666 P.2d 74 (1983);
Traphagan v. Maricopa County Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 331, 666 P.2d 76 (1983) (construing ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 12-84, 3-846 (1982)). In Arizona, it appears that an unwed father may petition for custody of his child either under the
state's habeas corpus statute, ARtz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4121 to -4147 (1978), or under the state's version of the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, ARtz. Rev. STAT. ANN. 88 25-331, -332 (Supp. 1983-1984). See, e.g., Webb v.
Charles, 125 Ariz. 558, 611 P.2d 562 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (natural father filed habeas corpus petition to regain custody
of his son from the grandmother and to obtain declaration of his natural parentage). However, both of these procedures
presume a request for custody of the child. If the child is in the custody of the mother and likely to remain so, an
independent method for an unwed father voluntarily to take on as much legal responsibility as possible does not appear to
be available. See Note, Unwed Fathers: Is Arizona Denying Their Right to Recognition as Parents? (to be published in
ARIZ. L. REV. (1984)).
221. Quilloin could have made such a commitment to his son even in the absence of a legitimation petition. He then
would have been much closer to the positions of Stanley and Caban, neither of whom had made any legal commitment to
the care of their children. See supra notes 66-80, 98-102, and accompanying text. Rather, Stanley and Caban had
evidenced their commitments to their children by their actions in exercising custodial responsibility for the children.
222. Lehr, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2993 (1983). "When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood by 'com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child,' his interest in personal
contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the due process clause." Id. (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. 380,
392 (1979)). The father may, as did Stanley and Caban, evidence his commitment by acts other than those enshrined in
state law.
223. See Caban, 441 U.S. 380, 393 (1979).
224. The same protection would consist of equality of treatment with custodial and once-custodial parents. See supra
notes 77-97, 108-37, and accompanying text. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in Lehr, implied that any father with
a developed relationship with his child must be heard before the adoption of the child by another can be decreed. 103 S.
Ct. 2985, 2994 (1983). In dissent in Caban, Justice Stevens had stated that the procedural protections given to Caban were
enough even for a once-custodial father. Caban, 441 U.S. 380, 414-15 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting). It is doubtful,
therefore, that Justice Stevens would advocate complete equality of substantive treatment for all fathers with developed
relationships.
225. O.F.F.E.R., 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977).
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relationships.226 It was these emotional attachments, and not any current exercise of
custody, that seemed to equate Caban's interests with those of currently custodial
parents. 227 The nature of the parent-child relationship of a father who has performed
all of the custodial responsibilities except that of living with the child is clearly of a
higher level than Quilloin's or Lehr's because it consists both of commitment to and
actual performance of many parental duties. Nevertheless, this relationship cannot be
of the same level as that of a father who has performed all of the parental duties and,
in particular, who has lived with the child and established the kind of emotional bond
that exists between parents and children who live together.
This difference between noncustodial fathers and custodial parents results from a
common condition of the relationships between unwed fathers and their children.
When the parents of a child are not living together, only one of them will actually live
with the child on a day-to-day basis, unless a joint physical custody arrangement has
been made. The parents may privately arrange the allocation of physical custody of
the child,228 and in those circumstances the state, of course, will have had no part in
the arrangement. If the state does become involved, it may, through its statutes and
courts, decide with which parent the child will live. 229 Only when married parents are
not formally separated or divorced does the law ever assume that a child is living with
both parents and thus in the full custody of both of them.2 3° If the state decides with
whom the child will live in a contest between parents with equal claims to custody,
the ordinary standard will be the best interests of the child.231
Even if an unwed father willing to take full custody of his child has a con-
stitutional right to equal consideration with other parents,232 a dispute over full
custody between him and the mother of the child cannot be resolved by reference to
his constitutional interests because hers are as strong. 233 The neutral best interests
226. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 103-14 and accompanying text.
228. Thus, in Lehr, despite the father's unhappiness with the arrangement, the mother retained sole physical custody
of the child without any aid from the state until the time of the stepfather's adoption. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2994 (1983). And,
in Quilloin, the mother retained sole physical custody of the child for eleven years of his life without objection from
Quilloin, who never sought or obtained custody of the child. 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978).
229. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANNs. §§ 25-331, -332 (Supp. 1983-1984); CAL. Ctv. CODE §§ 4600, 4600.5,
4608 (West 1983 & Supp. 1984); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.01-.04, .07 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1982-1983).
230. See, e.g., Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 268 Ala. 475, 107 So. 2d 885 (1959) (child of married couple presumed to be
subject to joint control of her parents; court will not intervene between unseparated married couple).
231. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 229; see also H. CLARK, supra note 9, § 7.4. Note that California
establishes a statutory preference for joint custody and even a presumption that joint custody is in the best interests of the
child. CAL. Ctv. CODE §§ 4600(b)(1), 4660.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1984). However, the presumption operates only if
both parents agree. Id. § 4600.5(a). If they do not, joint custody may be awarded, but it is subject to the general rule
requiring determination in the "best interests" of the child. Id. §§ 4600.5(b), 4600(b)(1). At this point, the Article is
proceeding on the assumption that the unwed father and mother are treated equally under the statutes for determining a
custody dispute between them. See infra notes 446-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of situations in which the
mother may be preferred because of a perception that her rights are of a different level of significance.
232. See infra notes 446-58 and accompanying text. The third part of this Article will address the constitutional
rights of a father to establish a developed relationship with his child. Right now, in considering the effect of a custody
determination between two parents, it is assumed that both have equal constitutional rights.
233. Justice Stevens has stated that the constitutional rights of the mothers and fathers of newborns are not equal
because the mother, by virtue of her pregnancy and close association with the child at birth and shortly thereafter, always
will have exercised full responsibility for the child's well-being, while the father must take affirmative steps to exercise
such responsibility. For Justice Stevens, the positions of mothers and fathers are different, not because of state-imposed
differences, but because of natural differences. Caban, 441 U.S. 380, 404-09 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting). For
purposes of this section, however, the assumption is that the mother and father have equal constitutional interests in the
custody of their children.
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standard that the state ordinarily uses in custody disputes between parents may be
open to a variety of attacks, 4 but it is not open to attack on the basis that it denies
one of the parents his or her constitutional right to live with the child and develop a
parent-child relationship of the highest order.235 Thus, assuming equal treatment in
the custody decision,2 36 an unwed father who is fully committed to taking on all the
parental obligations often has no way of developing the emotional bonds that arise
from day-to-day association and are an element of the most constitutionally signifi-
cant parent-child relationships.2 37 Thus, the nature of such a father's relationship is
inevitably different from that of a custodial parent, and the restraints the state may
constitutionally place on his relationship are most likely different as well.
First, the principle of equal treatment for parents with equivalent constitutional
interests that was so beneficial to Caban and Stanley238 will not serve as a simple way
to hold the state obligated to give the same treatment to fathers who have not lived
with their children that it gives to parents who have actually lived with their children.
From Lehr it appears that the nature of these fathers' relationships probably entitles
them to the procedural protections of notice of and participation in proceedings
leading to the adoptions of their children (and, concomitantly, the terminations of the
relationships they do have with their children). 239 The extent of procedural protection
required is unclear. More important, what state substantive grounds for eradication of
these fathers' relationships will satisfy constitutional requirements is also not clear.
Standard procedural protection rules support the conclusion that a father with a
substantial constitutional interest in retaining his relationship with his child is at least
entitled to participate in the proceeding that will terminate that relationship.2 40 Justice
Stevens, even while dissenting from the conclusion that Caban could veto his son's
adoption, conceded that Caban's interest was worthy of protection against "arbitrary
state action." 24 The same conclusion is derived from the thesis that private interests
234. See generally Mnookin, supra note 14.
235. If only one parent can live with the child and develop the emotional ties that arise upon living together, then, in
the case of a conflict brought to the courts, the court must decide between them. An argument that the state must award
joint custody, even in the absence of agreement by the parents, is beyond the scope of this Article.
236. See supra note 232.
237. For example, assume that the unwed father of a three-month-old child files a petition under AMts. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-331(B)(l)(b) (Supp. 1983-1984) for custody of a child who has been in the mother's custody since birth. The
father has done and wants to do everything possible to exercise all custodial responsibilities for the child. He wants to
support the child, participate in the child's rearing, and be with the child as much as possible. The mother is willing that
the father be involved with the child, but will not agree to any kind of joint custody arrangement. Under Arizona Revised
Statutes § 25-332, the court is obliged to decide custody in accordance with the best interests of the child and without
regard to the sex of the parents. One very important factor is the child's present "interaction and interrelationship" with
his or her parents. Id. § 25-332(A)(3). Another is the "child's adjustment to his home." Id. § 25-332(A)(4). It is most
unlikely that a court charged with making a custody decision in the child's best interests with factors such as these would
take an infant from the parent with whom it has lived since birth and place it with a parent with whom it has not lived. The
unwed father under these circumstances, given truly equal treatment, can expect at best an order granting him "reasonable
visitation" with the child. Id. § 25-337(A).
238. See supra notes 66-91, 98-137, and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 198-224 and accompanying text. If an interest is of constitutional stature, it ordinarily may not
be terminated by the state without the basic protections of notice and opportunity to be heard before the termination is
made final. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Also see
discussion in Lehr, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2997 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972), for an explanation of the necessity for defining an interest as one to be protected.
240. See supra note 239. The implication of Justice Stevens' opinion in Lehr is that fathers with developed
relationships have the right to make their opinions known about where the best interests of their children lie. 103 S. Ct.
2985, 2993 (1983). See also Caban, 441 U.S. 380, 414-15 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (developed relationship
entitled to protection against arbitrary state action; best interests standard sufficient).
241. Caban, 441 U.S. 380, 414-15 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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must be balanced with public goods in defining protected parental interests because
the constitutional stature of those interests depends on the degree to which parents
have performed the basic social functions that underlie the interest itself.242 Fathers
who have openly committed themselves to full custodial responsibilities and have
exercised all of the custodial responsibilities that are available to them have per-
formed a number of the functions of custody and are, perforce, the possessors of a
constitutional interest in retaining their relationships with their children. Because of
the status of these fathers' interests, in the second stage of analysis, when the state's
interest in preventing their participation must be measured against their protected
interests, 243 the state does not fare well.
As in Stanley, the state could not argue that these fathers may be presumed to be
strangers to and unconcerned with their children as a justification for not allowing
their participation. 2' As in Caban, the state also could not argue the difficulty of
locating and identifying these fathers as a justification for not allowing their
participation.24 5 Finally, if the state's argument were that such a father's participation
would add nothing to a determination of the child's best interests (if that is the
substantive standard to be used),246 it is likely that the Court would consider the
elimination of the views of a committed and responsible parent who stands ready to
take full custody of his child as diminishing greatly the likelihood of an accurate
determination of where the child's best interests lie. 247
The more difficult question is what substantive standard must be required of the
state when it seeks to terminate the developed relationship between a child and a
committed father who has performed as many of the custodial responsibilities as he
can, but who, because of conflict with a custodial mother, has not been able to live
with the child.24 8 In ordinary constitutional terms, the substantive standard required
would be determined by measuring the state's substantive reasons for terminating the
father's relationship against his constitutional interests.249 But if the denomination of
his interest as a constitutionally protected one has depended on a prior consideration
of how protection of his private interests will further the constitutional values un-
242. See supra subpart II(A).
243. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In Mathews
the Court set out three factors to be considered in determining the content of the procedures to be afforded:
[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous depriva-
tion of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requisites would entail.
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
244. See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 129-37 and accompanying text.
246. In Lehr Justice Stevens noted that an unwed father who had had no relationship with his child would probably
have nothing to add to the determination of the child's best interests. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2995 n.22 (1983).
247. Rather, such a father would be knowledgeable about the wishes of the child, the relationship and interaction of
the child with his parents, the child's "adjustment to his home, school and community," and the "mental and physical
health of all individuals involved." All of these are factors to be considered in a determination of the child's custody in his
best interests in Arizona. ARIZ. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 25-332 (Supp. 1983-1984).
248. See supra notes 219-37 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text; see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977);
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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derlying protection of parental rights, 250 consideration of state interests may not have
to enter in at all.
Thus, if a state terminates or disregards the interests of committed fathers just
because the state concludes that it is best for children not to have relationships with
their unwed fathers, the basic values promoted by such a father's relationship that
defined it as constitutionally significant in the first place should also preclude the use
of a best interests standard. On the other hand, the Court has flatly required a fitness
standard only in Stanley, in which the state was removing children from a parent's
full custody to place them in foster care2 5 ' In Stanley the Court did declare at one
point "that all Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness
before their children are removed from their custody.' 252 Stanley's relationship with
his children was constitutionally protected precisely because he was assumed to be
exercising full custodial responsibility, a basic value reflected in the right/duty notion
of parent-child relationships. The state could not base its action on a precisely con-
trary conclusion that custodial relationships between unwed fathers and their children
are not protected. The problem is twofold: first, one must determine whether the state
interests asserted as being served by a particular substantive standard are precluded
because they conflict with the constitutional values that underlie the protection given
to the relationship; and second, if the state interests are not so precluded, they must be
weighed against the interests in the relationship itself.25 3 The situation is analogous to
that noted by the Court in dicta when it said that the Constitution would be
"offended" if the state "were to attempt . . . the breakup of a natural family
...without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was
thought to be in the children's best interest. '
254
If, however, the state proposes to terminate or disregard the unwed father's
relationship on a best interests standard because the termination is to be effected by
the adoption of a child or will lead to the adoption of a child, the state's justifications
for a best interests standard may not be viewed so lightly. On one side is an unwed
father who has evidenced his full commitment to his child by taking advantage of
whatever legal process is available to acknowledge himself as a committed father, by
actually participating in custodial responsibilities as far as possible, or by doing both.
He would assume full custody, including living with the child, but for the mother's
full custody. He wants to retain the relationship he already has with the child and is
willing to turn it into a parent-child relationship of the highest level at any time that
option is available to him. He, of course, objects to adoption of his child by another.
On the other side is the state's desire to promote the adoption of the child by another
as smoothly as possible.
The easiest way to effect an adoption would be to disregard the interests of the
250. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
251. 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
252. Id. (emphasis added).
253. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
254. Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (quoting with approval O.F.F.E.R., 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977)
(Stewart, J., concurring)). The O.F.F.E.R. language was also quoted with approval in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 760 n.10 (1982).
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father and proceed with a consideration of whether the adoption would be in the best
interests of the child. 55 Since a committed father is constitutionally entitled to
participate in a proceeding that will result in the termination of his relationship with
his child,25 6 however, the state may not completely disregard the father's interest. At
the least, the state must take into account the father's argument that it would not be in
the child's best interests to terminate his relationship with the child, and the state may
terminate the relationship only on a finding that it would be in the child's best
interests to do so. The relationship as described is one of constitutional stature,257 and
it may not be ignored. Furthermore, even if the unwed father has not taken legal steps
to announce his commitment publicly, his open acts of participation in custodial
responsibilities for his child would distinguish him from fathers like Quilloin and
Lehr who did not legally acknowledge their children or evidence any actual commit-
ment to the children. 25 8 Rather, as implied by Lehr, a father with a noncustodial but
developed actual relationship would at least be entitled to a consideration of the
relative benefits and detriments to the child of the termination of his relationship with
the child. 259
A best interests standard, however, is of little comfort to an unwed father. While
a court, mandated to decide in its discretion a child's best interests, may be required
to consider the value to the child of retaining a relationship with the father, other
factors, such as the relative wealth of the adoptive parents, their situation as a
"normal, two-parent" family, 260 the advantages of legitimation (if the unwed father
has not legitimated his child), and the advantages of legally securing for the child a
home with two fully committed, fully custodial parents will weigh quite heavily
against the father. As in Caban, a best interests standard would most often result in
the termination of the father's existing relationship with his child.26 ' That is why, of
course, the father would argue, like Caban,262 Quilloin, 263 and Stanley, 264 that the
state must prove his unfitness before terminating his relationship with his child.
The situation may arise either when the mother has already consented to the
child's adoption 265 or when her parent-child relationship has been terminated. 266 If
the proposed adoption is by someone other than the mother's spouse, a general best
interests standard does not satisfy constitutional requirements. In that instance, the
state may want to promote several interests by the adoption, all of which it will
include in the factors of a best interests determination and all of which support the use
of a discretionary best interests standard. Among these interests are several the Court
255. Without the requirement of consideration of the father's interests, the court is much more likely to consider the
child's best interests to be served by adoption, particularly when the adoption is by the child's stepfather.
256. See supra notes 240-47 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 215-24 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 202-14, 215-24, and accompanying text.
259. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2994 (1983); see supra notes 215-24, 240-47, and accompanying text.
260. Caban, 441 U.S. 380, 391 (1979).
261. Id. at 384-87.
262. Id. at 385.
263. Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246, 253 (1978).
264. Stanley, 405 U.S. 645, 646-47 (1972).
265. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-106(A)(l)(c) (Supp. 1974-1983).
266. See, e.g., id. § 8-106(A)(1)(b).
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has specifically determined to be legitimate interests of the state in the child welfare
context. The state wants to be free to consider these interests at its will against the
constitutional interests of the father in retaining his relationship with his child. One
interest is legitimation of the child.2 67 Another is the provision of a "normal, two-
parent home" for the child.2 68 Another is the provision of a permanent and stable
legal placement for the child with a family committed to the child and by virtue of
which the child will develop the emotional ties that arise from intimate daily
association. 269 Only the last of these state interests is directly related to the balancing
that goes into the definition of a constitutionally protected parent-child
relationship. 270 And, of course, it is precisely the day-to-day association and the
emotional ties arising from it that the unwed father has been unable to accomplish.27
However, the only reason this hypothetical father has been unable to live with his
child and establish emotional ties is that the child's other parent, the mother, has been
living with the child. The mother has been living with the child, not because of a
superior constitutional right, but because of a necessary resolution of an irreconcil-
able conflict between two persons with equal right to a full custodial relationship with
the child.272 In the context of adoption by strangers, however, the very condition that
has prevented the father from entering into the relationship that would equate his
interests in constitutional terms with parental interests of the highest category is
missing. The mother is out of the picture. The only obstacle to the father's taking full
custody and establishing emotional ties now is the state's desire to place the child
with strangers. Because of his biological connection with the child and the developed
relationship established by commitment and participation in the child's rearing to the
extent possible, all of the constitutional values reflected by protection for the parent-
child relationship are met by preserving his relationship and allowing him to take full
custodial responsibility for the child.2 73 The state's argument for power to make a
best interests determination about whether the child's needs for day-to-day associa-
tion with permanent caretakers would best be met by retention of the father's relation-
ship and extension of it to a full custodial relationship or by placement in a permanent
adoptive home with strangers has already been denied by the allocation that defined
the father's interests as constitutionally significant.274
Justifications for a best interests standard that derive from the state's interests in
legitimation of children born out of wedlock and provision of normal, two-parent
families for children neither conflict with nor add to the public interests that underlie
267. Caban, 441 U.S. 380, 391 (1979).
268. Id.
269. Id.; see also Lehr, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2995 n.22, 2996 n.25 (1983); Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
270. See supra notes 49-56, 103-14, and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 225-37 and accompanying text.
272. See id.
273. When the father takes on full custodial responsibility, the one missing element in his relationship with his child
will be supplied. See supra subpart II(A).
274. This conclusion concededly rests on a notion that such a father has never done anything or omitted to do
anything that would warrant denial of his opportunity to take on full custodial responsibility for his child, and it also rests
on an assumption that a father who already has a developed relationship with his child has a constitutional right to the
opportunity to turn that relationship into one of the highest order. That opportunity interest is the subject of part In of this
Article.
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a constitutionally protected parent-child relationship-interests in providing for the
child's material and emotional needs, giving the child guidance and direction, and
fostering the emotional attachments that arise from daily association.2 75 Thus, these
state interests have not already been considered in the constitutional balancing.
Neither legitimacy nor a two-parent home is required for the public good that is
provided by protecting parent-child relationships. Although the Court has declared
these state goals to be worthy of consideration under a best interests standard,276 they
were not enough to justify unequal treatment of Caban, a father who had lived with
his children in the past.277 They also are probably not enough to justify the use of a
best interests standard for termination of the private interests of a committed, in-
volved father who will, absent termination, become a fully custodial father. Too
many alternatives are available to the state that will not destroy the already es-
tablished relationship.278 The harm to the father's established and potential relation-
ship with his child caused by termination is certain and decisive and, therefore,
termination should not be permitted when other less harmful methods of furthering
the state's interests are available.
Last, adoptive placement with strangers creates more risk that the child will not
be assured of the permanence and stability of living with committed caretakers with
whom the child will establish enduring emotional attachments than does allowing a
father with a developed relationship to assume full custody. The father has already
established a parental relationship with the child through his commitment and actual
involvement, and allowing him to take on the one remaining element of custodial
responsibility that will result in the emotional attachments between a parent and child
who have lived together on a day-to-day basis will best assure the child's future
welfare. 279 In this situation, then, reference to the constitutional values served by
protecting the father's relationship precludes use of a pure best interests standard.
Only if the father is found to be unfit to take custody of the child, without considering
the relative qualifications of the adoptive parents or the relative values of adoption,
may the state choose adoptive placement with strangers over retention and
strengthening of the father's relationship with the child.
When the child's stepfather is the petitioner for adoption, the state's jus-
tifications for a best interests standard are much stronger. 280 This conclusion holds
275. See supra subpart II(A).
276. See supra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
278. For example, in Arizona, the legislature has simply declared all children to be the legitimate children of their
natural parents. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-601 (Supp. 1974-1983). In California, an unwed father who lives with his
child and openly holds the child out as his own establishes a presumption of legal parentage without more. CAL. Ctv.
CODE § 7004(a)(4) (West 1983). The provision of a "normal, two-parent home" certainly carried little weight in Caban.
even when, as in that case, the "normal" home was with the child's natural mother and stepfather. 441 U.S. 380, 391-92
(1979). Any unwed mother who is caring for her child alone, of course, is not providing her child with a "normal,
two-parent home." Professor Hafen calls the relationship between an unwed mother and her child a "second choice"
arrangement, but one entitled to constitutional protection nonetheless. Hafen, supra note 41, at 496.
279. See supra subpart II(A).
280. This is the kind of adoption that was at issue in Caban, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246 (1978),
and Lehr, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983). The difference is in the level of the father's constitutional interest. See infra notes
470-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of how these issues can arise in an adoption by strangers.
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even though the unwed father's parent-child relationship is developed28 because he
has committed himself to complete responsibility for his child and has been precluded
from actually exercising complete responsibility, including living with the child, only
because the child's mother is the parent with whom the child has been living.
2 82
When the parent with whom the child has been living is the mother, only drastic
circumstances will justify a change in living arrangements. 283 In a stepparent adop-
tion, when the natural parent living with the stepparent has continuing complete
custody of the child and remains fit, the natural parent who is not living with the child
will not be able to assume complete custody of the child whether or not the adoption
is granted. By decreeing the adoption, therefore, the state will not be denying a
noncustodial unwed father the opportunity to become a father like Caban or Stanley.
Other circumstances have foreclosed that opportunity. Because one of the essential
elements of the most carefully protected parent-child relationships is missing from the
unwed father's relationship and because the state's action in decreeing the adoption
does not itself preclude the father from supplying the missing element, the state's use
of a best interests standard is not at odds with the values already given paramount
weight in the constitutional analysis. 284 Thus, the constitutional protection given to
the unwed father does not preclude the use of a best interests standard.
285
On the other hand, the state's purposes in using a best interests of the child
standard to decide between retaining the present parent-child relationship of the
unwed father or decreeing adoption by the stepfather are apparent. If the adoption is
decreed, the child will remain with the mother, but what already may be a de facto
complete parent-child relationship between the child and the stepfather will be legally
validated.286 The child has probably been living with the stepfather for some time and
will most likely continue living with him in the future. The stepfather's petition to
adopt is good evidence of a commitment to be a parent to the child in the fullest
sense. Only the adoption decree, the law's substitute for a biological connection, is
lacking. In Justice Marshall's words, "the result of the adoption in this case is to give
full recognition to a family unit already in existence."287 The state's use of a best
interests standard indicates that due weight will be given to the already established
relationship between the child and his or her natural father, a relationship that may be
so important to the child that it should be retained even at the expense of the adoption.
281. This characterization derives from Lehr's distinction between "developed" and "potential" relationships. 103
S. Ct. 2985, 2993 (1983).
282. See subra notes 215-37 and accompanying text.
283. See, e.g.. Black v. Black, 114 Ariz. 296, 560 P.2d 800 (1977) (modification of custody order only if material
change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-332(B), -339 (Supp.
1983-1984).
284. See supra subpart I(A); see also supra subpart II(B). Note the difference in the state's role in this situation and
the one discussed supra notes 260-79.
285. The following are other commentators who have focused on the existence of a de facto family relationship with
another as the critical element in determining whether adoptions should occur in the absence of parental unfitness or
consent: Bodenheimer, supra note 121, at 53-65; Chemerinsky, Defining the "Best Interests": Constitutional Protections
in Involuntary Adoptions, 18 J. F~m. L. 79, 86-87, 108-13 (1979); Ketcham & Babcock, supra note 57, at 536-42,
549-56; Note, In the Child's Best Interests: Rights of the Natural Parents in Adoption Proceedings, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv.
446, 468-73 (1976); Note, Unwed Fathers, supra note 57, at 105-12, 135-40.
286. See Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978), for use of this interest.
287. Id.
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However, in the absence of a parent-child relationship of the highest order and in the
absence of state action or purposes that conflict with the resolution of values achieved
by constitutional analysis, the state may, indeed should, resolve the conflict by
consideration of the relative value to the child in retaining either relationship.
288
In Caban the Court determined that a best interests standard could not be used as
the standard in the adoption proceeding initiated by the stepfather of Caban's
children. 289 Caban, however, had actually lived with his children in the past and had
thus established the emotional attachments to which the Court has given the highest
level of protection. 290 Further, Caban was an equal treatment case. Because Caban
and the mother of his children had relationships with their children of equal con-
stitutional significance, the state had to treat them equally.29' Therefore, because the
mother could veto the adoption of the children, the state had to give the father the
same power. Caban thus does not preclude the possibility that a neutral statute
providing for a best interests standard for terminations in stepparent adoption situa-
tions would be valid even against a father like Stanley or Caban when the child is
living with the parent whose spouse is the petitioner.
292
E. Summary
Constitutional protection for the relationship between biological parents and
their children is inextricably linked to parental performance of the duties included in
the term "custody": provision for the physical and emotional needs of children,
provision of guidance and direction to children, and living with children on a day-to-
day basis. Part of that protection relates to the emotional attachments that develop
between children and their parents when they live together and the parents perform
their custodial duties in the environment of a shared home. That kind of relationship
can exist between unmarried fathers and their children, as well as between other
288. A discussion of the argument that retention of both relationships is best for the child is beyond the scope of this
Article. However, that was presumably the result in Caban, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), where the Court's declaration that
Caban, a once-custodial father, must be given the power to veto the adoption of his children by their stepfather ensured the
retention of their relationship with him and, presumably, retention of their relationship with their stepfather would result
from continuing full custody in their mother. Recall, however, that Caban, unlike the father being discussed in the text,
had already established a complete relationship with his children because he had lived with them and thus already had a
constitutionally protected interest of the highest order. See supra notes 98-137 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 98-137 and accompanying text.
290. See id.
291. See id.
292. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text. In the course of this Article's discussion of Caban, 441 U.S.
380 (1979), it was implied that Caban appeared to go beyond a consideration of the gender distinctions made by New
York's statutes. See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text. The implication was that the relationship between Caban
and the children for whom he had once had full custodial responsibility was of the same constitutional significance as any
current custodial parent-child relationship and thus could not be given differential treatment on the mere basis of being of
less constitutional significance, even if the distinction were based on having or not having custody, rather than on gender.
The suggestion made in the text at this point would, under that theory, require closer attention to the second stage of
analysis, i.e., to the state's purpose of giving legal validation to the current and likely to continue de facto relationship
between the child and his or her stepfather. See supra notes 126-40 and accompanying text. Thus, a gender neutral statute
that provided for a lesser substantive standard in stepparent adoptions would survive not because the constitutional
interests of a once-custodial parent were of less significance than those of a currently custodial parent, but because the
state's interests in legal validation of the current and likely to continue relationship between the child and the child's
stepfather were strong enough to prevail over the natural father's interest despite its constitutional significance. See, e.g..
supra notes 215-91 and accompanying text.
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parents and their children. When it does, the unmarried fathers are entitled at least to
equal treatment with other parents who have or have had custodial relationships with
their children.
When unwed fathers have voluntarily failed to perform the custodial
responsibilities that give rise to constitutional protection for parental rights, the state
need not consider their interests because they are not of constitutional stature. Some-
times, however, the father does develop a relationship with his child that evidences a
full commitment to all parental responsibilities, but cannot assume all of the
responsibilities because the mother's interests conflict with his. Such a father cannot
rely on a claim to equal treatment because his relationship with his child is not the
same as that of other parents. Nevertheless, consideration of the values underlying
constitutional protection for parent-child relationships leads to the conclusion that
such a father's relationship is a protected one. Whether it prevails against the state
interests in promoting adoption in a particular case depends, first, on whether the
state's interests in adoption conflict with the constitutional values served by protect-
ing the father's relationship and, second, if there is no conflict, on whether the
father's interests are stronger than the state's. When the father, whether or not the
child is adopted, cannot perform all of the custodial functions and the prospective
adoptive parent can (and perhaps has already), the state's interests do not conflict
with the constitutional values and probably will prevail over them. But when the
father, if the child is not adopted, can perform all of the custodial responsibilities, the
state's interests in adoption by another conflict with the constitutional values underly-
ing protection for biological parents and probably will not prevail.
III. THE OPPORTUNITY INTEREST2 93
A. Introduction to the Opportunity Claim
As can be seen from the discussion of the unwed father's protections against
state-decreed adoptions by strangers, 294 the unwed father's claim frequently will be
for an opportunity to perform the acts that give rise to a parent-child relationship of
the highest constitutional significance. Recognition of an opportunity interest in
unwed fathers requires a conclusion that if the two elements of a constitutionally
protected parent-child relationship are the biological link and commitment to and
exercise of custodial responsibility, 95 the state may not deny biological parents the
opportunity to establish a protected custodial relationship.2 96 Without this opportu-
nity, the protected relationships discussed in part II will never arise. Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit describe the opportunity interest as the interest in developing the
important psychological parent-child relationship by continuous parental nurturing of
the child. 297 In constitutional terms, if it is the custodial relationship between a
biological parent and a child that is critical, the state may not prevent the develop-
293. The term "opportunity" was used by Justice Stevens in Lehr, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2993 (1983).
294. See supra notes 260-79 and accompanying text.
295. See supra subpart II(A).
296. See infra subparts II(B)-(C) for discussion of what the Court has said about opportunity claims.
297. GFS II, supra note 14, at 11.
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ment of a custodial relationship by denying an unwed father an opportunity to have
custody, unless the state provides justifications that would validate state denials of
custody to parents in general. 298 Given the probable strength of state interests in
adoption, 299 the state must at least give all biological parents equal opportunities to
establish and maintain protected relationships with their children. 3 1°
The opportunity interest is the claim made on the strength of the biological
connection alone. 30 ' As Justice Stevens said for the Court in Lehr, "the significance
of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no
other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. '"302 Claims for
constitutional protection generally have been unsuccessful when the claimant has
lacked a biological connection. 30 3 However, because only some special kinds of
parent-child relationships are of constitutional significance and all of those special
relationships require more than a biological connection, 304 the success of the opportu-
nity claim depends on the kind of parent-child relationship the unwed father wants to
or can establish.
30 5
Further, the timing of the opportunity claim may be of utmost importance. In
Lehr the natural father, who had not established a developed relationship with his
child in the two years of her life,30 6 was in effect complaining that the state's failure
to provide for his participation in the proceedings leading to her adoption by her
stepfather cut off his opportunity to establish a protected relationship with his
child.30 7 In response, the Court referred to the state's statutory method for fathers like
Lehr to make their desires to establish relationships with their children known to the
state.30 8 Lehr had never taken advantage of that opportunity. 30 9 Lehr's argument,
298. Justifications would consist of, for example, a finding of unfitness, see supra notes 74-75 and accompanying
text, or a finding that the child's best interests precluded custody in a situation in which parents of equal right are both
seeking custody. See supra notes 225-37 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 267-71, 286-88, and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 95-137, 174-92, 215-39, and accompanying text. Justice Stevens has said in dissent that the
mothers and fathers of newborn children have naturally different relationships with their children, and, therefore, the state
may take account of those differences when it seeks to promote the adoption of newborn children because the distinctions
are innate, rather than state-imposed. Caban, 441 U.S. 380, 404-07 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, that
distinction would appear to take no account of an opportunity interest arising by virtue of the biological link alone, and it is
that interest to which Justice Stevens appeared to be referring in his majority opinion in Lehr, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2993
(1983), and which is the subject of the rest of this Article.
301. In the constitutional analysis, the biological claim is the one aspect that seems to hold regardless of various
public benefits. See supra subpart n(A). Biological parents who do good things for their children have constitutionally
protected interests in maintaining their relationships with their children. Others who perform the same functions do not
receive the same protections. See supra notes 44-48; see also GFS I, supra note 14, at 16 ("The so-called blood-tie gives
them first right to the possession of the child."). The biological aspect of the natural parent's right, then, does not require
a balancing between private interests and public goods. But see Hafen, supra note 41, at 473-507 (kinship itself of value,
although kinship relationships within traditional marriage are preferred).
302. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2993 (1983).
303. See supra note 301.
304. See supra subpart II(A).
305. See infra notes 412-40 and accompanying text.
306. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2987-89 (1983).
307. Id. at 2985, 2990.
308. Id. at 2994-95.
309. Id. at 2998. Lehr could have simply registered himself as a person interested in claiming paternity of the child.
He would then have received notice of and participation rights in the adoption proceedings. The categories of fathers
entitled to notice are set out in Lehr. Id. at 2988 n.5 (quoting N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 11-a(2) (McKinney 1977 & Supp.
1983-1984)). The quoted statute makes plain that fathers receiving notice were entitled only to present their view of the
child's best interests. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § I 11-a(4) (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1983-1984).
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however, was not that the state had always precluded him from evidencing his
commitment and establishing a relationship, but that the state's decree of adoption
without considering his interests now denied him any opportunity to establish a
relationship with his daughter. 3 ° The Court's denial of Lehr's claim was based as
much on the timing of his claim as on the adequacy of the procedures afforded by
New York to unwed fathers who want to develop relationships with their children.
311
The point in time at which the state acts to preclude the natural father from ever
turning his "inchoate interest in establishing a relationship' '3 12 into an actual
relationship has a great impact on the decision whether or not the state has acted in
violation of the Constitution.
An opportunity claim may be made when a child is a newborn or many years
later.3 13 It may be made for opportunity to increase an already developed
relationship 31 4 or for opportunity to establish a relationship. 3 5 The timing of the
claim and the exact nature of the relationship that the father wants to establish are the
essential considerations underlying this Article's conclusions about whether opportu-
nity interests should receive constitutional protection against state action that will
curtail them. 3 16 Denial of an opportunity claim followed by termination or adoption
will be permanent and irrevocable. 317 Without the opportunity to develop a signifi-
cant parent-child relationship, the unwed biological father will never achieve the kind
of constitutionally significant relationship Caban and Stanley had with their children.
When it is the state that denies the opportunity, it may, by its denial, be impermissi-
bly interfering with constitutional rights.
B. Stanley and the Opportunity Interest
1. Stanley's Message
While Stanley318 dealt specifically with the interests of an unwed father in
maintaining his already existing custodial relationship with his children, 31 9 the logic
of the theory underlying the case and some of the Court's language support a conclu-
sion that any unwed father must be given the opportunity at least to claim custody of
his children and to demonstrate his qualifications for custody. Footnote nine of the
opinion is the source of this argument:
We note in passing that the incremental cost of offering unwed fathers an opportunity
for individualized hearings on fitness appears to be minimal. If unwed fathers, in the
main, do not care about the disposition of their children, they will not appear to demand
hearings. If they do care, under the scheme here held invalid, Illinois would admittedly at
310. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
311. See infra notes 377-411 and accompanying text; see also 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2995 n.23 (1983) (Justice Stevens
referred to the adoption petition (and decree) as analogous to the running of a statute of limitations).
312. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2995 (1983).
313. See infra notes 377-411 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 265-79 and accompanying text.
315. See infra subparts III(B)-(C).
316. See id.
317. See supra notes 4-25 and accompanying text.
318. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
319. See supra notes 66-97 and accompanying text.
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some later time have to afford them a properly focused hearing in a custody or adoption
proceeding.
Extending opportunity for hearing to unwed fathers who desire and claim com-
petence to care for their children creates no constitutional or procedural obstacle to
foreclosing those unwed fathers who are not so inclined. The Illinois law . . . provides
for personal service, notice by certified mail, or for notice by publication . . . .Unwed
fathers who do not promptly respond cannot complain if their children are declared wards
of the state. Those who do respond retain the burden of proving their fatherhood. 320
The language of this footnote has been construed consistently as a requirement that
the procedural protections of notice and hearing be extended not only to fathers who
have already established relationships with their children, but also to fathers who
have not yet established relationships with their children and now want to do so.
321
Much of the debate over Stanley has concerned the requisite form of procedural
protections it offers fathers who do not have existing relationships with their
children. 32
2
Footnote nine, however, does not talk only about procedural protections for
unwed fathers; it also posits a right to a "hearing on fitness" for unwed fathers "who
desire and claim competence to care for their children." 323 That language indicates
that a father who wants custody of his children, whether or not he has or has had
custody, must be given the opportunity to demonstrate his basic competence to do so,
not just an opportunity to argue that the children's best interests require placement
with him.
Lehr,324 while limiting the broadest reach of possible protection for the opportu-
nity interest, does not raise doubt about its viability as a constitutionally significant
interest. In fact, Justice Stevens declared:
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an
opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he
grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future,
he may enjoy the blessings of the parent/child relationship and make uniquely valuable
contributions to the child's development. 325
Lehr is important, not because it declares that there is no constitutionally protected
opportunity interest, but because it limits the situations in which the state must take
account of a father with only an opportunity interest. Thus, Lehr must be analyzed at
length for an understanding of the nature and strength of the unwed father's interest in
developing a protectible relationship with his children.
320. 405 U.S. 645, 657 n.9 (1972).
321. See, e.g., Barron, Notice to the Unwed Father and Termination of Parental Rights: Implementing Stanley v.
Illinois, 9 FAm. L.Q. 527, 528 (1975); Bodenheimer, supra note 121, at 53-56; Note, Unwed Fathers: An Analytical
Survey, supra note 121, at 1045-47; Note, Unwed Fathers, supra note 57, at 127-40; Comment, supra note 57, at
99-101.
322. See, e.g., Bodenheimer, supra note 121, at 62-76; Barron, supra note 321.
323. 405 U.S. 645, 657 n.9 (1972).
324. 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983).
325. Id. at 2993-94.
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2. Stanley and Participation Rights
As mentioned above, most of the debate over Stanley has concerned the apparent
requirement in footnote nine that the state must attempt to notify all unwed fathers of
proceedings, including adoption proceedings, affecting their actual or potential rela-
tionships with their children. 326 This requirement is derived from the elementary rule
that the state may not cut off people's constitutional (or state-granted) interests
without letting them know of its proposed action so that they may have an opportunity
to argue against the loss of their interests. 327 If a father has a viable opportunity
interest in establishing a relationship with his child, the state may not terminate his
interest by decreeing adoption without giving the father an opportunity to make his
claim.
Although some unwed fathers may not have any continuing interest in their
actual or potential relationships with their children, the rule requires that the fathers
be notified unless official evidence of their lack of interest exists. Examples of
official evidence are a prior adjudication that the putative father is not the child's
father, adjudication terminating the father's interest, a properly executed consent to
adoption, and a waiver of interest. 328 Most of the debate has focused not on the
general requirement of notice but on what constitutes a reasonable attempt at notice.
It is a basic rule that the state is not bound to notify in fact when actual notice is
impossible. 329 Further, as a corollary, several commentators have argued that no
attempt at notice need be made when the attempt would be futile. 330
326. See supra notes 320-22 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 240-47 and accompanying text.
328. Thus, the California scheme requires consideration of an alleged father's parental rights (and consequent
notification of all men identified as possible fathers) unless the alleged father has, in writing, denied paternity, waived his
right to notice, voluntarily relinquished the child for adoption, or consented to adoption, or unless the man's relationship
with the child has been terminated or determined not to exist. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(b) (West 1983). Because California
does not require notification of truly unknown or unlocatable fathers, id. § 7017(a)(1), (f), no notification, even the
spurious notice afforded by publication, will be given to some fathers.
Perhaps Arizona's scheme is more nearly in conformity with this "ordinary" rule. See ARiZ. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 8-111, -535 (Supp. 1974-1983); ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1), (e)(3). In Arizona an attempt has to be made to notify even
truly unknown fathers.
The Uniform Parentage Act does not require notification of truly unknown fathers, but it does require notification of
an identified but unloeated father via provisions for the constructive notice of publication. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 24(f)
(1973).
A scheme like Arizona's may be of little effect because it lacks any procedure for formal inquiry of the mother about
the father's identity or location. ARiZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-107 (Supp. 1974-1983) (formal requirements for mother's
consent do not include identification of father). The Uniform Parentage Act requires the testimony of the mother, under
oath, about the father's identity and whereabouts. See UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT §§ 10(b), 24(b) (1973); see also Barron,
supra note 321, at 535-39; Krause, Uniform Parentage Act, 8 FAM. L.Q. 1, 18 (1974).
329. See. e.g., Barron, supra note 321, at 528 (construing footnote 9 of Stanley to require that the unwed father be
notified of custody and adoption proceedings), 544-45 (notice by publication may be the only reasonable way to notify
many unwed fathers although the likelihood of actual notification via publication is remote). Barron's approach to
notification is in line with the language of footnote 9 since Justice White referred to the availability of publication.
Stanley, 405 U.S. 645, 657 n.9 (1972). Further, this approach is in line, as Professor Barron notes, with Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), in which the Court said that a reasonable attempt at notice must
be made, but that actual notice need not be accomplished if it is futile because of the state's strong interest in the final
resolution of legal disputes. Id. at 317. In Mullane the Court stated that publication was a reasonable attempt at notice of
persons whose locations or identities were unknown. Id. Publication was also a reasonable attempt at notification of
unlocatable or unknowable persons. Id. In the adoption situation, the state's strong interest in achieving the placement of
children in stable and secure adoptive homes clearly precludes a requirement of actual notice when any attempt at such
notice is futile. See Note, Unwed Fathers, supra note 57, at 98 (construing the Supreme Court cases to require notifica-
tion), 129-31 (flexibility in forms of notice to accommodate state's interest in adoptive placement).
330. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 24(t) (1973) (no need for notice if probable father's identity is unknown
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C. Lehr and the Opportunity Interest
1. Lehr and Participation Rights
Consideration of what constitutes a reasonable attempt at notice is beyond the
scope of this Article. Whether the state has some type of notice obligation, however,
is central to the issue addressed by this Article, for if the state is freed from the
obligation to make a reasonable attempt at notification, it perforce is freed from the
obligation to consider the substantive interests of the unwed father in the proceeding
and notice unlikely to be achieved by publication); CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(0 (West 1983) (notice only to identified
fathers; publication not required); Barron, supra note 321, at 545 (decision not to attempt notification, even via publica-
tion, should be left to discretion of the judge when the father is unknown); Bodenheimer, supra note 121, at 62-64
(footnote nine's reference to notice by publication was dictum; no attempt at notice of the unknown father should be
required in some circumstances); Note, Strange Boundaries, supra note 57, at 530 ("reasonable to permit self-
information as the unknown putative father's sole means of notice").
The first step in the analysis leading to these conclusions is Mullane's statement that actual notice is not always a
constitutional requirement, but that the requirement is to make a reasonable attempt at notice. 339 U.S. 306, 314-15
(1950). What is reasonable depends on a balancing of the individual's interest in notice against the state's interest in
resolving the particular dispute. Id. at 314. Whatever balance may be struck in a particular situation, the notice require-
ment of procedural due process will not be construed to "place impossible or impractical obstacles" in the way of final
resolutions of legal disputes. Id. at 313-14. In Mullane the Court used that line of reasoning as a justification for
publication (which is essentially futile), however, rather than as a justification for no attempt at notice. Id. at 309.
The second step taken by the commentators is to refer to the other interests affected by requiring notice by publication
and employ a balancing process that results in no requirement of notice or any attempt at notice in some circumstances.
See Barron, supra note 321, at 536-54; Bodenheimer, supra note 121, at 63; Note, Strange Boundaries, supra note 57, at
523-27. The unique interests that these commentators put forward as weighing against the unwed father's right to notice
are (1) the mother's privacy interest both in not identifying the father and in not having her name included in a publication
of notice; (2) the child's interest in not being publicly declared illegitimate; and (3) the state's interests in facilitating
adoption without the burden of having to make futile notification attempts, in not having to force the mother to identify the
father, in not putting the mother's name in the published notice, and in not having to publish the child's name as part of the
notice. See Barron, supra note 321, at 536-54; Bodenheimer, supra note 121, at 63; Note, Strange Boundaries, supra
note 57, at 523-27.
It seems to this author that Mullane stands for the proposition that, individual interests aside, the state must make its
best effort to notify, even if that means publication, unless that attempt will totally frustrate the state's interest in resolving
the issues placed before it for resolution. The state's compelling interest in adoption is in achieving the permanent
placement of the child. Clearly, an actual notice requirement would frustrate that goal in many cases. The question is
whether a requirement of an attempt at notice would possibly frustrate that goal. If constructive notice requires publication
of the mother's name, she might refuse to consent to adoption and still be unwilling or unable to provide a home for the
child. The state might not be able to achieve its compelling goal of resolving the status of the child and giving him or her
the stability and security of a permanent home. Further, constructive notice to an unknown father without the mother's
name would surely be an exercise in futility. This seems to be the argument advanced in favor of not requiring any notice
to a father whose identity is either unknown to everyone, including the mother, or unknown because the mother is
unwilling to provide his name. Bodenheimer, supra note 121, at 62-65; Note, Strange Boundaries, supra note 57, at
527-31. Professor Barron would leave questions of notification by publication, including whether to include the mother's
name in the publication, to the discretion of the trial judge in such instances. Barron, supra note 321, at 543.
This argument does not support a conclusion that publication may be dispensed with as the only reasonable way to
notify an identified but unlocated father. The California statute provides that publication need never be required as a form
of notice and that the court may, in its discretion, dispense with notice to an identified but unlocated father. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 7017(0 (West 1983). The state's reliance on an argument that a mother might not consent to adoption if she knew
the father's name, although not her own, were going to be published in conjunction with the adoption proceedings is very
close to an argument that she might not consent if she knew that a known and located father was going to be notified by
means of personal service or registered mail. If an unwed father has any right to notice, it is difficult to accept an argumant
that his right is outweighed by the state's interest in facilitating smooth adoptions by catering to the unwed mother's desire
that the unwed father not be involved. See Note, Strange Boundaries, supra note 57, at 523 (interest of unwed custodial
father in the adoption context is like the father's interest in Stanley because it entails the interest of a biological father in
the "future companionship and enjoyment of his children"), 524-27 (because of the competing social interests in
adoption and perhaps the mother's independent privacy interest, procedural due process does not require any notice or
state attempt at notice to unidentified unwed fathers, whether lack of identity results from mother's own lack of knowledge
or her refusal to identify).
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of which he is not notified. 33 ' In Lehr the Court declared that the State of New York
was not required to notify Jonathan Lehr of or allow him to participate in the proceed-
ing leading to the adoption of his child. 331 Clearly, the state decree of adoption would
permanently sever any opportunity for Lehr to establish a protectible relationship
with his child. 333 The Court considered Lehr to be a father who had failed to commit
himself to his daughter, either by taking advantage of the process provided 334 or by
actually taking enough parental responsibility for her, given the circumstances, to
evidence commitment and significant participation in the parental responsibilities.
335
The state need not give such a father the power to veto his child's adoption, nor must
the state even consider the father's actual or potential relationship with the child as a
factor in determining whether adoption is in the best interests of the child. 336
That conclusion rested, however, upon an assumption that the official evidence
justified the determination that Lehr was an uncommitted father. Unlike the situation
in Quilloin,337 the State of New York had little certain evidence that Lehr was such a
father. There was no prior termination decree, official waiver of interest, or formal
consent to the adoption. 338 Without giving Lehr an opportunity to argue that he was a
committed or participating father, the court hearing the adoption petition would have
only the uncontroverted statements of the adoption petitioners, who, in Lehr's case,
were certainly not neutral or even very reliable sources of information. 339 Even if the
official facts that Lehr had not taken advantage of the legal process to establish
himself as interested 340 and was not currently living with his daughter 34 1 were enough
to establish a lack of a developed relationship, 342 they surely were not enough to
33 1. Certainly an adoption would proceed with ease if the only possible objector did not have to be informed of it. In
the same way, legal resolution of a dispute over property would proceed with ease if one of two disputants did not have to
be informed of the legal proceeding.
332. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2987, 2994-95 (1983).
333. See supra notes 1-17 and accompanying text.
334. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2987-88, 2995 (1983).
335. Id. at 2987, 2992-93. Lehr had not supported his child, had not had custody of her, had not participated in any
way in her rearing, and had seen her only a few times in her life. Id. at 2987-89. As Justice White pointed out, Lehr
consistently tried to take on responsibility for his child; his failure was not caused by his lack of effort, but by the mother's
lack of cooperation. Id. at 2997-98 (White, J., dissenting).
336. See supra notes 201-14 and accompanying text.
337. 434 U.S. 246 (1978); see supra notes 201-14 and accompanying text.
338. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
339. The mother and stepfather would plainly be interested in not having Lehr present in the adoption proceedings.
Further, it appears that they did not inform the judge hearing the adoption petition of Lehr's continuing attempts to
establish a relationship with the child since the court did not learn of Lehr's continuing interest until after he filed a
paternity petition. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2988-89 (1983). It was only when Lehr received notice of a change of venue motion
for his paternity proceeding that he even knew of the adoption proceeding, id. at 2989, and thejudge hearing the adoption
proceeding entered the decree of adoption four days later, before Lehr could intervene. Id.
340. Lehr could have, but did not, register himself as a putative father who intended to claim paternity. Id. at 2987
n.4 (quoting Act of July 24, 1976, ch. 665, § 2, 1976 N.Y. Laws 1387, 1388-89 (current version at N.Y. Soc. SERV.
LAW § 372-C (McKinney 1983))). Registration would have assured him of notice and participation rights in the adoption
proceeding and would also have been official evidence of his interest in the child. Id. at 2987-88, 2988 n.5 (quoting Act
of July 24, 1976, ch. 665, § 3, 1976 N.Y. Laws 1387, 1389-90 (codified as amended at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § I l-a(2)
(McKinney 1977)) (amended 1980)).
341. An unwed father living with his child at the time an adoption proceeding is initiated is also entitled to notice and
participation rights in the proceeding. Id. at 2987-88, 2988 n.5 (quoting Act of July 24, 1976, ch. 665, § 3, 1976 N.Y.
Laws 1387, 1389-90 (codified as amended at N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § Il-a(2) (McKinney 1977)) (amended 1980)).
342. These facts, along with the facts that Lehr's name was not on the child's birth certificate, he had not been
married to the child's mother, he had not been adjudicated as the child's father, and the mother had not identified him as
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establish conclusively that Lehr did not now want to take advantage of his opportu-
nity as a biological father to establish a protectible relationship with his child.343
Actually, the judge hearing the case knew, when he issued the decree of adoption,
that Lehr's petition for legitimation and visitation was pending in another court.
344
The New York court, in effect, made two implicit determinations en route to its
decision to decree the adoption without notifying Lehr or allowing his participation.
It determined, first, without notice to or participation by Lehr, that Lehr did not have
either an existing relationship with his child or a viable opportunity interest in es-
tablishing a relationship with his child. It determined, second, that Lehr need not be
notified of or allowed to participate in the adoption of his child. The second de-
termination does not conflict with the theory posited in this Article about con-
stitutional protections that must be given to biological fathers when the state seeks to
decree adoptions of their children.3 45 The first determination, however, is of great
significance. It constituted a determination of a lack of any protectible interest with-
out any notice to or participation by the father. It was a state denial of notice and
participation to a father who, as far as the state was officially concerned, may have
demonstrated his commitment to his child and participated in her rearing 3 46 and who
had done nothing to demonstrate conclusively that he did not want to take advantage
of his opportunity as a biological father to establish a protectible relationship with his
the child's father in a sworn written document, were the only facts of which the trial court was obligated to take account.
Id. at 2988. If any of these conditions had been met, Lehr would have been entitled to notice of and participation in the
adoption proceeding. Act of July 24, 1976, ch. 665, § 3, 1976 N.Y. Laws 1387, 1389-90 (codified as amended at N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAw § I l-a (McKinney 1977)) (current version at N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 111 -a (McKinney 1977 & Supp.
1983-1984)). The absence of any of these conditions might not even be enough to draw a conclusion of lack of a
developed relationship. See infra notes 352-65 and accompanying text.
343. As Justice White pointed out in his dissent, there was a great deal of evidence on Lehr's side, unavailable to the
court hearing the adoption petition, that tended to establish Lehr as a father who wanted to take his opportunity to act as a
father to his child. He had lived with the mother until the birth of the child and visited the mother and child in the hospital
every day. The mother openly acknowledged Lehr as the child's father. After the mother left the hospital, she concealed
her whereabouts from Lehr. He "never ceased his efforts" to find the mother and child, and he offered financial
assistance, but was threatened with arrest unless he stayed away. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2997 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). He
retained counsel and finally filed his paternity action. Id. at 2997-98.
If the issue were whether it is appropriate to disregard Lehr's interest in the adoption because his interest had been
lost by his acts or omissions, the accuracy of that determination would seem to require consideration of his side of the
story. That is basically Justice White's point in dissent: "Appellant [was] never afforded an opportunity to present his
case." Id. at 2998 (White, J., dissenting).
Justice White's conclusion, however, rests on the assumption that Lehr's interest was of constitutional stature and
remained viable. Under this assumption, the state was restrained by constitutional procedural rules in the way it de-
termined to disregard Lehr's interest. Id. at 2998 (White, J., dissenting). It was on this point, however, that Justice
Stevens, for the majority, disagreed. See Lehr, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2990 (1983); see also infra notes 366-411 and
accompanying text. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), in which the Court said, "[Tio determine
whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest.
We must look to see if the interest is within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property." Id. at
570-71 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
344. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2989 (1983).
345. If a biological father has neither a developed relationship with his child in the sense of having committed
himself to custodial responsibility for the child and having exercised custodial responsibility to the fullest extent possible,
nor a still viable interest in taking on those responsibilities, the first stage of analysis, i.e., the consideration of the extent
to which protecting the private interest will serve the constitutional values underlying protection for parental relationships,
should result in a finding that a constitutional interest is lacking. The constitutional procedural protections of notice and
hearing, therefore, would not be applicable. See supra subpart II(A) and notes 198-214 and accompanying text; see also
infra notes 377-440 and accompanying text.
346. This was Justice White's point. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2997-98 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); see supra note 343.
1984] THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF UNWED FATHERS 359
child.347 The United States Supreme Court, by upholding the New York scheme that
allowed for such a determination, upheld that state denial.348
Lehr, then, alters the message most commentators have drawn from Stanley.
3 49
The conclusion before Lehr was that the state must make a reasonable attempt to
notify all unwed fathers of state action that will eradicate their interests in their
children and must allow their participation at least until the state makes an official
determination that they do not in fact have a protectible interest. 350 The only excep-
tion seemed to be for situations in which the father's lack of a protectible interest had
already been officially established. After Lehr, it is clear that in some circumstances
the state constitutionally may omit to notify or allow participation by unwed fathers
who never have been established officially as being without an interest and may even
deny them participation in the preliminary stage of determining that they are without
an interest.35' The reasoning underlying Lehr must be examined to determine the
reach of its holding.
2. Lehr's Impact on Developed Relationships
Justice Stevens took pains in Lehr to categorize Jonathan Lehr's actual relation-
ship with his daughter as merely "potential," and thus unlike Caban's and Stanley's
"developed" relationships with their children.3 5 2 Regardless of any efforts Lehr may
have made to turn his opportunity to establish a relationship into a developed relation-
ship, he had not succeeded.353 In the more than two years of her life preceding the
adoption, Lehr had had no "significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship
with Jessica, and he did not seek to establish a legal tie until after she was two years
old.",354 Justice Stevens did not rely on the evidence available to the court that
decreed the adoption to draw this conclusion; rather, he considered the information
presented by Lehr in his protest against the decree. 355 Having categorized Lehr's
actual relationship with his daughter as merely potential,3 56 Justice Stevens consid-
ered the constitutionality of denying notice and participation to a father with merely a
potential relationship with his child.357 Justice Stevens explicitly disclaimed any
347. Lehr did fail to take advantage of the procedure provided for registering himself as a putative father intending to
claim paternity of the child. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2987-88 (1983). That omission is some evidence of lack of interest. On the
other hand, he had filed a paternity and visitation petition before the adoption decree was entered, and the decreeing court
had knowledge of his petition before it entered the decree. Id. at 2988-89.
348. Id. at 2993-94.
349. See supra notes 326-30, 340-48, and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 326-30 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 340-48 and accompanying text.
352. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2993 (1983); see supra notes 198-214 and accompanying text. In dissent, Justice White
focused on the biological connection alone as giving rise to constitutional protection in all circumstances, regardless of
whether that connection has "developed" into something else. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2999 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
353. He had not actually supported the child. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2987 (1983). He had never lived with the child. Id. at
2988. He had not participated in her rearing in any way and had rarely even seen her. Id. at 2987. He had made no actual
legal commitment to her, unless the filing of a paternity and visitation petition more than two years after her birth is
evidence of a legal commitment. Id. at 2988-89. See supra subpart II(A) and notes 198-239 and accompanying text.
354. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2994 (1983).
355. Id. at 2987-88, 2993-94.
356. Id. at 2993.
357. Id. at 2994.
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implications the opinion might have for the notice and hearing rights of fathers with
developed relationships.3 58
The New York statute that set out the categories of unwed fathers who would of
right be notified and allowed to participate in proceedings leading to the adoptions of
their children, however, easily could exclude not only fathers with potential rela-
tionships like Lehr, but also fathers with developed relationships close to the one
Caban had with his children. 359 For example, if Lehr had actually lived with his
daughter and her mother after the child's birth and had participated in rearing the
child during that time, it would be hard to distinguish Lehr's actual relationship with
his child from that of Caban. Yet, without registering as a father intending to claim
paternity, placing his name on the child's birth certificate, or being identified by the
mother as the child's father in a sworn document, Lehr still would not have been
entitled to notice under the New York statute.36 Only a father living with the mother
and the child at the time of initiation of the adoption proceeding would be entitled to
notice without more official evidence of his relationship. 36 1 If a New York court
failed to notify a father who had lived with his child in the past and had participated in
all parental responsibilities for the child, 362 New York would be denying minimum
procedural protections to a father with the most significant of parental rela-
tionships. 363 The reasoning underlying Stanley, Quilloin, and Caban would militate
against the constitutionality of such a result, and Justice Stevens' careful distinction
of Lehr's actual interest from developed ones also argues against such a result.
364
Lehr deals only with the possibility of dispensing with notice to and participation
by a father whose only claim is for the opportunity to develop a relationship. If Lehr
had lived with his child, the application of the New York scheme to him would have
been unconstitutional. As it was, Lehr had not taken any action that made his
relationship with his child a developed one. His only complaint against the state
court's decree of adoption without notice to him was that it cut off his opportunity
interest without allowing him to participate. Lehr must be read as an opportunity
358. Id.
359. The statute provided for notice to any father who had been adjudicated to be the father of the child, had filed
notice of intent to claim paternity, was named as the father on the child's birth certificate, was living with the child and
mother at the time the adoption petition was filed, was identified formally by the mother as the father of the child, or was
married to the child's mother within six months after the child's birth. Id. at 2988 n.5 (quoting Act of July 24, 1976, ch.
665, § 3, 1976 N.Y. Laws 1387, 1389-90 (codified as amended at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § I I l-a(2) (McKinney 1977))
(amended 1980)).
Caban was identified as the father of his children on their birth certificates. 441 U.S. 380, 382 (1979). Nevertheless,
none of the facts of his relationship with his children that seemed to give it constitutional significance equal to that of the
mother's relationship would have entitled him to notice of their stepfather's adoption petition. He had lived with his
children and their mother, but was not living with them at the time the petition was filed. Id.; see supra notes 98-137 and
accompanying text.
360. Act of July 24, 1976, ch. 665, § 3, 1976 N.Y. Laws 1387, 1389-90 (codified as amended at N.Y. Dom a. R L.
LAW § II 1-a(2) (McKinney 1977)) (amended 1980), quoted in Lehr, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2988 n.5 (1983).
361. Id.
362. These, of course, were the factors relied upon in Caban. See supra notes 98-137 and accompanying text.
363. See supra subpart II(A).
364. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2991-94 (1983). "In this case, we are not assessing the constitutional adequacy of New
York's procedures for terminating a developed relationship .... We are concerned only with whether New York has
adequately protected [an unwed father's] opportunity to form such a relationship." Id. at 2994.
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case, and its only impact is on the opportunity interest of a father who has not
developed a significant relationship with his child.
365
3. Lehr and State Denials of Opportunity
In Lehr Justice Stevens explicitly stated that an unwed father, by virtue of his
biological connection alone, has a special opportunity interest in establishing a
relationship with his child. 3 66 Lehr establishes the limitations of that interest, not its
nonexistence. This subpart and the next one will discuss the limitations implied by
Lehr.
Only when it is the state (or the federal government) that acts to deny an unwed
father the opportunity to establish a significant parent-child relationship do federal
constitutional considerations come into play.367 In Lehr's situation, until the state
denied him notice of and participation in the adoption proceedings that finally and
permanently cut off any chance he might have had to act as a father to his daughter,
the state had had no part in his failure to develop any relationship with his daughter
during the two years of her life.368 It was the child's mother who had resisted all of
his attempts to assume various parental responsibilities. Unlike Caban and
Stanley, 369 Lehr did not have the cooperation of his child's mother in his attempts to
participate in the child's rearing.
If the state had offered Lehr no alternative means to establish a significant
relationship with his child or at least signify his desire to do so, its denial to him of
notice of and participation in the child's adoption would have involved the state in
two ways. First, as was the actual situation in Lehr, it would have been a state denial
of participation to an unwed father who had not developed a significant relationship
with his child in the two years of her life. But second, and more important, it would
also have been a state endorsement of the mother's unilateral power to preclude the
father from establishing a significant relationship. Through such an endorsement, the
state would be precluding the father from exercising his opportunity in the absence of
cooperation by the mother. It was this second kind of state involvement that Justice
Stevens was addressing when he said, "[I]f qualification for notice were beyond the
control of an interested putative father, it might be thought procedurally in-
adequate. "370
New York, however, did offer Lehr means wholly within his control for es-
tablishing a relationship with his daughter or at least for officially identifying himself
365. For a discussion of the methods by which a father can develop a significant relationship, see supra part II.
366. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2993-94 (1983); see supra notes 324-25 and accompanying text.
367. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law ....
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
368. It was the mother's refusal to cooperate and her affirmative avoidance of Lehr that prevented his success. 103
S. Ct. 2985, 2997-98 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). The mother concealed herself and the child from him, refused to take
his offered financial assistance, refused to let him see the child, and threatened him with arrest unless he stayed away. Id.
369. Both Caban and Stanley had lived with the mothers of their children and the children. Caban, 441 U.S. 380,
382-83 (1979); Stanley, 405 U.S. 645,646 (1972). Obviously, the mothers of their children cooperated with them in their
efforts to establish relationships with their children.
370. Lehr, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2995 (1983).
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as a father who wanted to establish a relationship. 371 If Lehr had taken advantage of
any of those alternative means, he would at least have been notified of and allowed to
participate in the adoption proceeding. 372 Thus, New York's failure to give Lehr
notice of and participation in the adoption proceeding only constituted a state denial
of opportunity to a father who, without any state action hindering him, had failed for
two years to "grasp" his opportunity to turn his potential relationship with his child
into a developed one or even to bring to the state's attention his desire to do S. 3 11
Lehr explicitly does not purport to deal with the adequacy of the New York
procedure as it might apply to a father with an already developed relationship with his
child. 374 Its rule probably would also not be extended to situations in which the
father, unlike Lehr, was without any recourse, absent the mother's good will, either
to establish a significant relationship with his child or at least to preserve his opportu-
nity interest in doing so. These situations would involve the state in the mother's
denial as soon as the state gave that denial effect. Actually, it is likely, given Justice
Stevens' comment set forth above, 3 7 5 that a state must either provide alternatives to
maternal cooperation or not give any significance to failures that result from a lack of
maternal cooperation. If the state does not provide an alternative, it must at least give
the father notice of and participation in a proceeding in which the state may forever
cut off his opportunity interest. 37
6
4. Lehr and the Timing of the Claim for Opportunity
The principle of Lehr would not apply to a situation in which a state failed to
notify a father with a developed relationship with his child of state adoption pro-
ceedings. 377 The principle of Lehr also would not apply to a situation in which the
state offered no alternative to a biological father who wanted to take on responsibility
for his child but was frustrated by the mother because the state would then be
involved in the mother's denial. 378 Nevertheless, the principle of Lehr does apply to a
father-like Jonathan Lehr himself-who has consistently and continually tried to
take on responsibility for his child--even to the point of filing a paternity and
visitation action that was pending when the adoption decree was issued.379
371. Lehr could have, at any time prior to the adoption, sought adjudication of himself as the father of his child. Act
of July 24, 1976, ch. 665, § 3, 1976 N.Y. Laws 1387, 1389 (codified as amended at N.Y. Doma. REL. LAW § Ill-a
(McKinney 1977)) (amended 1980), quoted in Lehr, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2988 n.5 (1983). But most significantly, he could
have established himself as a person entitled to notice and participation merely by filing a simple notice of his intent to
claim paternity of the child. Id. At the very least he had the means for keeping his opportunity interest alive.
372. Id. See infra notes 441-517 and accompanying text for a discussion of the substantive standards that must
govern if the opportunity interest is still a viable one.
373. The term "grasp" is Justice Stevens'. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2993 (1983). It should seem rather apparent at this
point that Lehr was incredibly inept in his attempts to establish a relationship with his daughter. He went to the trouble of
hiring a detective to search out the child and her mother, id. at 2997, but he never discovered the availability of
self-registration. Further, even after he obtained an attorney, he still failed to take the simple step of registering himself as
a person interested in claiming paternity of the child. Id. (counsel retained at least by early December 1978; adoption
petition not filed until December 21, 1978; decree not entered until March 7, 1979).
374. See supra notes 352-65, and accompanying text.
375. See supra note 370 and accompanying text.
376. See infra notes 441-517 and accompanying text for a discussion of the substantive standards.
377. See supra notes 352-65 and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 366-76 and accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 331-48 and accompanying text.
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The principle's effect on Lehr, however, was of no concern to Justice Stevens
because his only concern was that the New York statutory scheme reach those fathers
with actually established relationships. 380 In his words, the New York scheme "auto-
matically provides notice to seven categories of putative fathers who are likely to
have assumed some responsibility for the care of their natural children." 381 The
scheme might be inadequate if the father's entitlement to notice were entirely within
someone else's control382 and if the scheme "were likely to omit many responsible
fathers.", 383 It would not be inadequate if, as was the case in Lehr, it were likely to
omit many fathers like Lehr who had failed to turn their opportunity interests into
developed relationships. Lehr's problem was not that he, a man with a significant
constitutional interest in establishing a relationship with his child, was denied basic
notice rights because he had not complied with a statute that included most fathers
with significant constitutional interests like his. Lehr's problem was rather that he, a
man without a current, significant constitutional interest, was denied notice for fail-
ing to comply with a statute that does include most fathers who do have current,
significant constitutional interests.3 84 The nature of Lehr's interest is different from
the nature of the interests of those fathers who are most likely to be reached by the
New York notice procedures. 3
85
Lehr's interest in his child required no special treatment by the state because it
was no longer of any constitutional significance. 386 Lehr's interest was never trans-
formed from the opportunity that is the right of every biological father into a de-
veloped parent-child relationship that is identified by commitment to and responsibil-
ity for the child. For more than two years, he had tried and consistently failed to grasp
his opportunity to play an important part in his child's life. Consideration of the
constitutional values served by the opportunity right leads to a conclusion that timeli-
ness is required of parents who would grasp the opportunity, regardless of the
blamelessness of the parent who, like Lehr, just does not grasp it in time.
Part II of this Article established the principle that the Constitution protects only
the parent-child relationships of biological parents who have actually committed
themselves to their children and exercised responsibility for rearing their children.
That principle was derived in large part from a theory that the process of defining
which relationships are constitutionally significant includes a consideration of the
public interests served by protection. Parents who commit themselves to their chil-
dren and take responsibility for rearing their children serve the fundamental public
interest in assuring proper care for children. 387 The underlying premise of part III is
380. See supra notes 352-76.
381. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2994 (1983).
382. Id. at 2995; see supra notes 366-76 and accompanying text.
383. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2994-95 (1983).
384. Thus, when Justice Stevens stated that the New York procedures adequately protected Lehr's "inchoate interest
in establishing a relationship with Jessica," 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2995 (1983), what the procedures protected was Lehr's
original interest in establishing a protected relationship with his daughter. He could have originally taken advantage of the
procedures to establish such a relationship.
385. And, of course, it was Justice Stevens' identification of Lehr's interest as being different in nature from the
interests of other fathers that started the whole process. Id. at 2990.
386. See infra notes 441-517 for a discussion of the applicable substantive standards.
387. See supra subpart II(A). See generally supra part II.
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that the biological connection itself gives biological parents a constitutionally signifi-
cant interest in taking responsibility for their children-the opportunity interest.
388
But one of the most basic reasons for protecting those parents who do commit
themselves to their children and take responsibility for rearing the children requires
that the opportunity be grasped quickly or not at all.
Children are not static objects. They grow and develop, and their proper growth
and development require more than day-to-day satisfaction of their physical needs.
Their growth and development also require day-to-day satisfaction of their emotional
needs, and a primary emotional need is for permanence and stability. 389 Only when
their emotional needs are satisfied can children develop the emotional attachments
that have independent constitutional significance. 390 A child's need for permanence
and stability, like his or her other needs, cannot be postponed. It must be provided
early. 39' That need for early assurance of permanence and stability is an essential
factor in the constitutional determination of whether to protect a parent's relationship
with his or her child. The basis for constitutional protection is missing if the parent
seeking it does not take on the parental responsibilities timely. The opportunity is
fleeting. If it is not, or cannot, be grasped in time, it will be lost. Any opportunity that
Lehr may have had at the time of, or shortly after, the birth of his child was lost by the
time he finally took official action to compel the child's mother to let him share in the
rearing of their child.
The main significance of Lehr, then, is its indication that the opportunity interest
of every biological father in establishing a constitutionally protected parent-child
relationship is of constitutional significance for only a limited time. Nevertheless,
what constitutes a limited time depends on the circumstances under which the state is
acting.
When the state failed to notify Jonathan Lehr of the proceedings leading to his
daughter's adoption, the child was already more than two years old.392 When
Quilloin tried to turn his potential relationship with his son into a developed one, the
boy was more than eleven years old. 3 93 The ages of the children were, of course,
relevant to the issue of timeliness. In addition, however, the decree sought in both of
the cases was adoption by the children's stepfathers with whom the children had lived
in de facto parent-child relationships for a long time. 394 In Lehr Justice Stevens
referred to Jessica's relationship with her stepfather as an "established" one.395 In
Quilloin Justice Marshall referred to the child's relationship with his mother and
stepfather as a "family unit already in existence." ' 396 In both cases, someone else
had, in the absence of any state authorization, taken on the parental responsibilities
that the unwed father had failed to assume. The children were living with their
388. See supra notes 294-325 and accompanying text.
389. GFS I, supra note 14, at 31-40; GFS 11, supra note 14, at 3-14.
390. See Lehr, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2993 (1983); see also supra subpart H(A) and notes 98-137 and accompanying text.
391. See GFS I, supra note 14, at 31-40; GFS II, supra note 14, at 3-14.
392. Lehr, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2987 (1983).
393. Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246, 247 (1978).
394. Lehr, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2987 (1983) (21 months); Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246, 247 (1978) (more than nine years).
395. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2995 n.22 (1983).
396. 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
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stepfathers; the stepfathers were presumably participating in the children's rearing,
contributing to their support, giving them guidance and discipline, and establishing
the emotional attachments that arise from such close association. 397 When the state
was finally asked to validate those existing parent-child relationships, 398 not only had
a great deal of time passed since the children's births, but a great deal of time had
passed since others had independently stepped into the fathers' positions.
The father's opportunity interest is of limited duration as a constitutionally
significant interest because of the child's need for early permanence and stability in
parental relationships. That need is a part of the constitutional values to be taken into
account in defining a constitutionally significant interest. 399 In both Lehr and
397. In short, the stepfathers were performing all the "duties" that give rise to the "rights" of biological parents.
See supra subpart II(A). See generally supra part 11.
398. Each stepfather filed a petition to adopt the child. Lehr, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2987 (1983); Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246,
247 (1978). By the adoption decree the state would validate the relationships. See supra notes 1-17 and accompanying
text.
399. See supra notes 387-91 and accompanying text.
Among other commentators who have focused on the child's needs for both an early development of a parent-child
relationship and maintenance of the relationship once it has begun, regardless of whether the relationship is with a
biological parent and regardless of whether the child's biological parents are fit, are the following:
(1) Authors Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, in both of their books, advocate maintenance of and legal autonomy for a
child's relationship with a "psychological parent" who "wants" the child. GFS I, supra note 14, at 20-23, 53-64; GFS
II, supra note 14, at 3-14. A "psychological parent" is one who, "on a continuing, day-to-day basis, through interaction,
companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs for a parent, as well as the child's
physical needs." GFS I, supra note 14, at 98. A "wanted child" is one "who receives affection and nourishment on a
continuing basis from at least one adult and who feels that he orshe is and continues to be valued by those who take care of
him or her." Id. According to Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, when the original placement decision is made, the critical
goals are early placement of the child with parents, whether biological, adoptive, or foster, who want to and will be the
child's psychological parents, id. at 17-23, 40-49, 53-64; GFS 11, supra note 14, at 3-14, and maintenance of the
psychological parent-child relationship once it has developed. GFS I, supra note 14, at 31-40; GFS 11, supra note 14, at
3-14. For Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, then, the parental "right" involved in disputes over the custody of children is the
"right" of those with whom the child is placed to become his or her psychological parents and the "right" of the child's
psychological parents to maintain their relationship with the child. GFS It, supra note 14, at 3-14. Any "opportunity
interest" belongs to whomever the child happens to be placed with at birth. Id. This theory neither supports nor denies
recognition of a legal right in biological parents to become the child's psychological parents, but it does deny recognition
of a legal right in biological parents to supplant others who have already become the child's psychological parents.
The Court, in its development of the constitutional theory of parental rights, has given attention to the early
development of emotional bonds between a child and a committed adult caretaker. See, e.g., supra notes 27-61, 389-98,
and accompanying text. Indeed, in O.F.F.E.R., 431 U.S. 816, 844 n.52 (1977), the Court explicitly referred to
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit. The Court did not, however, recognize a "psychological parent" theory as part of
constitutional theory; rather, it focused on "the legal consequences of the undisputed fact that the emotional ties between
foster parent and foster child are in many cases quite close, and undoubtedly in some as close as those existing in
biological families." Id. For the Court, the pertinent point for the legal status of children and parents is the fact, whether
psychological or sociological, that emotional bonds do develop between children and those who are committed to caring
for them and do care for them. The Court has also emphasized the protection to be given to biological parents who have
developed emotional bonds with their children. See, e.g., id. at 844-46; see also supra subpart II(A). Finally, the Court
has certainly supported the maintenance of the relationship between a biological parent and the child for whom he or she
has exercised custodial responsibilities even after someone else has assumed the "psychological parent" role. See, e.g.,
supra notes 98-137 and accompanying text. This author is less confident than Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit of the law's (or
the psychologists') ability to make a certain decision about where the "psychological" parent-child relationship lies when
the child has moved from one caretaker to another, and it may be that the Court is also uncertain. See R. MNOOKIN, supra
note 34, at 476-79.
This Article assumes that emotional bonds do develop between a child and a committed caretaker who exercises
custody in the fullest sense. See supra subpart II(A). Those emotional bonds are a critical factor in the definition of a
constitutional right in biological parents to maintain their relationships with their children. The biological relationship also
is itself of constitutional significance, however, because it is biological parents who have a constitutional interest in the
opportunity to develop relationships with their children.
(2) Professors Ketcham and Babcock rely on the theories of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit in positing a "Basis It" for
nvoluntary termination of parental rights. Ketcham & Babcock, supra note 57, at 549-52. Thus, when a "natural parent
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Quilloin the child's needs were met by another before the natural father succeeded in
taking on responsibility for his child. 4°° In other situations, however, the child may
be without permanent and stable parental relationships when the state is asked to act.
For example, when a natural mother formally consents to the adoption of her child by
strangers, whether the child is an infant or an older child, the effect of her consent is
legal authorization of the placement of the child with a new set of parent figures, not
the validation of an already existing parent-child relationship.40 1 Protection of the
is not participating in a psychological parent/child relationship and when the child has established a psychological
parent/child relationship with the person seeking to adopt (the child]," id. at 550, the child's great need for validation of
his or her existing relationship and the concomitant reduction of the parent's rights in the child that results from the lack of
an ongoing psychological relationship justify a termination of any legal relationship between the natural parent and the
child, id. at 540-42. The Ketcham and Babcock article does not try to reconcile the psychological parent concept with the
constitutional protection traditionally given to natural parents. See supra subpart I(A) and notes 389-98 and accompany-
ing text.
(3) Professor Chemerinsky relies on Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit and on Ketcham and Babcock to conclude that
maintenance of an existing psychological parent-child relationship gives the state the kind of "compelling justification
necessary to interfere with a parent's constitutional right to raise his or her child." Chemerinsky, supra note 285, at
109-10. For Professor Chemerinsky, a natural parent's liberty interest in raising his or her children is not defined by
whether he or she has established the emotional bonds that develop during the exercise of custodial responsibility. Rather,
the liberty interest of a natural parent in raising his or her children exists regardless of whether he or she is actually raising
the children, but is not weighty enough to prevail against the state's interest in maintaining an already existing psycholog-
ical parent-child relationship between the child and someone else. The parent's interest fails at the second stage of the
analysis. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text. This Article, in contrast, initially approaches the problem at the
first stage of analysis, i.e., the first task is the definition of the natural parent's interest as a constitutionally protected one
against which the state can prevail only upon compelling justifications. See id. That approach appears to be the one taken
by Justice Stevens in Lehr, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983). See supra notes 201-14, 331-98, and accompanying text.
400. When the relationship between natural parent and child has been disrupted or has never been established,
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit advocate placement with or maintenance of the child's relationship with that person or those
persons who are committed to exercising all the parental responsibilities for the child, especially the provision of the
psychological bond that arises between a child and his or her caretaker. GFS I, supra note 14, at 31-64. This view is in
effect the one adopted in the text as the constitutional theory underlying a case like Lehr. See supra note 399.
401. In such circumstances, the mother, who would presumably have a protected relationship with an older child by
virtue of having been associated with the child throughout the child's life, and who would also probably have a protected
relationship with an infant by virtue of her pregnancy and close association with the child at birth and shortly thereafter,
see Caban, 441 U.S. 380, 404-07 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting), would be giving up her interest and, therefore, her
relationship with the child should be considered no further in the adoption process. See supra notes 1-17 and accompany-
ing text for discussion of effect of consent to adoption decree. See infra notes 446-58 and accompanying text for further
discussion of this problem.
It is important to keep in mind, however, that not all adoptions are with strangers to the child. For example, the
mother's consent may be to adoption by caretakers with whom the child has lived for a long time. Further, while adoptive
placement may be with strangers, by the time the decree is entered, the adoptive parents may be "strangers" no more. For
example, in W. E. J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1979), by the time the father's claim
for an opportunity to act as a father to his child was decided by the appellate court, the child had been with the "stranger"
adoptive parents for the entire 16 months of his life, except for a few days after his birth. See infra notes 470-86 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this kind of situation.
When the mother formally consents to the adoption of her child, whether the adoption is a private one or through an
agency, the state immediately becomes involved in the process because of its parens patrlae interest in assuring that
children without their natural protectors are being protected. See generally H. Ct.ARK, supra note 9, §§ 18.1, .3, .4, .8.
Thus, in Arizona, a parent may consent to adoption by a specific private person or to placement for adoption by a
state agency or by a state authorized agency. Attz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-107(D) (Supp. 1974-1983). If the parent places
the child with a private couple and consents to their adoption of the child, the adoptive couple must either be certified by a
state court as acceptable to adopt children, id. § 8-105(A), or petition the state court within five days of receiving custody
of the child for permission to retain custody pending such certification, id. § 8-108(A). Further, before the adoptive
parents can petition to adopt the particular child, a certificate of their acceptability to adopt that child must be issued by the
state court. Id. §§ 8-105(D), (G), (1), 8-109(A)(2). If the placement is to be made by an authorized private agency or a
state agency, both certificates of suitability to adopt are still required, but an order allowing for custody pending such
certification is unnecessary. Id. § 8-108(C)(4). In that event, however, the state, either through its agency or through a
private agency under strict statutory and administrative guidelines, will be making the placement. See id. §§ 8-101(2),
-105(A), -107(D)(), -108(C)(4); see also id. § 8-503 (duties of the Arizona State Department of Economic Security
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father's opportunity interest in such circumstances would not run afoul of the public
value in early permanence and stability because there would be no present per-
manence and stability. Protection of the father's opportunity interest, on the other
hand, assuming his willingness to take on all of the parental responsibilities, includ-
ing providing a home for the child,40 2 would assure permanence and stability for the
future. Under these circumstances, the father's opportunity interest, provided he has
not otherwise defaulted,40 3 should still be considered of constitutional significance
because protection of his interest would not disserve any of the public values that
justify protection. 4 0 Those values would have been best served by early and per-
manent custodial care, 40 5 but when maintenance of the early care is no longer possi-
ble, the next best choice must be made.
Whether the natural father's interest has lapsed because of passage of time, then,
depends on the circumstances in which the state is acting. The time limitation per se
applies only when another man has independently taken on the responsibilities of
fatherhood for the child and asks the state to validate an already existing relationship.
If the mother of a child consents to the child's adoption by strangers, the state still is
required under the principles of Stanley,40 6 unaltered by the Lehr opinion, to notify
and allow participation by a natural father who, like Lehr, has done nothing to
evidence officially a waiver or loss of his interest in his child.40 7 Failure to attempt to
notify a father in this circumstance under a scheme like New York's should be
unconstitutional even after Lehr.
In his dissent to the Lehr opinion, Justice White took issue with Justice Stevens
for engaging in balancing to determine whether Jonathan Lehr's interest in his child
was entitled even to minimal procedural protections. 40 8 Justice Stevens, however,
was not balancing a plainly identified constitutional interest against various opposing
state interests. Rather, he was balancing the basic private and public values that
underlie a determination of whether the interest has any constitutional signifi-
cance. 40 9 The constitutional rights of parents are inextricably tied up with the parents'
performance of constitutional duties.4 10 A claim for opportunity is not different from
any other parental claim; its viability as a constitutional claim depends on whether it
(DES) regarding the supervision and licensing of child welfare agencies like private adoption agencies); ARIZ. R. ADMIN.
P. 6-5-6901 to 6-5-6908 (standards governing DES in its licensing and supervision of private agencies). The only other
exceptions for the custody order of § 8-108 are placements with close relatives or spouses of natural parents. ARIZ. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 8-108(C)(1)-(2) (1974).
The discussion above demonstrates the involvement of the state in the adoption process from its initiation by means
of the formal consent of the mother, through placement with potential adoptive parents, to issuance of a decree of
adoption. Parents may informally arrange for the care of their children by others, but when they intend the arrangement to
be validated as an adoption, the state becomes involved at the very beginning of the process.
402. See infra notes 412-40 and accompanying text.
403. See id.
404. See supra subpart 1I(A) and notes 294-325 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 386-91 and accompanying text.
406. See supra notes 294-325 and accompanying text.
407. See supra notes 337-48 and accompanying text.
408. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2997-99 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
409. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text. Justice White would define the constitutional interest as that of
any biological father in his child, whether or not the relationship is developed. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2999 (1983) (White, J.,
dissenting).
410. See supra subpart II(A).
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accords with the values that justify protection for parents. Blood gives the father an
absolute first chance to perform the constitutional duties. If he fails, regardless of his
blamelessness, the critical requirement of stability for the child precludes a second
chance. 4
11
D. The Opportunity Interest After Lehr
1. When Does a Father Fail to Grasp His Opportunity?
After Lehr, then, the opportunity interest that belongs to a natural father by
virtue of his biological connection alone may lapse over time if the child's stepfather
voluntarily assumes full custodial responsibility for the child.41 2 As long as the state
did not play a part in the original assumption of responsibility by the stepfather,4 13 it
need not even attempt to notify the natural father of its ultimate validation by adop-
tion of the relationship between the child and the stepfather. But Lehr leaves intact
most of the implications in the language of footnote nine of the Stanley opinion.
4 14
When the state has no official evidence, such as prior termination, consent, or
waiver, that a biological father has lost his opportunity interest, and the state may not
assume from the combination of passage of time and assumption of parental
responsibility by another that the father's interest has lapsed, the father's biological
connection alone requires the state to notify him of proceedings in which it may
irrevocably cut off his opportunity to turn his potential relationship into an actual one.
The opportunity interest is constitutionally protected only to the extent that the
biological father who claims protection wants to make the commitments and perform
the responsibilities that give rise to a developed relationship because it is only the
combination of biology and custodial responsibility that the Constitution ultimately
protects.41 5 He has no constitutional protection for his opportunity to do anything
less. If it is officially established that he merely has sought or is seeking to maintain
his biological connection or to visit the child occasionally or to do anything else short
of full assumption of the parental responsibilities that are open to him, the state may
take official notice of his failure to grasp his opportunity to take on full responsibility
for his child and need pay no more attention to his interests.416
This official finding of a failure to grasp the opportunity can be made under
several rubrics even in the adoption context. The failure may already have been
officially established by prior adjudication, formal consent, or waiver.4t 7 Otherwise,
411. The message of Lehr is that the father may lose his chance even though he has not been at fault in any way. See
supra notes 366-407 and accompanying text. The same effect may occur even if the relationship is an already developed
one, see supra notes 215-92 and accompanying text, although that effect will occur at the second stage of analysis when
the state's interests are being weighed against what is concededly an interest of constitutional significance. See infra notes
441-517 and accompanying text.
412. See supra notes 377-411 and accompanying text.
413. See supra notes 366-76 and accompanying text.
414. 405 U.S. 645, 657 n.9 (1972); see supra notes 294-330 and accompanying text.
415. See supra part H.
416. Emphasis is placed on the taking on of all responsibilities that are available to him because of the possibility
that he may be willing to do everything possible and still not be able to develop a relationship of the highest constitutional
significance. See supra notes 215-92 and accompanying text.
417. Thus, in Arizona, a parent who formally consents to his or her child's adoption or whose parental rights have
been terminated in a prior adjudication need not be considered further in the adoption process. ARtZ. REv. STAT. ANN.
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in the absence of a Lehr situation,4 18 a finding of a father's failure to grasp the
opportunity may be made only after a reasonable attempt to notify the affected father
of his opportunity to participate. 4 19 After those prerequisites, the father, upon appear-
ance, may be found to be a father whose opportunity interest has lapsed because of
passage of time and circumstances. He, like Lehr, would have no constitutionally
significant opportunity interest.4 20 The state would not have to consider his interests
in its decision whether or not to decree the child's adoption or to declare the child free
for adoption.
The state would have an alternative for dealing with a father like Quilloin.
Quilloin let eleven years pass before he tried to make a binding commitment to his
son and assume responsibility for the boy.4 2' In the meantime, the boy's stepfather
took on all the attributes of a father to the child.4 22 Quilloin, like Lehr, may be
perceived as a father whose opportunity interest has lapsed and, therefore, who need
not be considered. On the other hand, Quilloin, like most fathers in that kind of
situation, could not be perceived as blameless. No one, including the child's custo-
dial mother for a long time, had ever prevented Quilloin from showing his commit-
ment to his son by regularly supporting him, regularly visiting him, and acting as a
father to him to the fullest extent possible under the circumstances.42 3 In con-
stitutional terms, Quilloin voluntarily disregarded his parental responsibilities to his
child. That kind of disregard constitutes a form of abandonment,424 not of an already
established relationship, but of a potential one. Nothing in any of the Supreme Court
cases announcing protection for established parent-child relationships and implying
protection for the opportunity to establish a parent-child relationship precludes a state
from terminating either a relationship or an opportunity to establish one for the kind
of unfitness demonstrated by abandonment.425 Various members of the Court have
implied that in the adoption context the state might use stricter standards of
abandonment.426 Logically, such standards could certainly include any conscious
§§ 8-106(A)(1) (necessity for parental consent in general), -106(A)(1)(b) (no need for consent if prior judicial termina-
tion), -107 (time and contents of formal consent) (Supp. 1974-1983).
418. See supra subpart III(c).
419. See supra notes 414-16, 294-330, and accompanying text.
420. See supra subpart III(C).
421. Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246, 249 (1978); see supra notes 201-14 and accompanying text.
422. 434 U.S. 246, 252, 255 (1978); see supra notes 201-14 and accompanying text.
423. See supra notes 201-14 and accompanying text.
424. See, e.g., In re Juvenile Action No. S-624, 126 Ariz. 488, 616 P.2d 948 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (appropriate
test for abandonment is whether the conduct of the parent implies a conscious disregard of obligations owed by a parent to
a child). See generally H. CLARK, supra note 9, § 18.5. The Arizona abandonment ground for termination provides that
the relationship may be terminated if
the parent has abandoned the child or... has made no effort to maintain a parental relationship with the child.
It shall be presumed the parent intends to abandon the child if the child has been left without any provision for
support and without any communication from such parent for a period of six months or longer. If in the opinion
of the court the evidence indicates that such parent has made only token efforts to support or communicate with
the child, the court may declare the child abandoned by such parent.
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-533(B)(1) (Supp. 1974-1983) (text of section effective Sept. 1, 1985).
The purport of the text is not to fit the constitutional theory into the terms of such a state statute, but to provide a
constitutional base for expansion of state grounds for abandonment if states choose to do so. See H. CLARK, supra note 9,
§ 18.5. After Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), a state probably could find, without federal constitutional difficulties, that a
father like Quilloin has abandoned his child.
425. See H. CLARK, supra note 9, § 18.5; see also supra notes 1-32 and accompanying text.
426. See. e.g., Lehr, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2996-97 (1983); Caban, 441 U.S. 380, 392 n.ll (1979).
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disregard of the opportunity to do everything possible to develop a fully protectible
relationship with one's child.427 A father like Quilloin, under a properly drafted state
statute, constitutionally could be held to have abandoned his child when he failed to
take the opportunity that was freely available to him to do everything possible to act
as a father to his child.
The abandonment that is effected by such failures to grasp the opportunity to
develop a protectible parent-child relationship could be based on a failure to assume
as much parental responsibility as possible under the circumstances. Quilloin in-
formally acknowledged his son, visited his son sporadically, and occasionally con-
tributed to the child's support, but Quilloin did not commit himself to the fullest
extent of the parental responsibilities available to him.4 28 Justice Marshall stressed
that Quilloin had never sought and did not seek, in response to the adoption petition,
to become the boy's physical custodian. 429 Quilloin's request for full custody,
however, particularly at the time of the adoption petition, would have been futile.
430
His failure to seek full custody, including physical custody, should not constitute a
conscious disregard of the opportunity to take on the parental responsibilities that
were his for the taking.
With that caveat, however, a state has several ways in which to structure a
constitutionally valid abandonment ground for termination of the parental rights of an
unwed father based on his conscious failure to grasp the opportunity available to him
to act as a father to his child. 43 1 For example, in Texas, if a man knows of a woman's
pregnancy and fails to support her during her pregnancy and remains apart from the
child or fails to support the child after birth, any interest he may have in developing a
relationship with the child may be terminated at the child's birth.4 32 Because knowl-
edge of pregnancy and willful failure to support would be established in a proper
hearing, 43 no constitutional concern prevents finding that such a father has aban-
427. The trouble with finding abandonment in a situation like Lehr's is that he consistently tried to perform those
acts which, if successful, would have put him on a par with Stanley and Caban. See supra notes 331-65 and accompany-
ing text. If he had succeeded, he too would have had a developed relationship of constitutional significance. See id.
428. Quilloin, unlike Lehr, did not try to establish a protected relationship with his child, although he had ample
opportunity to do so. See supra notes 150-214 and accompanying text.
429. 434 U.S. 246, 247 (1978).
430. See supra subpart II(D).
431. A viable distinction probably could be made between the mothers and fathers of newborn children that justifies
different state treatment of them concerning abandonment and other grounds for termination. See infra notes 446-58 and
accompanying text for discussion of that issue.
432. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02(l)(H) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). Of course, ifa state were to adopt such
a ground for abandonment, it would be difficult to say that a father, like Lehr, for example, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2997 (1983),
who had lived with the mother during pregnancy had not developed at least something of a relationship with the child
before the child's birth. See infra notes 446-58; see aso Lavell v. Adoption Inst., 185 Cal. App. 2d 557, 8 Cal. Rptr. 367
(1960) (found legitimation under a statute requiring the father to receive the child into his home and hold it out as his
own). In Lavell the father had lived with the mother for a two-year period prior to the child's birth, but the mother left the
father before the child's birth, refused to marry the father, and consented to the child's adoption by others shortly after the
child's birth. If Lavell had been the law in New York at the time Lehr started his long attempt to get to know Jessica, his
prospects might have been brighter.
433. Otherwise, the problems discussed supra in notes 328-51 and accompanying text would arise in this situation if
the timeliness problem of Lehr's claim, see supra notes 377-411 and accompanying text, is not present. The state has to
give this father a chance to refute the charge unless he, like Lehr, has let his chance slip away because of lack of timeliness
and the substitution of someone else as the child's "father." See id. Obviously, both abandonment and lack of interest
may be present in the same situation, as in Quilloin. See supra notes 387-407, 201-14, and accompanying text.
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doned his child by his voluntary failure to grasp his first available opportunity to act
as a father to his child. Paternal responsibilities, like maternal ones, may begin before
birth.434 A father who wants to act as a father to his child may be held to those
responsibilities as well as the more familiar ones arising after birth. A father who
willfully fails to take on such responsibilities may constitutionally be held to have
abandoned his child in the same way that a father like Quilloin could be so held.
The state may also take official cognizance of the father's failure to grasp his
opportunity when the father fails to take the opportunity offered in the proceeding in
which his rights are being considered. Thus, under the Uniform Parentage Act,435 a
natural father who has not otherwise been adjudicated or presumed to be the child's
father4 3 6 and who appears in response to notification that the mother of his child
proposes to consent to the child's adoption is given the opportunity to request custody
of the child.43 7 Assuming that custody does not remain in the mother of the child,438
if he does not request custody, his interests are terminated. 439 Regardless of whether
any acts of abandonment have occurred in the past, such a father has declined to take
on all the parental responsibility available to him, and the state constitutionally may
take official notice of that failure."4
2. Substantive Standards
If an unwed father does manage to traverse all of the obstacles to his assertion of
a viable opportunity interest, the state must not only give him the appropriate
participation rights in proceedings leading to the termination of his interest, but it
must also apply the appropriate substantive standard in the proceeding. The important
issue is the current significance of Stanley's message that fathers "who desire and
claim competence to care for their children" must be given "hearings on their
fitness" to do so. 4" The substantive standard to be applied in the termination of an
unwed father's opportunity interest in his child depends on the kind of relationship
available to the father if his opportunity interest is honored. 44 2 First, regardless of the
kind of relationship that is available, the father's interests, because they are of
constitutional significance, must be considered in determining whether to free the
child for adoption. 44 3 His participation rights extend beyond a demonstration that he
434. See supra note 432. Marriage to the mother before birth seems to effect by itself the establishment of a
developed relationship. See Lehr, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2994 (1983); see also supra notes 174-85,215-18, and accompanying
text. If a father is perceived to be subject to parental responsibilities before birth, and he takes them on at that time, it is
hard to conclude that he lacks the protected interest that Justice Stevens has posited for the unwed mother of a newborn.
See supra notes 431-32; see also supra subpart 1(A).
435. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT (1973).
436. Id. § 24(b); see id. § 24(a) (presumptions of paternity), § 6 (cause of action for determination of paternity).
437. Id. § 24(d); see id. § 24(f) (requirements of notice).
438. The discussion in the text assumes that the consent is to adoption by strangers, so the father would be in a
position otherwise to take on custody of the child. See supra subpart II(D).
439. UNtF. PARENTAGE Act § 24(d) (1973).
440. Such a refusal would be the clearest instance of a biological father's refusal to "grasp" the opportunity offered
him. See supra notes 412-16, 294-330, 198-214, 150-80, 32-64, and accompanying text. See UNtF. PARENTAGE ACT
§ 24 commentary (1973) (termination upon such a refusal to request custody conclusive evidence of a lack of interest).
441, 405 U.S. 645, 657 n.9 (1972); see supra notes 294-330 and accompanying text.
442. See supra subpart II(D).
443. See supra notes 215-47, 318-30, 337-48, and accompanying text.
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has an opportunity interest. Like the father with a developed interest,"' he at least
may argue "his opinion of where the child's best interests lie." 445
The unwed father making an opportunity claim may have as much difficulty in
making an equality claim for the same substantive treatment that the mother receives
as does a father with a developed relationship that does not include all of the parental
responsibilities. 4 4 6 In Lehr Justice Stevens summarily dismissed Lehr's claim for
equal substantive treatment with the child's mother by focusing on the actual dif-
ferences between Lehr's relationship with the child and the mother's relationship with
the child. 4 4 7 The mother (and the stepfather) had had "continuous custodial
responsibility for the child," while Lehr had had no "custodial, personal, or financial
relationship" with the child." 8 The distinction in Lehr, however, was between a
parent with current, full custodial responsibility for the child and one who had no
relationship with the child and had no protectible opportunity interest in developing
one. A distinction in the treatment of such parents creates no problems for fathers
who have viable opportunity claims.
When the mother of the child retains her interest in the child, however, the
unwed father's claim for equality is analogous to the claim of a father with a de-
veloped relationship in a similar situation. 449 The unwed father whose claim for the
opportunity to assume full custody of his child is asserted against the claim of the
child's mother will be subject to a best interests resolution of the dispute, even if his
rights to custody are considered equal to the mother's.
450
If the father with merely an opportunity interest seeks full custody against the
claims of persons other than the mother and relies on a claim for equal treatment with
other parents in situations similar to his, he also may have serious problems. Several
Justices have distinguished between the interests of mothers and unwed fathers with
mere opportunity claims, especially when the child is a newborn. In Caban the
majority took special care to distinguish Caban's claim from that of the father of a
newborn.45' Justice Stevens, in dissent, went much further. He focused on what he
called the "obvious" distinction between unwed mothers and unwed fathers at and
shortly after a child's birth.452 He pointed out the mother's natural condition of
having been responsible for the child before birth and shortly thereafter.453 For
Justice Stevens, that difference in natural function justified a difference in the state's
treatment of the mothers and fathers of newborns.454 One could say that the mother of
a newborn already has a developed relationship with the child, while the father has
only the opportunity to develop a relationship. Claims for substantive protection for
444. See supra notes 240-92 and accompanying text.
445. Lehr, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2994 (1983).
446. See supra notes 225-92 and accompanying text.
447. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2996 (1983).
448. Id.
449. See supra notes 225-92 and accompanying text.
450. See id.
451. 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979).
452. Id. at 404-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
453. Id.
454. Id. at 407-08.
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the opportunity interest, then, probably must be made independently of a claim for
equal treatment with the mother. She will always, under this analysis, be in a differ-
ent position from that of an unwed father.
4 55
Further, Justice Stevens, dissenting in Caban, asserted that even fathers like
Caban should be entitled to no more than protection against "arbitrary state action"
as a matter of procedural due process and perhaps to no more substantive protection
than protection against "official caprice." 456 For him, as a matter of substantive due
process, the state's use of a best interests standard satisfied the latter requirement in
Caban's situation.457 In Lehr Justice Stevens implied only that the father's con-
stitutional interest in his child entitles him to present his opinion of the child's best
interests.458 Justice Stevens' opinion in Caban was a dissent, however, and the
majority certainly did not agree with his substantive standard. Moreover, in Lehr
Justice Stevens was not addressing the interests of fathers with viable opportunity
claims. The constitutional analysis developed so far in this Article supports greater
substantive protection for the opportunity interest, as do the majority opinions in
Stanley, Caban, and Quilloin. The remaining discussion, then, addresses the issue of
what substantive protection should be given to a father with a viable opportunity
claim.
If the adoption sought is an adoption by strangers, the father's opportunity to
establish a protected relationship must prevail in the absence of his unfitness. 459 This
conclusion derives from a consideration of the values served by protecting the natural
father's interest. By definition, the relationship that he seeks to establish is a com-
plete custodial relationship.4 60 When the adoption petitioners are strangers to the
child, there is no one else with a constitutional claim to custody of the child. 46' The
father's constitutional right as a biological father is to meet the basic custodial needs
of his child. The state may not deny him that right unless he is incapable of fulfilling
those needs. In these circumstances, the biological father with only an interest in the
opportunity to take on custodial responsibility has an interest of as much con-
stitutional significance as that of a father like Stanley or Caban. He stands ready and
able to act as a father to his child in every important way, and his biological connec-
tion alone gives him the primary right to do so. Therefore, the state must use a fitness
standard to deny him custody of his child.4 62
Unlike the father with an already developed relationship, the biological father
with only an opportunity interest cannot claim that he, as opposed to the adoptive
parents, is in the best position to serve the child's needs because he already has a
455. This conclusion might have implications for the discussion of conflicts between mothers and fathers over
custody of their children. See supra notes 225-92 and accompanying text. See supra note 432 for discussion of a situation
in which it would be hard for a state to deny equal treatment to a father.
456. 441 U.S. 380, 414 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
457. Id.
458. See 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2994 (1983).
459. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the meaning of the term "'unfitness." This
standard appears to be the one posited by UNtIF. PARENTAOC ACr § 24(d) commentary (1973).
460. See supra subpart II(A); see also notes 65-197, 215-92, and accompanying text.
461. See supra subpart II(A) and notes 294-325 and accompanying text.
462. See supra notes 412-40 and accompanying text.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
relationship with the child.4 63 Nevertheless, the constitutional significance of his
interest as a biological father who wants to take on full custodial responsibility for his
child limits the state's substantive standards in the same way. The state's desire to use
a best interests standard to find the best placement for a child is precluded by the
constitutional decision that biological parents who are qualified to care for their
children are protected in doing so. 46" At the second stage of the analysis, legitimate
state interests, like those in promoting legitimacy or adoption by "normal, two-
parent" families,4 65 that might be used to argue for an open-ended best interests
standard do not prevail over the conflicting interests of a biological father who is
capable of and willing to take on full responsibility for his child.
Nevertheless, as is the case of a father with a developed relationship, in many
adoption situations the father who is ready and able to assume the parental
responsibilities cannot because the child's mother has been awarded legal custody of
the child. 466 Even though the natural father can commit himself to the child and take
on various parental responsibilities, he, like the father who has already assumed such
responsibilities, will never be able to live with the child on a day-to-day basis and
establish the emotional attachments that are such an essential part of the protected
parent-child relationship. Moreover, when the mother's husband is the petitioner for
adoption, the stepfather, in all likelihood, will be the man with whom the child forms
such attachments. When the natural father can never achieve a parent-child relation-
ship of the highest constitutional significance and the stepfather may already have
such a relationship or at least be in the process of forming one, the state may use a
best interests standard to resolve the conflict between allowing the natural father to
develop a relationship with his child and maintaining the relationship between the
child and his stepfather.467
The substantive standard that must be applied to the two preceding situations is
fairly easy to derive by comparing it with the standard that must be applied to
analogous situations involving fathers with developed relationships. The natural
father, by virtue of his biological connection, does have a constitutionally protected
interest in the opportunity to develop a relationship with his child, but only the kind
of relationship that is protected by the Constitution. If he is both able and willing to
develop a protected relationship, the state may not prevent him, just as it may not
prevent a father who already has such a relationship from maintaining it and turning it
into a relationship of even greater significance. 468 If the father is both able and
willing to develop a protected relationship, but the mother's relationship with the
child will probably prevent him from ever developing a parental relationship of the
highest constitutional significance, the state may be able to prevent him from es-
tablishing a relationship if someone else is already supplying the missing elements.
463. See supra notes 265-79 and accompanying text.
464. See id.
465. Caban, 441 U.S. 380, 391 (1979); see supra notes 265-79 and accompanying text.
466. See supra notes 215-92 and accompanying text.
467. Recall that the best interests standard must take the fact of his relationship into account. See supra notes 232-59
and accompanying text.
468. See supra subpart II(B).
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This conclusion is analogous to the conclusion that the state may be able to prevent
the maintenance of a developed relationship if, because of the continuing presence of
the mother, the relationship does not incorporate all the elements of the most care-
fully protected parent-child relationships and someone else is supplying the missing
elements.469
A fairly common situation arises, however, that cannot be resolved by analogiz-
ing to situations involving fathers with already developed relationships with their
children. When a mother relinquishes her child for adoption, the theory outlined
above requires the state to determine whether the natural father's interests preclude
adoption before it can decree adoption by others. That determination, however, may
very well not be made before the child is placed with the prospective adoptive
couple47 and, indeed, may not be made until many months after the child's
placement.4 7' The father may not know of the placement until months after it has
occurred, 4 7 2 and when he does find out about it, his claim of interest in his child may
not be resolved for a long time.473 In Arizona, for example, the statutes governing
adoption provide for placement with adoptive parents pending the decree of adoption
and resolution of the claims of a natural father.474 Such statutes promote the forma-
tion of a close relationship between the child and the adoptive parents during this
period.4 75
Thus, the adoptive parents, with whom the child may have been placed soon
469. See supra notes 198-200, 215-92, and accompanying text.
470. In Arizona, for example, placement for adoption, certification of the adoptive parents as suitable for adoption
in general and for adoption of the child in particular, and petition for adoption do not require prior consent or termination
of the rights of both parents. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-105, -108, -109 (1974 & Supp. 1974-1983). It is only the
adoption decree that must be preceded by parental consent, termination of parental rights, or a waiver of those rights. Id.
§ 8-106(A)(1). (C). Precertification investigation of the child requires an inquiry and report about the parents' unfitness or
their willingness to allow the adoption to take place, but not a final determination of either. Id. § 8-105(D).
All of these preliminaries to adoption seem to depend on a notion that legal custody of the child is obtained by the
agency or adoptive parents either because the natural mother gives over custody to them (and it is validated by the court,
see id. §§ 8-108, -105, -113) or they have been awarded custody through some other process. See. e.g., id.
§§ 8-241(A)(1) (disposition of a child adjudicated dependent), -538(B) (disposition of a child whose parent's parental
rights have been terminated). When a natural parent consents to the adoption of his or her child, that consent appears to
constitute a relinquishment of the parental rights and responsibilities tied up in the concept of custody. See supra subpart
II(A).
In the situation posed in the text, however, the other parent, the unwed father, has not consented, and his rights have
not been terminated. He is ready and able to take over the care of his child, and he has, in these circumstances, a
constitutional right to do so.
471. See, e.g., W. E. J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1979), in which the child had
been living with his adoptive parents for sixteen months, from the day after his birth, when the appellate court finally ruled
on the natural father's claim for custody of his child. Arizona requires a six-month waiting period between the filing of a
petition for adoption and the hearing on the petition. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-113(C) (Supp. 1974-1983). Several
months may pass between placement and the filing of the petition. See, e.g., id. § 8-105(G) (ninety day investigation
period between placement and report on suitability of child for adoption by the persons with whom he or she is placed).
472. In Arizona, the father need not be notified of the placement until the petition to adopt is filed, ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 8-111 (Supp. 1974-1983), ora petition to terminate his parental rights is filed, id. § 8-533. InIn re Baby Girl M.,
9 FA . L. REP. (BNA) 2403 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 1983), the father did not know of the pregnancy, the birth of the
child, or the placement until two weeks after the child's birth.
473. See, e.g., W. E. J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1979), in which the father
responded to an adoption petition filed one week after the child's birth, but his claim was not finally resolved until sixteen
months after the child's birth.
474, See supra note 470,
475. Such a relationship is of importance to the child's welfare. See supra subpart II(A) and notes 389-99 and
accompanying text.
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after his or her birth, will be performing all of those duties that, when performed by a
natural parent, give rise to constitutional protections of the highest order. They will
provide for the child's physical and material needs and will have the kind of intimate
association with the child that produces the emotional attachments critical to a child's
development. In addition, by virtue of their desire to adopt, they will offer the child
the permanence and stability in care that the child needs for proper growth and
development.47 6 The situation is similar to a stepparent adoption, but with two very
important distinctions.
First, the relationship fostered by adoptive placement is the direct result of state
facilitation.4 77 In a stepparent adoption, in contrast, the relationship is the result
either of purely private arrangements or of a state resolution of a conflict between the
mother and father, both of whom have equal constitutional interests in their child.47 8
Second, unlike a stepfather adoption in which the mother's interests play an impor-
tant role, no private constitutional interest of equal stature stands in the way of the
natural father's development of a complete custodial relationship with his child. 479
When the court is finally ready to resolve the issue, what standard must it apply
in this situation? On the one hand, the natural father, if he has not waived or
abandoned his interest in assuming responsibility for his child, and if he is capable of
and willing to take on all the parental responsibilities for his child,48 ° presumably
476. See id.
477. See supra note 470.
478. See supra notes 225-37, 366-76, and accompanying text.
479. See id.
480. The same rule applies under Arizona law, where courts have interpreted the statutory provision for waiver of
parental consent in the child's interests to require a showing of fault, incapacity, or unwillingness to care for the child. See
supra note 10.
In the discussion in note 10, supra, it was pointed out that although the Arizona adoption statute provides for
dispensing with parental consent "when the court determines that the interests of the child will be promoted thereby,"
ARtZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-106(C) (Supp. 1974-1983), that provision and earlier versions of it have been construed by
the Arizona courts to require as a jurisdictional basis some kind of fault, incapacity, or unwillingness on the part of any
parent (including an unwed father) that prevents the natural parent from assuming custody of the child or that would justify
the court in denying custody to the parent. See, e.g., Clark v. Curran (In re Appeal in Pima County, Adoption of B-6355
& H-533), 118 Ariz. 111,575 P.2d 3 10, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 848 (1978). When a parent's unfitness does not stem from
the parent's fault, the required jurisdictional finding can still be made by reference to statutes like Arizona Revised Statute
§ 8-201(11), which defines a "dependent child" as one who, among other things, is "[iln eed of proper and effective
parental care and control and has no parent or guardian ... capable of exercising such care and control" or "is not
provided with a home or suitable place of abode." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201(11) (Supp. 1974-1983).
In a situation like the one in the text, the Arizona Supreme Court has declined to rule that a child is "dependent"
when the only apparent reason the natural father is not providing the child with support, care, and a home is that the
adoption agency to which the mother has relinquished the child for adoption will not let him do so. Caruso v. Superior
Court, I00 Ariz. 167, 412 P.2d 463 (1966). Thus, in Caruso, the trial court had no jurisdiction to make any further
disposition of the child. id. at 174, 412 P.2d at 467. But see Natural Mother v. Adopting Parents (In re Adoption of Baby
Boy), 106 Ariz. 195, 201, 472 P.2d 64, 70 (1970) (child properly found dependent because his mother was in prison and
presently incapable of providing for the child, but her release was imminent); see also Clifford v. Woodford, 83 Ariz.
257, 320 P.2d 452 (1957) (in custody dispute between natural father and stepfather, "fitness" construed to require a
consideration of the children's "best interests"). The Clifford reasoning could be carried over to terminations of parental
interests in the context of adoption, although so far the Arizona courts have drawn a very strict line between custody
decisions like the Woodford cases and decisions that permanently and irrevocably sever the legal ties between biological
parent and child. See Gowland v. Martin, 21 Ariz. App. 495, 520 P.2d 1172 (1974). If the Clifford reasoning were carried
over to a situation like the one in the text, where adoptive parents have established a close relationship with the child, then
in Arizona state facilitation of the relationship between the adoptive parents and the child in derogation of the natural
father's opportunity interest, see supra notes 366-76, 470-79, and accompanying text, would raise difficult questions of
state denials of constitutional rights.
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must be allowed to exercise those responsibilities. On the other hand, the child has
benefitted from a developed relationship with adoptive parents, a relationship that has
developed because the state has fostered it. Because of the state's facilitation, persons
other than the father have performed the duties that ordinarily justify protection for
the parent-child relationship. If the state decrees adoption because of the child's
interests in remaining in his or her already established home, it will have un-
constitutionally deprived the father of his opportunity to take responsibility for his
child.4 8' On the other hand, if the state denies the adoption petition and allows the
father to take custody of the child, the child probably will be harmed.4 82
This problem cannot be solved by manipulation of the constitutional principle. It
is the state that has created the dilemma, and the state could have provided for a quick
resolution of the father's claims before the development of a relationship between the
adoptive parents and the child. In that sense the situation is unlike the one in Lehr.
483
Lehr had no protectible interest because someone else had taken on the parental
responsibilities and also because the state had not facilitated the substitution.4 84
When the state has created a conflict between the father's interests and those of the
child, resolution may be possible only in terms of the remedy available to the father.
If a decree of adoption is entered, the father may not demand custody because of the
481. See In re Baby Girl M., 9 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 2403 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 1983); W. E. J. v. Superior
Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1979); Detrich v. Sheldon G. (In re Tricia M.), 74 Cal. App. 3d 125,
141 Cal. Rptr. 554 (1977); In re Reyna, 55 Cal. App. 3d 288, 126 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1976), for an ongoing debate among the
California appellate courts on the appropriate standard to apply under California's version of the Uniform Parentage Act,
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 7000-7021 (West 1983 & Supp. 1984). Note that in California the custody decision takes on
heightened importance because California's version of the Uniform Parentage Act apparently gives consent rights only to
."presumed," and not merely adjudicated, fathers, and a presumption of paternity, in situations other than marriage or a
semblance of marriage, arises only if the child lives with the father. Id. §§ 7004(a), 7017(a), (d), 224. In W. E. J. v.
Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1979), the majority overturned the lower court's decision in
part because it had not used a best interests standard in responding to the natural father's claim for custody. Id. at 307-12,
160 Cal. Rptr. at 864-67. The custody issue is of particular importance in the California scheme, for only by receiving the
child into his home and holding the child out as his own may an unwed father become a "presumed" father with the power
to veto his child's adoption. CAL. Civ. CODE § 7004(a)(4) (West 1983). Even if he has been adjudicated the father under
California Civil Code § 7006, his consent is apparently not required unless he has somehow been able to take the child into
his home. Id. §§ 7017(d), 224. Thus, in In re Baby Girl M., 9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2403 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 1983),
another California appellate court declared that the unwed father must be given custody (and thus the status of a
"presumed" father with power to consent) unless the transfer of custody to the parent would be harmful to the child. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 4600(c) (West 1983). Even under the approach taken by the court in Baby Girl M., however, the child's
custody might remain with the adoptive parents. See In re Reyna, 55 Cal. App. 3d 288, 126 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1976), in
which consideration of harm to the child was held to include consideration of psychological harm. If the unwed father is
denied custody on that ground, the state, by facilitating the early placement of the child with the adoptive parents without
giving the father an opportunity to assert his claim in a timely manner, will be denying, as in the situation in the text, the
father's constitutional right to take custodial responsibility for his child.
482. See supra notes 389-401 and accompanying text. In a situation like this, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit would
probably leave the child with his or her psychological parents. See GFS I, supra note 14, at 40-64, 35-37; GFS II, supra
note 14, at 3-14. However, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit set a time of twelve months before caretakers who want to
continue caring for the child may seek to make their relationship legally permanent. GFS 11, supra note 14, at 46. That
timetable seems to reflect a notion that the child once lived with the natural parents, unlike the situation in the text, id.,
and the timetable might be different for a child who had never lived with his or her natural parents and had thus only
established a relationship with persons other than his or her natural parents. Goldstein, Freud. and Solnit believe that
separation from committed caretakers is always harmful to a child, regardless of his or her age at separation. GFS I1, supra
note 14, at 9; GFS I, supra note 14, at 17-23, 31-37.
483. 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983).
484. See supra notes 366-407 and accompanying text.
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harm to the child, 485 but the father should be able to pursue other remedies for
vindication of his constitutional rights.48 6
A recent Texas case, In re Baby Girl S., 4 8 7 is the best example of a situation in
which use of a best interests standard unconstitutionally denied a biological father his
opportunity to develop a protected relationship with his child. Donald Kirkpatrick
was the unwed father of a baby girl.488 Before the child's birth, Kirkpatrick tried to
support the mother, tried to maintain contact with the mother, and offered to marry
the mother. 489 When all of these efforts failed and he learned that the mother planned
to relinquish the child for adoption, he made plain his desire to raise the child
himself, and he even deposited money with the Texas court for the child's support.
4 90
The father was twenty-five years old at the time of trial and lived and worked on his
family's Nebraska farm. 491 The mother described him as a "wonderful man ... a
good man, a hard worker .... 49 She also stated that he smoked, swore on
occasion, did not keep his house clean, and was not of her religious convictions. 493
The mother was sixteen and from the same Nebraska community as the father. Her
parents refused to consent to her marriage to the father. With their assistance and
encouragement, she went to Texas to give birth to the child and relinquished it at birth
to a private adoption agency for placement with adoptive parents.494
Under Texas law, the unwed father was not a "parent" whose interests must be
485. See supra notes 389-401 and accompanying text.
486. The remedy would presumably arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). The statement in the text does not take
into account all of the multitude of problems associated with such a claim. State action and immunity problems im-
mediately come to mind. Discussion of the problems with that kind of remedy is beyond the scope of this Article. See Ellis
v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1982) (for purposes of a § 1983 action, a parent's right to retain custody is a
"liberty" under the fourteenth amendment; question whether those standing in the place of parents have the same kind of
interest; adequate state remedies preclude claim in this case).
The authorities cited supra note 285 and the discussion supra notes 389-401 and accompanying text focus on the
extraordinary weight that must be given the interest (whether denominated as a state interest or as an independent interest
of the child) in maintaining the child in the family relationship that he or she has already established. That focus, however,
does not preclude a conclusion that the state may, by its facilitation of the development of such a relationship, deprive the
natural father (or another parent) of his constitutional right to develop a relationship with his child. The child is a human
being and may not be treated like a piece of property to be awarded to the prevailing party. Nevertheless, some means
must be devised to deter state actors from depriving people of their constitutional rights.
487. 628 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982), vacated sub nom. Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc.,
103 S. Ct. 1760 (1983). The United States Supreme Court originally granted certiorari, 103 S. Ct. 784 (1983), but vacated
and remanded upon being informed that the father might have recourse through Texas' involuntary paternity statute, Tax.
FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 13.01-.09 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). 103 S. Ct. 1760 (1983). That avenue apparently has not been
used previously by a Texas father, but it was suggested to the author last year by Professor Jack Sampson of the University
of Texas at Austin School of Law. If an unwed father can use involuntary legitimation, he will be declared the father of the
child upon proof of biological paternity. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.08 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). The effect of such a
finding is "to create the parent/child relationship between the father and the child as if the child were born to the father and
mother during marriage." Id. § 13.09. In that event, the father would have the same rights to custody and consent to
adoption that any other Texas parent has. See id. §§ 11.01(3), 12.02, 12.04, 16.03, 15.02. The Texas court, on remand,
refused to determine the issue because it had not been raised at trial; thus, Kirkpatrick's claim has yet to be finally
resolved. In re Baby Girl S., 658 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983).
488. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Texas at 3, Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene,
Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1760 (1983).
489. Id. at 4-5. (The facts were all gathered from the trial transcript.)
490. Id. at 5.
491. Id. at 4-6.
492. Id. at 7.
493. Id.
494. Id. at 4.
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considered in an adoption proceeding. 495 His only chance appeared to be to petition
for legitimation of the child under Texas' voluntary legitimation statute.496 If he were
declared to be the child's father under that statute, he would be considered a parent
with the same rights and duties as any other parent, including the rights to take
custody of the child and to veto the child's adoption unless proved unfit. 497 Under the
legitimation statute, however, in the absence of consent by the mother, the trial court
could declare paternity only if it found legitimation to be in the best interests of the
child.498 At the hearing, the mother testified about the preceding facts and stated that
she believed it was in the child's best interests to be adopted by "two Christian
parents." 499 The mother's father said that it would be an embarrassment to the family
for the child to be raised in the small community where both families lived.5 °0 On the
other hand, Kirkpatrick stated, "All I can say is I love my daughter and I want her,
and she's blood, and I just can't see letting her go." 50' The trial judge found that
legitimation would not be in the child's best interests and that termination of the
mother's rights and placement of the child for adoption would be in the child's best
interests. 50 2 The Texas appellate courts upheld the trial court's determination, focus-
ing on the facts that Kirkpatrick wanted to raise the child in his and the mother's
hometown and that he had no "family relationship" with the child. 50 3
Kirkpatrick's situation illustrates the effect of a best interests standard, even
when a father has full notice and participation rights, in a contest between an unwed
father and the state over the fate of a child whom the father wants to raise on his own
and the state wants to place for adoption. There is surely no abuse of discretion in a
decision that a child's interests would be better served through adoption by a couple
who has undergone the rigors of state-supervised preadoption investigation5 4 than
through placement with a concededly imperfect unwed father in a town in which
everyone would know the circumstances of the child's birth. In Kirkpatrick's situa-
tion, however, while Kirkpatrick may not have been able to argue for equality of
495. See discussion of Texas law supra notes 10, 17. Under the Texas statutes, the father was notified of the process
leading to the child's adoption apparently only because the agency sought to terminate the mother's rights on the strength
of her consent. See Joint Appendix at 872, Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1760 (1983) (trial
court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law). An unwed father whose paternity has not been established is only entitled
to notice of termination proceedings directed at the child's mother. Tax. FAm. CODE ANN. § 11.09(a)(8) (Vernon Supp.
1982-1983). But see In re T. E. T., 603 S.W.2d 793, 797 (Tex. 1980) (implies that the unwed father has a right to notice
and participation in proceedings affecting his potential relationship with his child), cert. denied sub nom. Oldag v.
Christian Charities, 450 U.S. 1025 (1981). In other circumstances, consent to the state or an authorized agency appears to
preclude the need for termination and thus the statutory requirement of notice to the father. Tax. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 16.03(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
496. TEx. FAai. CoDE ANN. §§ 13.21-.24 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
497. See supra note 487 for effect of a declaration of paternity. Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 13.21(b), 12.01, 12.04
(Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1982-1983).
498. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.21(c) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
499. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Texas at 6-7, Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of
Abilene, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1760 (1983).
500. Id. at 7.
501. Id. at 5-7.
502. Joint Appendix at 85a-86a, Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1760 (1983) (trial
court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law).
503. 628 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982), vacated sub nom. Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene,
Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1760 (1983).
504. See supra notes 470-82 and accompanying text (discussion of Arizona process).
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treatment with the thousands of single parents who already have custodial rela-
tionships with their children, his opportunity interest as a biological father should
have prevailed over the state's desire to use a best interests standard.
A best interests standard does not adequately protect Kirkpatrick's interest in his
child. A biological father has a constitutional interest in the opportunity to take on the
full custodial responsibility for his child that is the basis for the substantial con-
stitutional protection that custodial or once-custodial biological parents receive. 50
5
The biological connection alone gives him this opportunity interest. 50 6 The Texas
court's mistake was in focusing on the lack of a current "family relationship"
between the child and her father.50 7 Kirkpatrick had a constitutional right to establish
a "family relationship." Constitutional protection for the opportunity extends only to
those fathers who are able and willing to assume as much custodial responsibility as
possible because the biological connection is significant only in combination with
performance of custodial responsibilities and the emotional attachments that arise
between child and custodian. 508 Kirkpatrick, however, was willing and able to take
on full custodial responsibility for his daughter. The opportunity interest may be
limited when circumstances that are not the result of state manipulation have made it
impossible for the father to take on full custodial responsibility, particularly when the
mother has retained custody.50 9 In Kirkpatrick's situation, however, no current con-
flicting private interests of a constitutional stature equal to Kirkpatrick's prevented
him from taking full custody of his child since the mother had declined to take
custody of the child.510 If permitted by the state, Kirkpatrick would meet the basic
needs of the child.5 11 Unlike the Lehr situation, the interests of the mother in retain-
ing custody of her child were not present. 5 2 Further, unlike Lehr, passage of time
had not resulted in someone else's assumption of the parental responsibilities. 5 13
Even if Lehr is read to limit protection of the opportunity interest to situations in
505. See supra subparts III(A)-(C), II(A).
506. See supra subparts IlI(A)-(B), II(A).
507. 628 S.W.2d 261, 262 (rex. Civ. App. 1982), vacated sub nom. Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene,
Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1760 (1983).
508. See supra subpart II(A) and notes 412-16, 215-92, and accompanying text.
509. See supra notes 377-411, 215-92, and accompanying text.
510. See supra notes 215-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of potential conflict between a custodial
mother and an unwed father. See also supra notes 446-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the possible
difference in the nature of the interests of the mother and the father of a newborn. Kirkpatrick's situation involved a
mother who did not want to take on custodial responsibilities herself, so her interest was not one in custodial responsibil-
ity. Some of the authorities cited supra note 330 would extend paramount protection for the mother's right to privacy from
her interest in not having her name revealed in published notice to her interest in disposing of the child in the way she
thinks best-regardless of the father's desire to assume responsibility himself. Surely, the mother's right to control the
destiny of her child does not prevail or even continue after she relinquishes her responsibilities and when a fit father wants
to undertake them. In Lehr Justice Stevens referred to the mother's right to privacy as a state justification for not notifying
fathers like Lehr, but the mother whose right to privacy was at issue in Lehr was a custodial mother whose husband had
taken on all parental responsibility and wanted to adopt the child. 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2995 (1983). The mother in Lehr was
not out of the picture. Further, the main privacy interest implicated in notice is the privacy interest in seclusion, not the
privacy interest in untrammeled control. See supra note 330; see also Buchanan, supra note 37, at 598 n.290.
5 11. Under the theory developed in this Article, the constitutional analysis takes account of the needs of the child
because those are the values served by the protection. See supra subpart II(A) and notes 389-407, 280-92, and
accompanying text.
512. See supra notes 494, 446-58, and accompanying text.
513. See supra notes 377-411 and accompanying text.
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which the claimant has taken advantage of prescribed procedures, 514 Kirkpatrick took
advantage of the procedures. Finally, although the opportunity interest may be lim-
ited if the father abandons the child, even if the abandonment occurs before the
child's birth, 5 15 Kirkpatrick never abandoned his opportunity. He tried to support the
mother during pregnancy and tried to marry her, and when those attempts failed, he
took advantage of the only means available to him to take on full responsibility for his
child. He even attempted to support the child during the pendency of his legitimation
petition.
Kirkpatrick's situation is precisely the one in which the biological father's
opportunity to establish a full relationship with his child may not be denied just
because it might be better for the child to live with someone else. The considerations
that go into denominating a father's right as constitutionally protected preclude the
state from using conflicting considerations to justify a best interests standard. Thus,
the constitutional conclusion that a fit biological father like Kirkpatrick has a right to
take on responsibility for his child itself prevents a state determination that children
like Kirkpatrick's child are to be given into the care of those people whom the state
considers best qualified. The state's interest in providing homes for the homeless
cannot be a factor in a case like Kirkpatrick's. Only state interests like legitimation
and provision of a "normal, two-parent home" remain as a justification for a best
interests standard in this situation. 516 But those interests, standing alone, should not
prevail. The proceeding in which the issue arose would have accomplished legitima-
tion of the child. The "normal, two-parent home" justification is the only desirable
condition that a father like Kirkpatrick cannot provide. The state's desire to factor in
the provision of such a home was not enough to justify the use of a best interests
standard in a situation in which a father who stood ready and able to turn a developed
parent-child relationship into a fully custodial one opposed the state's use of a best
interests standard in a situation involving adoption by strangers. 517 Even though the
unwed father in Kirkpatrick's situation cannot rely on the protection given to an
already established parent-child relationship, the state's preference for a conventional
home for the child cannot prevail over the constitutional right of a fit and willing
biological father to assume full custodial responsibility for his child and thereby to
establish a relationship equal in every way to that of any other single custodial parent.
The reasons for using a best interests standard are not significant enough to outweigh
the substantial constitutional interests of a father like Kirkpatrick.
E. Summary
Constitutional protection for the biological connection between an unwed father
and his child is quite limited. It consists only of protection for the opportunity to
come forward timely and act as a parent in the whole sense to the child. The father's
opportunity interest must be reconciled with the perhaps paramount interest of a
514. See supra notes 331-58, 366-76, and accompanying text.
515. See supra notes 412-40 and accompanying text.
516. See supra notes 265-79 and accompanying text.
517. See id.
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custodial mother in the child. Time and circumstances may limit protectibility of the
father's interest because the values that underlie protection require that the father take
advantage of his opportunity early and completely. A protected opportunity interest
belongs only to those fathers who are able and willing to take advantage of it.
Biological fathers with only an opportunity interest probably cannot rely on equality
claims, even when their children are newborns. Nonetheless, despite all of these
limitations, the nature of the opportunity interest certainly precludes the state from
denying it without a reasonable attempt at notice and hearing, and the interest almost
certainly is of enough substantive weight to prevent a state's denial of it by use of a
best interests standard in situations involving fathers like Kirkpatrick to whom none
of the limitations apply.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to establish a constitutional basis for protecting the
interests of unwed biological fathers in establishing and maintaining relationships
with their children. That basis has depended upon a consideration of the fundamental
social values served by protection of parental rights and a conclusion that con-
stitutional protection for unwed fathers extends only to those fathers with rela-
tionships that serve those fundamental social values. The only parental right that does
not require simultaneous performance of parental obligations is the opportunity right
to take up those obligations. That right indeed inheres in the biological connection,
but it is limited in duration and will be lost whenever a father voluntarily fails to
assume the parental obligations or involuntarily fails to assume them if the failure
occurs after a long enough time.
The rights this Article has posited do not depend on claims by unwed fathers for
equal treatment with other parents whom the state may favor. The rights derive,
rather, from an independent consideration of the fundamental rights of all parents in
their relationships with their children. Thus, the thesis of the Article has broader
implications, for it could be used, perhaps, to limit the rights of some other groups of
parents. Essentially, however, the message is that if an unwed biological father is
willing and able to perform those functions that society has always deemed critical for
the protection and development of children, the Constitution requires the state to
allow him to do so initially and to continue doing so, in the absence of circumstances
not of the state's own making.
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